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Communication is not so easy. Most people don't realize this because a lot of the
work involved in communication is done unconsciously and hence it seems to require
little effort.
For machines it is much harder to understand just what message people are com-
municating when they speak in a natural language like English or Dutch. When faced
with sentences like:
(1) (a) Only the rounded green one?
(b) That's me.
(c) Just a minute.
a machine needs to explicitly figure out what is meant by one in (a), and what it is
that the green one is only. In (b), the problem is what is referred to by that. And
imagine that (c) is the reply a customer gets when she calls up an airport information
service and asks how long it takes to fly from Amsterdam to Toronto. In such a case,
(c) is probably an indication that the person on the other side of the phone is looking
up the requested information, rather than a direct answer to the question. But how
can that be decided?
What is needed to be able to interpret such sentences is contextual information.
This extra information supplies the necessary clues to decide what is meant with
the sentence. The task of the hearer or reader of a sentence is to combine the con-
textual information with the information in the sentence. If that can be done, the
sentence can be unambiguously understood. The application of contextual informa-
tion is something that people do unconsciously when interpreting language, and they
usually do not realize that sentences may have several possible interpretations when
taken in isolation. The problem of finding the intended interpretation only becomes
apparent when contextual information does not provide enough clues. In such cases,
people experience the sentence as being ambiguous.
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When one tries to create computer programs that have to work with natural
language, the interpretation problem is one of the major obstacles. On the other
hand, computers have no problems dealing with languages designed especially for
them. It would be tempting to suggest that this means that computer languages do
not exhibit arry kind of contextual dependency. However, that is not the case. As an
example, take a look at the following lines in a dialect of Bas[c:
(2) 10 LINE 300,300,200,400
20 GOTO 30
30 LET A - 4~B
Lines 10 and 20 are strightforward. The first one will cause the machine to display a
line from the point at coordinates 300,300 to the point at coordinates 200,400. The
second line causes the execution pointer of the program to jump to the program line
marked as 30. But in line 30 something interesting happens: depending on the value
of variable B this command can possibly give rise to a`division by zero' exception
(if B happens to have value 0), halting the execution of the program. However, if
we take this possibility into account, we can still assign a meaning to the expression:
`if the value of B is not equal to 0 then assign to A the value of B divided by 4,
otherwise print an error message'. So in fact, if we view the meaning of a statement
in a computer language such as BASiC as the result of its execution, then the meaning
of the expression in 30 cannot be established without taking into account extra infor-
mation from outside the statement (the value of B). In this sense computer languages
exhibit context-dependent features, just as natural languages do. The difference be-
tween context-dependency in computer languages and in natural languages is that the
computer knows what information constitutes contextual information in the case of
computer languages, and how to combine it with the information in the statement to
get to the intended interpretation. In other words, the notion of context for computer
languages is a for~nal one.
In this thesis we try to develop a formal notion of context for the interpretation of
natural languages. This means we need to establish what information should be in
a context, how to represent it, and how a computer can use it to find the intended
meaning of natural language input.
The way we approach the problem is by first looking and comparing existing
theories of natural language context and check what kinds of information are included
in them. Next, a theory of communication is presented based on the formalization of
agentsl in Constructive Type Theory (CTT). From this theory a notion of context
follows, the information in which is compared to the inventory of proposed information
that we found earlier. This leads to the inclusion of some extra information in the
CTT context representation. Using this extended context notion in CTT, we define
an algorithm for context-driven interpretation of natural language. This algorithm
has been implemented as part of the DEtvK project, and we discuss some aspects of
that implementation.
1Such agents can be thought of as participants in a conversation, both human and machine.
1.2. THE DENK PR.OJECT 3
1.2 The DENK project
The research resulting in this thesis was perforrned as part of a larger research pro-
gram called the DENK project~, a long-term collaborative research activity of the uni-
versities of Tilburg and Eindhoven3 that aims at the exploration, formalization and
application of fundarnental principles of communication from a computational per-
spective, in order to build acívanced cooperative htmian-computer interfaces.4 This
section gives a short introduction to the ideas behind the project.
Point of departure is that from a user's point of view an interface of a conrputer
application should present itself as an intelligent electronic assistant who is knowl-
edgeable about the task that the user is working on. The assistant interface should
interact in an intelligent and cooperative way with the user, using natural language
and other modalities when appropriate. The DEtvK system tries to provide such an
assistant. It is intended to be a generic interface: its architecture as well as the tech-
niques developed and incorporated in the various modules and interfaces should be
applicable in a wide range of application domains and tasks.
The DENK project takes an approach to communication according to which com-
municative behaviour is analysed in terms of actions, motivated by a goal or function.
This is in fact the general tenet of speech act theory ([Aus62],[Sea69]) as well as of
more recent approaches to dialogue analysis such as Dynamic Interpretation Theory
([Bun91],[Bun94],[Bun98]) and Communicative Activity Analysis ([A1198]).
Many kinds of computer application, for instance in a.reas such as process control
and computer-aided design, involve interactions with representations of real objects.
The interaction with real objects is physical: they can be picked up, rotated, moved,
connected to other objects, etc. Information about the object can come through
different perceptual channels: vision, touch and hearing.
Interaction with other agents, by contrast, takes place through symbols using
signalling systems such as natural language, gestures and facial expressions. Symbolic
actions require an interpreter to bridge the gap between symbols and their actual
meaning and purpose before they can produce changes in the domain of physical
objects or provide information about these objects.
The distinction between these two types of interaction, direct and indirect, is
reflected in the design of the DENK system. Two components~in the system play
distinct roles in the user-system interaction:
. A cooperative assistant supports symbolic interaction. It interprets messages in
natural language from the user, is capable of reasoning about various aspects
of the domain and the user, and produces communicative behaviour adequate
with respect to (its model of) the user's beliefs;
ZThis section contains contributions from several people that have at some point been involved
in the DEtvK project, a.o. Harry Bunt, Robbert-Jan Beun, René Ahn and Tijn Borghuis.
3The DerrK project is financially supported by the Co-operation Centre Tilburg and Eindhoven
Universities (SOBU).
4`DeNK' is an abbreviation of `Dialoogvoering en Kennisopbouw' (Dialogue Management and
Knowledge Acquisition). The Dutch w-ord denk means think.
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. The application dornain ncodel, implemented by means of an animation system,
represents and visualizes5 the domain. The user can operate directly on objects
visible in this domain model.
A user of the DENK system can interact with the application domain both indirectly
through linguistic communication with the cooperative assistant who has internal
access to the domain, and directly through graphical operations. The user can also
interact through a combination of the two modalities, for instance by using a deictic
linguistic expression accompanied by pointing at an object on the screen.
These multiple interaction channels are depicted in the `triangle view' of inter-
action, depicted in figure 1.1. The triangle's corners are the three interacting com-
ponents: the user, the cooperative assistant, and the domain model. This triangle




Figure 1. L The triangle view of interaction
In projects tha.t airn at building multimodal communication systems there is a. ten-
dency to start working on the processing of inputs from several modalities, or on
the use of modalities for output presentation; this may be explained by the fact that
the forms of inputs and outputs are conspicuous aspects of multimodal systems. In
the DENK project we decided to work the other way round, in an `inside-out' fash-
ion, developing first a powerful representation of dialogue contexts and a model of
the mechanisms for context change under the influence of interaction with the user.
Under this approach we implemented the context-change view of communication in a
system-internal knowledge representation formalism, using an architecture that allows
multiple input and output modalities for the expression of communicative action.
STouch and hearing are not included in the current project.
6This triangle has figured in the literature ((Hut89]) as conceptually desirable but it has not been
theoretically or practically elaborated upon.
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The knowledge representation formalism that we use is Constructive Type Theory
(CTT), a versatile and powerful logical formalism, based on typed lambda calculus.
Typed lambda calculi were developed for foundational mathematical research. The
project Automath ([dB80]) showed its usefulness for automatic proof verification in
that field. The last ten years have seen it being used in the field of natural language
semantics ([Ran91], [Sun86], [DP94]). In the DE1vK project we use a version of Pure
Type Systems ([Bar92]), with extensions to capture some of the special requirements
for communication modeling (see chapter 3). This form of CTT is used for the
semantic representation of the utterances exchanged by the user and the system, for
representing the system's knowledge of the task domain (the system's gdobal semantic
conte~t) and for representing the shared beliefs of user and system derived from the
dialogue (the local semantic context, assumed to be shared with the user).
The cooperative assistant updates its information state according to the (natural
language) utterances from the user of the DENK system. The assistant interprets the
utterances in terms of their semantic content (the information introduced into the
dialogue) and commnnicative fv~nction (the particular way in which the addressee's
cognitive state is to be updated with the semantic content) On the basis of its updated
information state, the assistant generates communicative acts and~or domain acts.
The DEtvK system interprets the natural language utterances by a process that
uses contextual information (see chapter 2). This interpretation process consists of
two main stages:
1. A stage of context-independent interpretation, where the semantic consequences
of morphosyntactic structure are made explicit;
2. A stage of context-dependent interpretation, where contextual information is
taken into account in order to obtaín contextually appropriate interpretations.
The first stage is performed by a natural language parser based on the framework of
Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG, [CS94]). Semantic and pragmatic
components have been added to the standard form of HPSG analysis that make it
more suited to the DEtvK system. The parser produces representations in a format
that is convenient for the second interpretation stage. The intermediate format is
called Unders~ecified Logical Form ([Kie96]). These ULF representations are allowed
to be `underspecified' in that they may leave open various aspects of the meaning
of the natural language expression under consideration, such as the relative scopes
of scope-bearing elements, the logical interpretation of natural language quantifiers,
or the intended referents of anaphoric pronouns. In fact, ULF representations leave
open any aspect of ineaning that cannot be decided on the basis of the syntactic
evidence available in the utterance (see chapter 4). The ULF language is based on
the representation language developed in the projects PLUS and DELTA ([GR93],
[Ren94]).
The context-dependent stage of interpreting user utterances in the DENK sys-
tem computes contextually appropriate interpretations, relating content words to the
concepts of the application domain, relating pronominal anaphors and definite de-
scriptions to the objects the user intended to refer to, interpreting natural language
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quantifiers in terrns of logical relations appropriate for the application task and do-
main, etc. To be `appropriate', a contextual interpretation should be compatible with
all the context information available to the interpreter. This does not imply that a
contextually appropriate interpretation is necessarily unambiguous. The cooperative
assistant has to generate appropriate actions on the basis of its understanding of the
user's utterance, so the assistant should construct interpretations that are specific
enough to enable it to do that. If the interpretation process is unable to deliver such
an interpretation, it will engage in a subdialogue with the user in order to interactively
disambiguate the user's utterance.
A crucial aspect of interpretation concerns the assignment of communicative func-
tions to user utterances. The interpretation of a user utterance results not just in a
CTT expression, but in a pair of two expressions, each belonging to a well-defined for-
mal language. Such pairs are called annotated segments ([Piw95]). The annotations
are sets of feature-value pairs that tell the system what t.o do with the information
represented in the CTT segment. An annot,ation contains, for instance, the infor-
mation whether the user's utterance contains wh-elements such as what or which, or
syntactic inversion (can you ... instead of yo~a ca~e ...).
Part of the DEtvK project consisted of implementing the ideas and algorithms
in a working system. To be able to demonstrate the system, a specific domain has
been chosen and implemented. The domain chosen is that of the working of Philips
transmission electron microscopes. The cooperative assistant plays the role of an
expert on this domain and can help the user gain knowledge about such microscopes.
Since some of the examples that we give in this thesis are taken from this domain, and
we assume that most readers of t,his thesis are not familiar with it, we have included
a short introduction to electron microscopes in appendix C.
1.3 Organisation of the dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows: In the next chapter we discuss
several existing theories and proposals concerning the formalization and application
of context. From these, a taxonomy of contextual information is extracted. Then in
chapter 3 an introduction is given to the formalisrn used in the DEtvK system for the
representation of the system's knowledge and the meaning of utterances: Constructive
Type Theory. We show how CTT can be used for the representation of an agent's
knowledge and the meaning of utterances. From this follows a notion of context in
CTT. This is then compared with the contextual information taxonomy from chapter
2.
Starting with chapter 4 we focus on how contextual information can be combined
with information coming from an utterance. We begin by reviewing underspecifica-
tion techniques and presenting our own underspecification language ULF. Chapter 5
describes how a ULF representation can be converted into a CTT representation. The
DENK-prototype and the implementation of the algorithms given in chapter 5 are the
topic of chapter 6.




"The speaker speaks, and the hearer understands him: this is a socio-
psychological phenomenon. It is carried out in the following way: the
common culture [. ..] lives in the minds (partly conscious and partly un-
conscious) of the two persons engaged in the conversation in the form of
an inarticulated image. In the consciousness of the speaker [. ..] parts
of this common culture with its images are streaming forth before they
harden into actual speech. Before the speaker and hearer start talking to
each other, they are - if they share the same culture and dialect - united in
terms of the possibilities of information exchange that can occur between
them. When they start talking, they polarize into two parties and the
previously common, potential image gets polarized into two images: the
image of the describer and the image of the hearer-reader of the message.
It is the speaker who divides the image to begin with, but an adjusting
power from the opposite side of the hearer approaches it and completes
it - with some distortions [. ..]. The sentence, qua linguistic unit, can-
not possibly induce images and feelings in the hearer's mind; I believe
a sentence induces just the reverse in the hearer's consciousness; instead
of inducing the original image intact, it makes the listener aware of the
imperfections of language; it will make him aware of how the speaker's
original image and meaning got chopped up and squeezed into a frame
within whose confines he, the hearer, rnust now try to reconstruct what
the speaker really meant. I view speech as a bridge of integrated units
of images living in the speaker's consciousness reaching out and tying in
with the hearer who, in his turn, has similar integrated units and images
in his consciousness.
We must now notice the paradoxical nature of sentence formation. It
is in order to make communication and understanding possible that the
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inarticulated unity of the original message must polarize into the duality
of a code during speech. The speaker performs certain alterations on
this image for the sake of the hearer. The hearer, however, succeeds in
understanding what was said only if he, in his turn, manages to reunite into
a whole what was given to him in a bi-polar form of the communication."
([Kar38])
This view on communication was presented in 1938 by Karácsony. In (FK76], Fabricius-
Kovács, agreeing with Karácsony, argues that when linguistics emerged as a field in-
dependent of ps,ychology and philology, certain abstractions were introduced, one of
them being that language was studied as an object independent of the people speak-
ing, writing, reading and hearing it. Although this has been a fruitful enterprise, he
notes that certain phenomena cannot be successfully analyzed without taking into
account the situation in which an utterance is used.
Of course, he is not the only one who claims that we need more than the lin-
guistic unit to be able to interpret natural language successfully. Many authors have
proposed to include information coming from the context of an utterance in the inter-
pretation. However, it is far from clear what kind of information should be counted as
contextual. And given a certain kind of information, the question is how to represent
that information in such a way that it can be used in efFicient (or at least decidable)
algorithms for combining it with the information coming from the sentence itself.
In this chapter we look at the different types of context information and represen-
tations of such information that can be found in proposals in linguistics and artificial
intelligence. Since our aim is the formalization of a notion of context for compu-
tational interpretatíon of natural language, we are primarily concerned with formal
representations and decidable algorithms for using them.
2.2 Contextual information
Much of the semantic interpretation of an utterance is only possible if information is
used that the context would have to supply. However, it is hardly ever made clear what
exactly this context is and how it can be represented and exploited. The application
of context information is seen as the domain of pragmatics, which is usually given
t~.e task of selecting the `most relevant' of the dozens of readings semanticists are
able to extract for a single sentence or term. Unfortunately, the level of formalization
in most work on pragmatics is nowhere near as high as in semantics and certainly
not directly usable in computational applications. On the other hand, some formal
semantic theories have been extended to include certain contextual information.
We distinguish between five main types of information:
. Sitz~ational informatio~t, information about the situation in which the linguistic
exchange takes place: the location, the participants, what objects are present
and visibile;
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. Agent information, information about the beliefs and intentions of the partici-
pating agents;
. Bac~ground information, information about the domain of conversation and
information about t.he world in general, what objects and relations exist;
. Dialoyue information, information about what has been said, and how it was
said;
. Social infor~nation, what kind of exchange we are dealing with, and the roles of
the participants in such an exchange.
In the sections that follow we look at ways to represent these five kinds of information.
Most proposals deal with more than one of these types of information. In section 2.3
we summarize the different representations for each of them.
2.2.1 Contextual parameters
One of the simplest ways to introduce context information is through so-called con-
textual parameters ([Kap78]). Kaplan uses these parameters to refer to aspects of the
situation in which an utterance is made, so we are dealing with situational information
here. These contextual parameters provide a way to interpret words or phrases that
exhibit a deictic kind of reference to objects or information in the utterance situation.
This parameter approach has become more or less standard. For instance, one can
extend a standard intensional model-theoretic semantics as follows:
Let a model M consists of a triple (U, W, I) with U the universe of individuals, W a
set of possible worlds and I a set of fimctions from worlds to denota.tions (functions
from n-ary predicates to appropriate n-tuples of individuals). Kaplan extends this
notion of a model with conte~ts.
A context c is a quintuple (cagi Caud ~ cT, cP, cw) where
ca~ - the speaker~writer of c
ca„d - the audience of c
cT - the time of c
ep - the place of c
cW - the world of c
A model now consists of a sixtuple (C, U, W, T, P, I) with U and W as before, C the
set of contexts, T a set of times and P a set of places. I, the interpretation function,
is now a function from contexts to denotations. For non-indexical expressions the
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By propagating this contextual information through the semantics, one is able to
define a recursive definition of trirth. In other words, this semantics is compositional.
2.2.2 Extended reference functions
Sag ([Sag81]) notes that although Kaplan's work provides a powerful basis for the
analysis of truth and denotation in a natural language, it still isn't strong enough to
capture certain phenomena that are pervasive in language. Kaplan's work does not
take into account any aspect of ineaning that needs to be specified relative to the
beliefs of the speaker. For exarnple, simple cases of demonstrative reference can also
be accounted for using a Kaplan-style context. Take the sentence
(4) This is óigger than that.
Now we can include in our context a function cf that tells us for each occurrence of
a demonstrative term what the referent is, so we can still come up with a recursive
definition of truth. But, as Sag notes, following Nunberg ([Nun79]), the object pointed
at need not be the. same as the object referred to. For instance, one may point at a
picture in a magazine and refer to the event depicted:
(5) That should not have happened.
Another example is the sentence that Nunberg discusses:
(6) The harn saredwich is yetting rest,less.
When this is said by a waiter in a restaurant, it would probably mean that the person
that ordered a sandwich is getting restless.
Sag offers several options for allowing this kind of transfer of reference. First of all,
since the functions in the context are objects that are in the domain of pragmatics,
these contexts are subject to restrictions coming from cultural assumptions and shared
knowledge (compare the quotation in the introduction to this chapter). As such, we
might assume that the functions that tell us what the referents are for the occurrences
of demonstrative terms will give us the transferred referents rather than the direct
referents. So, in the context that is relevant for interpreting th,atti should not have
happened, the value of c~(thatti) would be the event rather than the picture. However
it is far from clear what kind of inechanism could be responsible for such functions
that always select the appropriate referents.
As an alternative, Kaplan-contexts could be extended with explicit reference trans-
fer functions cRT mapping entities that are being pointed at to entities that are ac-
tually referred to. The denotation of a demonstrative term a would then be given
by
(7) Qa~c - eRT(ef(a))
Of course, in many cases cRT would map objects onto themselves. However even this
may not be sufficient for defining a recursive definition of truth for certain sentences.
As a problematic example Sag gives a variation of the ham sandwich sentence:
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(8) There are five laam sandwiches sitting at table 9.
Clearly, this sentence is telling us there are five people that ordered a ham sandwich
sitting at ta.ble 9, rather than one person that ordered five ham sandwiches (the latter
would probably be said as The five ham sandwich,es is sitting at table 9). To allow
the word five to have its normal meaning we should not transfer the reference of the
indexical term but rather the sense of the noun phrase. That is, instead of applying a
transfer function to the denotation of five ham sandwiches, we should apply a function
to the meaning of ham sandwich and then cornbine the result of that with the meaning
of ftve.
The way this can be done is as follows: instead of a contextually-given reference
transfer function cRT we have a contextually given sense transfer function cST that
maps one-place predicate senses to one-place predicate sensesl:
(9) csT : 6~(U)wXT ~ 6~(U)wXT
Sag extends this notion of sense transfer to also include other cases than the
interpretation of noun phrases. For instance, lie discusses examples from Clark and
Clark ([CC79]) such as
(10) He porched the newspaper.
(11) My sister Ho2idini'd her way ov,t of the locked closet.
In the first sentence, we have a noun porch being used as a verb (with meaning
`to throw onto a porch'). In the second sentence a name Hotrdini is being used to
refer to an act of escaping. Since this is a rather productive option in English, the
meaning of such neologisms can only be calculated using some kind of function given
by pragmatics, as it depends heavily on cultural factors and shared knowledge. The
cST's seem to be of the right type to provide such a function.
The productive nature of such phenomena also prompted Nunberg ([Nun79]) to
note that we should not put such `extended' uses of words into a lexicon: since any
speaker can make iip new uses, a hearer should have some mechanism of finding the
intended representation. He also proposes to use functions from one type of object to
another for that. Since in general there are many possible relatíons between types of
objects, he also investigates what criteria one should apply when selecting a function.
Referring functions, as he calls them, are derived from a number of conceptually
basic functíons such as`type of', `source of', `possessor of' etc. These may combined
to create more complex functions. To be able to choose the most likely function
from among the possible ones, a value is assigned to them which reflects the relative
likelihood of this function being used. This should be set up in such a way that the
use of a composite function is less likely than the use of one of its components. Since
the identical function could be among the possible functions, its likelihood should be
highest. So, if we encounter the following sentence
1~(U) denotes the powerset of U: the set of all subsets of U.
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(12) He threw a rock at me.
we should assume the speaker meant a real rock, rather than a person who is very
supportive, since there is no reason to expect any extended reference here. Extended
reference may be triggered by a problem with the types of arguments usecl with a
predicate. Forinstance in the sentence
(13) John works for the newspaper.
we should assign the sense of `newspaper publishing company' to newspaper, since an
object made of printed paper hardly qualifies as an employer.
These kinds of type mismatches have also been discussed by Pustejovsky ([Pus91],
[Pus93]). Puste,jovsky discusses a problem with the interpretation of sentences like
(14) Mary began a óook.
Here, the verb begin, which usually combines with another verb, has a noun phrase
as argument. Now, according to Pustejovsky, begin should only be assigned a lexical
entry as a subject control verb2. To allow sentences like (14), Pustejovsky proposes
to allow type shifts from one type of object to another. So, the combination of begin
with a noun phrase like óook requires some type change to either the verb, or the
noun phrase. Pustejovsky opts for the latter possibility in this case.
To explain how such type shifts can be generated from simple lexical entries rather
than stipulating them as distinct lexical entries in the lexicon, he introduces the
notions of coercion and qt~alia strv,ct~ares.
A qualia structure is to be understood as a set of entailments associated with a
lexical entry. Four qualia roles are suggested:
. Constitutive: the relation between an object and its constituents, or proper
parts.
. Formal: That which distinguishes the object within a larger domain.
. Telic: Purpose and function of the object.
. Agentive: Factors involved in "bringing about" the object.
For instance, the word book might be assigned the following qualia structure:
(16) const: narrative(x)
form: book(x), disk(x), ...
telic: read(e,y,x), relate(x,story)
agentive: artifact(x), write(e,z,x)
ZThis means that in a sentence like
(15) John began to clean the house.
the subject John of begin is understood as being the subject of the embedded verb clean as well.
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According to this approach, a book is a kind of narrative which comes in the form of
a book or a disk or maybe something else. The purpose of a book is to read it (e is
a reading event of book x by reader y), also, a book is meant to relate a story. The
agentive factors inform us that a book is an artifact, and to create a book, one has
to write it.
Now, began a óook is not directly interpretable, since the type of the object book is
incompatible with what the verb begin expects. We have to find an element in the
qualia structure that associates the object with something eventive. This is what is
rneant with coercion.
Two candidates in the above qualia structure are available, so accordingly, we get
two interpretations: Mary began reading a book (telic), or Mary began writing a book
(agentive).
Clearly, this concept of qualia structures is related to Nunberg's use of conceptually
primitive functions and Sag's transfer functions. The general idea then seems to be
that words are assigned only one meaning (unless we are dealing with true homonyms)
and that some pragmatic mechanism is present by which extended, related meanings
can be created and recognized on the basis of functions. Exactly which functions can
be used is determined by the speaker and hearer's common knowledge. Such functions
thus belong to the background information in the context.
2.2.3 World knowledge
The background information is also the basis of the next approach to interpreta-
tion that we will discuss. Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt and Martin ([HSME88],[HSAM93]
describe a principled approach for machines to handle local pragmatic interpretation
problems such as metonymy, reference resolution, noun-noun compound relations and
certain types of syntactic ambiguity. From their assumption that to interpret a sen-
tence a hearer has to explain why it is true, it follows that to interpret a sentence a
machine has to prove the sentence's logical form, allowing for coercions and making
assumptions where necessary. This is done by backchaining, or abdnction, from the
logical form to facts and rules in a knowledge base. This knowledge base contains
information about the domain, and also about language. For instance, it contains
axioms that state which relations in the domain can serve as the implicit relations in
rioun-noun compounds.
As an example, we will look at the sentence
(17) The Boston of~ice called.
This sentence contains three of the local pragmatic interpretation problems that the
abduction strategy solves: we need to find the referent of the Boston o,~ce, expand
the metonymy involved to `(someone at) the Boston ofFice called' and determine the
implicit relation between Boston and o,~ce.
The logical form associated with this sentence is
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(18) ~x, y, z, e call(e, x) n person(x) n rel(x, y) n office(y) n Boston(z) n nn(z, y)
Here, nn and rel are special predicates that represent some generic relations. The
nn relation is the union of all domain relations that can be linguistically realized b,y
compounding. The rel relation is the union of all domain relations that relate objects
to metonymically related objects. The knowledge base will contain axioms defining
these relations.
So what this logical form is saying is that there is an event e, which is a calling
event by some person x (this requirement that x is a person comes from a sortal
restriction associated with the call predicate), and this person x is related to some
office y which bears some relation nn to Boston.






b'y, z(in(y, z) -~ nn(z, y))
dx, y (works-for(x, y) ~ rel(x, y))
All of the conjuncts in the logical form (18) can be proven from the facts and rules in
the knowledge base, except for call(e, x). This then is the new information conveyed
by the sentence: the speaker intends for the hearer to add the fact that Jl called to
her knowledge.
This is in general the approach: try to construct a proof from the knowledge base
for the logical form of the sentence. Any information that cannot be proven will be new
information that the speaker is trying to convey with the message. The underlying
picture about what communication does, is the following: a message in part contains
information shared by the speaker and the hearer (common beliefs). However, there
will presumably be some part of the message that is currently privately believed by
the speaker, and which, by the hearer adding it to his beliefs, results in it becoming
mutual belief (see figure 2.1).
Of course, we can always construct a proof for any logical form by simply assuming
all conjuncts. So to make this approach work more constraints are needed. A first
obvious requirement is that assumed propositions are consistent with the knowledge
base: one cannot assume something that is contradicted by what is already known
(assuming we can actually decide thís). Furthermore, the authors have added weights
to guide the abduction algorithm. The cheapest proof is the preferred one. This
is usually the proof that derives most of the conjuncts from facts that were already
known. Also, salience of different axioms is taken into account,. The relative weights
of the various proof operations are determined experimentally.
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Figure 2.1: Communication, beliefs and the give~new distinction
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The notion of context that this approach embodies consists mainly of background
information combined with a notion of salience. There is no explicit dialogue infor-
mation. The proposal put forward by Hobbs et al. makes extensive use of the world
knowledge that an agent lras. This world knowledge is a tlaeory, in the mathernatical
sense, that an agent has about the world.
McCarthy and Buvac also use theories as the basis of their work on context. They
investigate how different theories can be related to each other to enable an agent to
use different representations of a particular domain with different degrees of sophis-
tication. They use the term `context' to refer to such theories and have proposed a
formalism in which such contexts are first-class citizens ([MB94],[McC93], [Buv96]).
The goals of this move are given as
. to allow simple axioms for common sense phenomena to be lifted to contexts
involving fewer assumptions. This is necessary if these axioms are to be irrcor-
porated in comrnon sense databases that can be used by any program needing
to know about the phenomenon covered but which may be concerned with other
matters as well;
. to have some model of the circumstances of a conversation to allow for different
meanings of words dependent on the situation in which they are used;
. to allow systems to refine concepts as they `learn', that is, to allow systems to
reason about their concepts and never to be stuck permanently with a concept
once they have a formalization of it.
Contexts are taken to be formal objects and are primitive. Some contexts are rich,
that is they cannot be exhaustively described. As an example, ~1cCarthy mentions
contexts to be used in the interpretation of conversation. Other contexts are poor and
these can be associated with finite sets of propositions.
The main schema in McCarthy and Buvac's context formalism is
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(20) c : IST(c',p)
which is intended to mean: p is true in context c'. This statement itself is an assertion
in another outer context c. So, for instance, if we have two contexts geology a.nd
finance about geological information and financial institutions respectively, we can
have axioms like the following (assuming 0 as the outer context):
(21) 0 : IST(geology,dx(bank(x) t~ riverside(x)))
(22) 0 : IsT(finance,`dx(bank(x) t~ bankfinance(x)))
Th the geology context, the proposition dx(bank(x) t~ riverside(x)) is true, while
in finance we have dx(bank(x) t~ bankfinance(x)) available. Such a scheme could
thus be used to resolve ambiguities having to do with homonyms. Once we decide
on a. context, ambiguous predicates have certain axioms attached to them which fix
their meaning in that context.
Another term that makes use of contexts, besides ISTO, is vAt,vEO. This is a function
from contexts and terms to the value of that term in that particular context. As an
example, take the contexts NL and US standing for the Dutch and American job
inarket respectively. In both contexts we have the term average-number-holidays,
but the value of these terms can differ:
(23) 0 : vALUE(NL, average-number-holidays) - 26
0 : va.I,uE(US, average-number-holidays) - 12
To relate contexts in a more general fashion, we use a relation named specializes
which holds between a context cl and c2 if cz involves no more assumptions than cl
and every proposition in cl can be translated into a proposition in cz. Then we can
define a non-monotonic inheritance relation that allows us to assume that a lot of
predicates behave the same in different contexts:
(24) 0:(specializes(cl, cz) n-~abl(p, cl, cl) n IST(cl, p)) ~ IST(c2i p)
(25) 0:(specializes(cl, c2) I~ -~ab2(p, cl, c2) n IST(cl, p)) ~ IST(cl, p)
The ab-relations define abnormality in either the inside or the outside direction, i.e.
going from subcontext to supercontext (outwards) or from supercontext to subcontext
(inwards).
This, in short, is all there is to the theory, but the possible applications are numerous.
Contexts can be used for the representation of states, that is, the world at different
points in time, thereby allowing a separation between `eternal truths' and `contingent
facts'. The latter will be true in some contexts and false in others, while the former
are required to hold in all contexts.
Another possibility, and one which we will explore in section 7.2.2, is to use suclt
contexts to define the interpretation of terms dependent on the domain of discourse
as we saw in the `bank' example.
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2.2.4 Situations
The idea of using Kaplan-style parameters to represent information about the situa-
tion in which an utterance is used, has been elaborated further in the formalism of
Sit~cation Se~nanttics.
Situation Semantics is the name given to the application of the more general Sit-
nation Theory ([BP83]) to the semantics of natural language. Situation Theory is
based on the insight that all activity is sitnated, that is, takes place in some environ-
ment. Now, if we warit to describe an activity we cannot always abstract over this
environment in which the activity takes place. In situation-theoretical terms: activi-
ties occur in situations. Some types of activities are a.lso about situations; they may
convey information. It is these kinds of activities that situation theory focuses on.
Thus, situation theory is a general theory of information. It describes how a certain
activity in a certain situation can carry information about another situation.
Because of this focus on the situation in which an activity takes place, the notion of
context is built into the very heart of situation semantics as well. Clearly the English
word 1 in an utterance has some connection to being the person that produces the
utterance. However, who the producer of the utterance is cannot be determined on
the basis if the utterance itself, but can only be determined by looking at the situation
in which it is uttered.
In general, the situation ín which an utterance is produced contains an infinite
amount of information: what the weather is like, what the time is, what happened 10
minutes before the utterance, what color the book on the table is etc. Situations thus
correspond to `rich' contexts in the sense of McCarthy (see previous section}. On the
other hand, a situation does not contain any information about things that are not in
the situation. So, a situation located in Amsterdam generally does not contain any
information about what is or is not the case in New York. This is why situations
are inlierently partial. They may contain positive information about a certain fact,
negative information about a certain fact, or no information at all about a certain
fact.
In Situation Semantics, the ~rceaning of an utterance is defined as a relation be-
tween the situation the utterance takes place in (called the disconrse situatàon, or
circv,~nstan.ce), and a described situation. Note that meaning in this sense is still
considered to be compositional in nature. The ineaning of an utterance is still some
function of the meaning of the parts. However, what is known as the interpretation of
an utterance, that is, the information ca,r ried by the utterance relative to the discourse
situation, is not.
The discourse situation fixes the s;,eaker, the addressees, the location and the
physical dimension of the utterance (tlie speech signal), but there is more informa-
tion available from outside the utterance, such as physical objects in the immediate
surroundings. These situations are exploited by discourse participants for instance
when they use definite descriptions. Such situations are called resource sitv,ations.
We will now first take a look at the formal definitions of the objects in Situation
Semantics, and then see how these are applied to certain context-related phenomena
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in language.
Starting from the assumption that all there actually are situations, we define some
derived notions which will act as primitives in the theory:
Definition 1
Situation theory primitives
. Individuals. These are things in the real world. a, b, ... are used as
variables ranging over individuals.
. Relatiorrs. We use 1Z to represent the collection of all relations, R,~
for the collection of all n-ary relations. Elements of Ro are also
called sit~aation states, an example of this is `noon', which is a state
a location can be in. We will come back to this later.
Elements of Rl are also called properties.
One relation which is assumed to exist is the binary relation `same'.
. Space-time locations which "refer indirectly, through tense, to con-
nected 4-dimensional regions of time and space" ([BP83], p.51). We
use l, l', l" as variables over locations.
There are three primitive relations on these locations:
- temporal precedence: l ~ l'
- temporal overlap: l o l'
- spatial overlap: lCl'
Other relations can be based on these, via a construction of instants
of time and points of space out of the spatio-temporal locations3.
There is a largest space-time location lu.
We also need trwth valv,es. There are two truth values: 0 and 1. We wíll write T for
the set of truth values.
From these primitives the following constructs and properties are defined:
Definition 2
Situation theory constructs and properties
. A constitt~ent seqv,ence is a sequence y-(r, ~1i . ..,~n) with r E i2n
and xl ...~n individuals. So, this is a relation with as many individ-
uals as arguments as the arity of the relation prescribes. Constituent
sequences can be seen as basic facts.
3Examples are:
- temporal inclusion: l C~ l'
- spatial inclusion: l C3 l'
- temporal and spatial inclusion: l Cl l'
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. A situation type is a set of pairs (y, i) with y a constituent sequence
and i E T. So, in a situation type, some constituent sequences can
be paired wit.h 0, some with 1, and some might not even occur in it.
. A situation type s is coherent iff
1. ~~y((y, 0) E s n(y, l) E s) and
2. da, b((same, a, b),1) E s~ a- b and
3. ~~a((same, a, a), 0) E s.
So, in a coherent situation type, facts are not both true and false,
and the `same' relation correctly reflects equa.lit,y inside the language.
. Two situation types s and s' are comPatible iff sUs', the set-theoretic
union of s and s', is coherent.
. A state of affairs: a pair (l, so) with l a location and so a situation
type. Now it is clear why we have these 0-ary relations in Ro. Loca-
tions are not arguments to relations but are external entities to which
a 0-ary relation R may be assigned via a sit,uation type ((R), 1).
A state of affairs (l, so) claims that all facts in so hold at l. So, a
state of affair (l, so) is factual if
- If ((R, al, ..., a,~), 1) E so then individuals al, ... a„ stand in the
R relation at l. And
- If ((R, al, ..., an), 0) E so then individuals al, ... a,~ do not stand
in the R relation at l.
. A state of affairs (l, s) is part of a state of affairs (l', s') iff l- l' and
s C s'.
. A discourse situation is a state of affairs s with exactly one speaker.
D is the collection of discourse situations. We use d, d', ... to range
over elements of D. ad indicates the speaker of d, l~ the location of
d (discourse location).
. Next we introduce a course of events (coe) as a set e of triples (l, y, i)
with l a location, y a constituent sequence and i E T. E is the
collection of coe's. We use e, e', ... to range over elements of E. A
coe is meant to represent the ever-changing aspect of events as used in
natural language. Recall that one dimension of a location is actually
time. Now, these coe's are sets, but we can form from these partial
functions from locations to situation types, which allow us to assign
to each location the sets of `things that happened then and there':
Given a coe e we define e' as the function defined by l E dom(e`)
iff (l,y,i) E e for some y,i, and for l E dom(e`), e`(l) -{(y,i) ~
(l, y, i) E e}.
Clearly, if defined on a location l, e'(l) is a situation type.
. To abstract over individuals, relations and locations, situation theory
comes with its own way of abstraction: using basic indeterminates.
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These are nothing but (typed) placeholders for individua.ls, relations
and locations.
As a notational convention we will use n, b, ... as individual indeter-
minates, r, s, ... as relation indeterminates and l, l', ... as location
indeterminates.
. An event type is like a coe but individual, relation and location inde-
terminates may be used instead of their `determinate' counterparts.
. An indeterminate4 is either a basic indeterminate or a term of the
form (~, E) with ~ an indeterminate and E an event type. Indeter-
minates that are not basic indeterminates are called roles.
. An anchor is a partial function from indeterminates to determinates
of the right type. Given an event type E, an anchor is called a total
anchor for E if it is defined on all indeterminates in E. We write E[f]
for the substitution of each indeterminate ~ in E with its determinate
counterpart f (~).
. If e is a coe of type E then an individual ~ has the role r in e iff all
possible anchors f for E such that E[f] C e map r to ~. That is, all
assignments of values to indeterminates such that the result is still
part of e, agree on the value for r, and this value is ~.
. A conte~t for an event type E is any situation in which all roles in E
are uniquely defined.
Using this collection of constructs, we now turn to Situation Seinantics proper and
see how they are used in the analysis of utterances.
As we have seen, the meaning of an utterance cp is a relation between two sítuations.
This is written as
(26) u Q~p~ e
Here, u is a situation in which cp is uttered, e the situation described by cp. So (26)
says that the meaning Qcp~ of cp relates the utterance situation u with the described
situation e.
The situation u must contain at least the public aspects of an utterance: the
speaker, the person she was uttering the words to, and the words themselves.
The first thing we need is an event type to encode this information:
(27) DU - { (l, (speaking, Q), 1), (l, (addressing, á, b), 1), (l, (saying, á, à),1) }










QBefore we only defined óasic indeterminates.
2.2. CONTEXTUAL INFOR.~I.4TION 21
If d is a context for this event type DU (that is, there is a unique way to anchor each
role in d), it is called a discov,rse situation.
Using this basic part of the utterance situation, it is clear how we can get the
appropriate semantics for indexicals like I, yo~, here and now: the relevant objects
in the referred situations are constrained to be identical to the objects that are the
values of some of these linguistic roles in th~ dicourse situation. This is how I can
be used to refer to the speaker, you to refer to the hearer, and itere anci now to
(projections of) the discourse location. The discourse location provides the context
for the interpretation of these indexicals.
Now this would seem like a fairly roundabout way to get to sornething that might
as well have been represented using a Kaplan-style context. However, language users
can exploit other situations besides the direct discourse situation. For example, the
interpretation of a proper name like Jackie, when used by a speaker, hinges on the
speaker having some individual named Jackie in mind. This individual may be known
to the hearer but that is not necessary. It is not even necessary that Jackie is a real
individual, or that the speaker knows who Jackie is, for it is possible that the speaker
heard someone else talk about a person narned Jackie, and is merely passing on
this information. Nevertheless, the speaker will have some information, some mental
representation of Jackie, and this information is connected to the use of the name.
This can be represented quite easily in Situation Semantics. Barwise and Perry
start with a simple extension of the discourse situations:
(29) REF - { (l, (speaking, à),1), (l, (addressing, à, b), 1),
(l, (saying, à, á),1), (l, (referring-to, à, cz, ár ),1) }
Not that a is just the referring subexpression. In general, a sentence can contain
more referring subexpressions, each with its own referent ài. Now, ref2 is defined as
the role (á~, REF). A situation in which all roles refZ are uniquely filled is called a
referring situationfi. Given a referring situation c for a(partial) utterance a, we write
c(a) for the referent of a.
Given an utterance a with substrings a2 and referring situations ci, the set of tuples
(ai, c(ai)) such that a is a referring expression and ci(a2) is defined, is a partial
function from referring words to their referents. This partial function is called the
speaker's connections. Note that although these speaker's connections fulfill a role
similar to Sag's treatment of referring expressions through contextual parameters,
there is an important difference: using contextual parameters, the referent function
SObserve that the event of saying an utterance ~ implies saying all of the substrings of a. So, the
cr in this event-type may be assigned to a substring, a single name, or the whole utterance.
6The authors observe that this referring behavior of names is actually an extreme instance of
a more general phenomenon, since many words refer to some concept the speaker perceives in the
world, but generally these concepts are shared among speakers. For instance, the verb óite refers to
the actívity of biting. But in the case of infrequent words of the language, similar phenomena as in
the case of names may occur: the word can be unknown to one of the discourse participants. This
is reminiscent of Karácsony's remarks about dialogue partners sharing a dialect, however, he states
it as a requirement for communication, whereas Barwise and Perry allow mismatches between the
concepts. In such cases communication attempts will be unsuccessful.
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is not an aspect of the speaker's beliefs but is assumed to exist independently. In
Situation Semantics, the referring functions are primarily private to the speaker, so
the hearer has to reconstruct them.
So from the hearer's perspective, the relation between described situation and
utterance situation is more complex. The hear~er may not know who the individuals
are that the speaker refers to with names. Similarly, he may not know the location of
the described situation (although certain constraints can be deduced from the tense
of the utterance). In such cases, the representation the hearer has of the meaning of
the utterance will contain indeterminates.
In addition to the discourse situation d and the speaker's connections c, both
of which are situations which together make up part of the utterance situation u
that is related to a situation e described by the utterance, Barwise and Perry also
introduce the notion of the setting of an utterance. Expressions like verb phrases
cannot describe situations (only full sentences can); there is some argument missing
in a relation described by a VP. A setting records the meaning of the utterance sofar.
Remember that the event of producing an utterance automatically yields subevents
corresponding to the production of substrings. All these substrings have a meaning,
and clearly we would like to be able to combine the meanings of the substrings into
the meaning of the string as a whole. Settings provide a way of doing just that.
Now, with the inclusion of settings the general schema for the interpretation of an
utterance becomes a relation between four objects and a sentence:
(30) d, c Q~p~ Q, e
where cp is an utterance, d the discourse situation, c the speaker's connections, Q the
setting, and e the described situation. Note that the nature of the setting may vary.
It can be an individual, a location, a truth value, etc.
Examples are:
d, c Q1~ Q, e iff speakerd - Q
d, c Qyou~ Q, e iff addresseed - Q
(31) d, c Qhe~~ a, e iff c(h,e~) - o-
d, c Qshe~~ Q, e iff c(she~) - o
d, c QitT~ a, e iff c(iti) - Q
The indices on third pronouns here are used to keep track of the different uses of
pronouns, which, unlike you and I, are assumed possibly refer to different individuals
even when spoken by the sa.me speaker~.
Barwise and Perry define the meaning of a definite description following the simple
~Actually, the word you can also be used several times in one sentence, referring to different
persons:
You and you, foldow me!
Barwise and Cooper's formalism as given here does not allow this.
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principle that definites can be used to identify an object by the properties it has in
some situation. This situation is called the resource situation. A situation can only
function as a resource situation for a definite description if it has an object satisfying
the definite description. So definites may be connected to partial functions from
situations to objects that fit the description. Some situations will have such objects,
others will not. The definition given is:
(32) d, c Qthe a~ Q, e iff d, c Qa~ Q, e and
there is at most one T such that d, c Qc~~ T, e
In this definition T is the setting formed by the object that satisfies the description
a. The interpretation of a definite is the same as the interpretation of the description
itself with the added requirement that there is just one object (per described situation)
that satisfies the description. Given this definition, it is easy to see that if we fix the
discourse situation d, the connections c and the described event e, we should be able
to identify the object that makes this meaning relation true. That is, d, c Qthe a~ is a
partial function from situations to individuals. If d, c Qtlae a~ Q, e then d, c Qthe a~(e) -
It is interesting to see exactly what situations can be used as resource situations for
definite descriptions. Barwise and Perry do not give precise criteria as to what would
count as accessible situations, but they note that such situations at least include
perceivable situations and situations built up by conversations, that is, situations
that have been described prior to the current utterance. Resource situations thus are
representations of both situational information and dialogue information.
2.2.5 Referents for anaphoric items
Isard ([Isa75]) observes that in a text one can explicitly refer to the fact that something
has just been said. That is, the previous discourse itself can become the topic of
conversation, as in:
(33) (a) I am a foreigner.
(b) I just told you that I was a foreigner.
In this case, the (b) sentence is obviously true (irrespective of the truth of the first
sentence) by virtue of the speaker having uttered the (a) sentence. The truth condi-
tions for the second sentence should therefore in some way be able to refer to the act
of uttering a sentence.
The same phenomenon occurs when parts of an utterance are not understood by
a hearer, and she asks for clarification of the previous sentence:
(34) A. So let's meet on (Tues)day.
B. Did you say Thursday?
This observation leads to two further requirements on context representations:
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. the utterances themselves should be accessible as part of the domain of conver-
sation;
. the context must change as discourse unfolds, since each new utterance extends
the domain of conversation by virtue of the previous requirement.
Assuming that each sentence has to be interpreted with respect to a reference point,
which is basically the same as Kaplan's notion of context as an n-tuple of parameters,
Isard proposes to associate sentences with operations that alter such a reference point
to accomplish this update behavior of sentences. The description of other phenomena
can also benefit from allowing these operations. For instance, pronoun reference
can be described using complex function on reference points if we allow sentences to
contribute to the reference point information about what has been recently mentioned
and in what role. This is similar to what Winograd did, without much theoretical
underpinning, for the interpretation of the pronoun it in SxRDLU ([Win72]). A slight
complication is formed by the fact that pronoun reference can also take place inside
a single sentence, such as
(35) ~The eygJi broke when I dropped ~itJi.
The index i indicated that it refers back to the egg. This would seem to indicate that
the update function might have to be defined on a smaller scale than full sentences,
since by the time we interpret it, some referent for the egg should be in the context.
The dynamic aspects of pronoun reference have of course received a lot of attention
and have resulted in the development of many forms of dynamic sernantic.s, such as
Discourse Representation Theory (DRT,[Kam81]). The purpose of these theories is to
explain under which conditions anaphoric elements can refer back to objects that have
been introduced in the previous discourse, and what the interpretation of sentences
containing such bound anaphora is. Take the following example:
(36) fA manJz walks in the park. ~HeJ~ whistles.
The claim made by dynamic semantics is that there is a link between the word lae
and the expression a naan. It is not just that they should refer to the same object in
the real world, but the reference to an object in the real world by he is mediated by
the expression a man. This was first realized and formalized by Kamp ([Kam81]) arrd
Heim ([Hei82]). So, we say that he refers to the e~pression in the previous sentence
rather than to something in the real world. This can be seen more clearly in so-called
donkey sentences:
(37) ~Every farmerJ` who owns ~a donkeyJ~ beats ~itJ~ .
Clearly, it cannot refer to any particular donkey in the world. It can only refer back to
the referent introduced by the noun phrase a donkey. So a theory of how this linkage
works should at some level have objects that pronouns can refer to, separate from the
objects in the domain. These intermediate level objects are usually called discourse
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referents. Dynamic semantics therefore is a theory of how discourse referents are
created and used. The discourse referents are a formalization of part of the dialogue
lI1fOI'mat10I1.
Anaphoric expression don't need to pick up the exact discourse referents intro-
duced ( [vD91]). There is a whole range of possibilitiesa:
(38) [A manJ` entered the room. [HeJt wore a blue sweater.
(39) [A manJ` entered the room. [The manJi wore a blue sweater.
(40) [A painterJ` entered tlce room. [The artistJi wore a bl~ae sweater.
(41) [An artistJ` entered the room. "[The painterJti wore a Lhie sweater.
(42) [A manJ` and [a womanJ~ entered the roona. [TheyJt~~ wore blue sweaters.
(43) [A married coupleJ` entered the room. [The manJ, wore a blue sweater.
(44) [A carJ` entered the village. [The driverJZ wore a blue sweater.
(45) [A man was killedJ`. Joh,n saw [itJt on the news
In (38) we have the simplest case: the discourse referent itself is picked up by an
anaphor. In (39) we have another simple case: a definite picks up the discourse
referent. itself. In (40) we see that the noun used in the definite description need
not be identical to the one in the referent expression. But when we compare this to
the obviously awkward reference in (41), we see that the noun is only allowed to be
less specific, so a referential expression should not contain a more specific noun. (42)
and (43) show we can refer back both to combinations of referents and projectiorrs
(subsets) of referents. Note that the latter involves world knowledge. This is a special
case of the use of the definite in (44). Here we see that the anaphor doesn't really
refer back to the object itself, but to an object that stands in a unique relation to
it. This is similar, but not identical, to what we have seen in section 2.2.2, where we
saw the use of special reference transfer fimctions to get from one sense of a word to
another. We will come back to this later.
The essential feature of dynamic semantics, is, as the name already suggests, that
meaning is dynamic. What tlris means in the case of dynamic semantics is that the
meaning of a sentence is seen as a relation between context states. It is also possible
to view the meaning of a sentence as a function: given an input state, we can calculate
a set of output states. In this view, a sentence is an update of the context, if we define
the context to mean the current context state. The exact nature of these context states
and how to define the relation between them is the subject of dynamic semantics.
The solution to the puzzle of donkey sentences is based on the following properties
of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, [Kam81], [KR93]):
BExamples based on [vdB96~.
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. Indefinites are treated as free variables. So, a donkey will be translated as
donkey(~) .
. Every is translated as an operator capable of binding multiple variables. To be
precise: ever,y will bind any free variable within its scope.






A DRS is built up from the following expressions:
. A non-empty set of constants C
. A finite set of variables V
. DM - CUV, a finite set of discourse markers
. A non-empty set of relation symbols R, with fixed arity
. ' -' and ' ~', representing identity (between discourse
and implica.tion (between DRSs)
Conditions, DRS
The sets COND of conditions and DRS of DRSs
markers)
are given by:
. If R ER with arity k, and dl ... d~. EDM
then R(di . . . d~ ) ECOND
. If di,dz EDM then (di - dz) ECOND
. If Ki,Kz EDRS then (Kr ~ Kz) ECOND
. If U CDM and C CCOND then ~U, C) EDRS
So, a DRS consists of a set of discourse markers and a set of conditions. Usually a
graphical notation is used for this: a box divided into 2 parts. The top part contains
the discourse markers, the lower part contains the conditions.
Processing a sentence is done by applying a number of Discourse Construction
Rules. This will lead to the following DRS for our example donkey sentence (37),
repeat.ed here for convenience:





~ beat i( '~z)r
own(Z,.7i) ~z -7i
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Note the translation of the pronoun it: it initially gets assigned a fresh discourse
marker jz. Anaphora resolution is assumed to provide t,he identification of this fresh
rnarker with an accessible, mrarker ( in this case j~ ). R'e will come back to the notion
of accessibility later.
To save space we will also use a linear representation of DRSs. A DRS is repre-
sented as a list [U ~ C] with U the discourse markers, and C the conditions.




A model NI for DRS is a pair (D, I) where D is a nonempty set
(the domain) and I a function that assigns each constant in C an
element, of D and each element in R of arity k a k-ary relation in 111.
I('-') -identity.
2. Embedding
An embedding is a partial function of type DM~ D. This is a func-
tion that is consistent with the mapping that I does for the constants,
and it also provides interpretations for some of the variables.
3. Extending embedding
Let E CDM. Tlren an embedding g extends an ernbedding f (writ-
ten as f~F g) iff dom(g)-dom( f)UE and f C g. So, g assigns
the same values to the domain of f, but also assigns values to the
discourse markers in E.
4. Verification
Let Dm([U ~ C]) - U and cotvD([U ~ C]) - C.
Let f be an embedding. The verification relation (~) between em-
beddings and conditions and DRSs is recursively defined as follows:
. f ~ R(di , . . . , d~.) iff the tuple ( f (dr), . . . , f (d~ ) ) E I (R), so
f verifies a relation iff the tuple formed by the values of the
discourse markers with respect to f, is a member of the inter-
pretation of the relation.
. If T CCOND, f~ T iff for each C E T, f~ C. A set of
consitions is verified iff each condition is verified.
. Let K be a DRS. f~ K iff Dtvt(IC) Cdom( f) and f ~coND(K).
A DRS is verified if the embedding is defined on all discourse
markers, and all conditions are verified.
' f~(Kr ~ K2) lfi f19((f ~DM(K,) 9 I~ g ~COND(Kl)) -3
~h(9 ~D[v[(x21 h n h ~coND(KZ))). An implication is verified
iff each possible extending embedding g of f that verifies the
antecedent, itself lras an extended embedding h that verifies the
consequent. 5o f itself does not have to verify the antecedent.
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This is similar to traditional interpretations of (material) impli-
cation.
5. Truth
Let 0 be a discourse with DRS K. Then 0 is true in a model 11~I iff
there is an embedding f such that f~ K.
Applying this definition of truth to the DRS in (47) we get:
[~ [z,~l ~ farmer(i)BLdonkey(jl)8cown(i, jl)] ~[j2 ~ beat(i, j2)ói,j~ - jl]] is t.rue
in a model A7
iff
there is an embedding e such that.
e~[~ [z,~i ~ farmer(i)~donkey(ji)8cown(i, ji)] ~[Jz ~ beat(z,,jz)~Jz - Ji]]
iff
there is an embedding e such that
d9((e ~{~,~, } 9~ 9~ farmer(i) n g~ donkey(jl ) n g~ own(i, jl )) ~
~h(g ~{~z} h ~ h ~ beat(i,jz) ~ h~ (jz - ji )))
iff
there is an embedding e such that
d9((e ~{~,~, } 9 n(9(z)) E I(farmer)n
(g(ji)) E I(donkey) n (g(i),g(ji)) E I(own)) ~
~h(g ~{~z} h ~(h(i), h(jz)) E I(beat) n h.(jz) - h(j~)))
iff (using the definition of ~, which forces h(jl) - g(jl) and h(i) - g(i))
there is an embedding e such that
d9((e ~{~,~,} 9 n(.9(i)) E I(farmer)n
(9(~i)) E I(donkey) n (9(z),9(.7i)) E I(own)) ~
~9(i),9(ji)) E I(beat))
Note that since we do not use any of the values e might assign to discourse markers,
we can ignore e and pretend it is the empty assignment. We can then get away with
just using one assignment g. But then what we actually have left is the truth value
of the formula:
`di, j((farmer(i) n donkey(j) n own(i, j)) ~ beat(i, j))
This is precisely what we would expect the sentence to mean.
The dialogue information available at some point for the interpretation of a sentence
is formed by the DRS to which the interpretation of the sentence gets attached. This
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DRS is a representation of the previous utterances and the accessibility relations
between them. It is clear how the interpretation of a sentence leads to an update of
the context: the DRS representing the meaning of the sentence is embedded at some
point inside the DRS representing the dialogue inforrnation sofar. The result is the
new dialogue information for interpreting the next sentence in.
2.2.6 Discourse structure and control
Besides the inforrnation about accessible referents, other forms of dialogue information
have been proposed. One important class is formed by theories of discourse structure,
which describe how sequences of sentences can form dialogues. The idea is that
sentences can stand in several different relations to the surrounding discourse, and
each sentence must stand in one of those relations to some previous (part of the)
discourse. Examples of this are Grosz and Sidner's notion of discourse structure in
[GS86], and Poesio and Traum's conversational contexts ([PT95]). We begin with
describing the former.
Grosz and Sidner give an account of discourse structure that is aimed at answering
the following questions:
. How do we know when a series of sentences forms a single discourse or several?
. What makes a discourse coherent?
Their theory introduce the notion of a discourse structure as consisting of three con-
stituents: linguistic structure, intentional structure and attentional structure. These
components each deal with different aspects of the utterances in a discourse. Together
they provides a dialogue participant with the necessary information for determining
how an utterance fits with the rest of the discourse.
. Linguistic structure
Utterances in a discourse form constituents called discourse segments. These
segments need not consist of consecutive sentences: they can be discontinuous.
Empirical research has shown the existence of such segmentation, however there
is no agreement on the exact location of borders. There are some indications
that linguistic clues such as pauses and changes in speech rate may be indicative
of these borders. Also, the start of a new segment can also be indicated by cue
phrases such as incidentally, in the first place and co~ning back to my earlier
point. The linguistic structure consists of discourse segments and an embedding
relationship that can hold between them: a segment may be a part of another
segment.
. Intentional structure
The purpose associated (by the discourse participants) with a discourse as a
whole, and with any of the discourse segments, provides the means for deter-
mining which utterances constitute a single discourse and for distinguishing
coherent discourses from incoherent ones. Grosz and Sidner assign a specific
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Discov,rse Purpose (DP) to a discourse as a whole, and a Discourse Segrner~t
P~rpose (DSP) to each of the discourse segments. These purposes are to be
thought of as the reason (intention) of the producer of the segment for pro-
ducing it. There may be several intentions for producing a certain utterance,
but those that serve as discourse purposes share the characteristic that they are
intended to be recognized by tlre other discourse participants. Examples that
Grosz and Sidner give of discourse (segment) purposes are:
- Intend that some agent intend to perform some physical task.
- Intend that some agent believe some fact.
- Intend that some agent believe that some fact supports another.
- Intend that some agent intend to identify an object.
- Intend that some agent know soine property of an object.
The intentional structure consists of these purposes and two relations between
them: a dorreina~ce relation and a satisfactiorc-~receden,r.e relation. The dom-
inance relation is a partial ordering on the intentions. If an intention DSP1
provides part of the satisfaction of another intention DSP2, then DSP2 will
dominate DSP1. If the satisfaction of an intention DSP3 cannot be achieved be-
fore another intention DSP4 has been satisfied, then DSP4 satisfaction-precedes
DSP3.
Since the intentional structure is concerned with the role of utterances as well
as beliefs of agents, we classify it as both dialogue information and agent infor-
mation.
~ Attentional state
The attentional state models the participant's changing focus of attention as
the discourse proceeds. According to Grosz and Sidner, the attentional state
is a property of the discourse and not of the participants. It is formalized as a
set of so-called focus s~aces. There is a set of transition rules that define the
addition or deletion of spa.ces. The collection of focus spaces at some specific
time is called the focv.s str~cture.
A focusi~ag process associates each discourse segment with a focus space. This
contains the entities that are salient at the time of the utterance. One of these
objects is the DSP.
The focus structure takes the form of a stack, allowing the relative salience of
objects to vary with entering and exiting new discourse segments. R.ecall that
segments may be discontinuous, and for this reason we should be able to retrieve
an old focus space on re-entering an earlier discourse segment. So, the pops and
pushes governing the focus stack are triggered by the intentional structure.
Grosz and Sidner's model allows to explain what happens when during a dialogue the
speaker flashbacks to an earlier topic or digresses, or begins a dialogue with what is
known as a`semantic return', picking up an old conversation. In all these cases we
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want the appropriate referents to be available, and the switching of focus stacks allows
this. This theory thus forms an extension of DRT's theory of accessible referents. For
this reason, it has also been incorporated in several extensions of DR.T.
One of these extensions of DRT with information other than that about accessible
referents and the rneaning of the discourse sofar, is proposed by Poesio and Traum
([PT95]) who present a rnodel of dialogue context that integrates existing discourse
models used for specific tasks, such as reference resolution, speech act recognition
and dialogue management. Their context model is aimed at providing the following
information:
. make available the antecedents of various forms of anaphoric reference
. represent the occurrence of speech acts
. contain information about the beliefs, intentions and obligations of conversa-
tional agents
Such a discourse model would in a systematic way be able to allow for the specification
of a more refined notion of reference accessibility, in line with Grosz and Sidner's
observations about the effect of discourse structure described above.,
Poesio and Traum base their representation of context on DRT, since DRSs, as
we have seen, can be seen as a representation of the preceding linguistic information
for the purpose of reference resolution. Moreover, DRT offers a formal account of
the update character of utterances, at least for the dialogue information, which the
authors hope to preserve for the extended context model.
In addition to the information about reference accessibility, information is included
in a DRS about speech acts that have occurred and the discourse relations that hold
between them.
To this end, they interpret the root DRS not as a representation of the truth
conditions of a text as a whole, but as a representation of the díalogue situation in the
sense of 5ituation Semantics. In such a root DRS, we find the so-called corcversational
eve~ets which are associated with a described situation. Reference resolution takes
place at the level of described situations. To be able to serve as antecedents, referents
must be introduced as part of the same described situation as the anaphor we are
trying to bind. As an exarnple of the representation Poesio and Traum use, we look
at the following exchange9 between two dialogue partners A and B:
(48) A: ~Eregi~ce E2~` is at Avore.
B: The boxcar is also at Avon, and is hooked to [itJt .
9Taken from the TRAINS dialogues, [ASF}95].
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An update on an existing context modeled by such a DR.S is done by conversation
event generation rules which add two new discourse referents: one for the conversa-
tional event and one for the time, and two conditions: one for the locutionary act
(the sort of utterance done, as visible from the surface form of the sentence: tell, ask
or instruct) and one to place the conversational event in time. The normal DR.S
update rules are then used within the embedded DRS that represents the content of
the locutionary act.
Poesio and Traum further extend the representation to allow for the inclusion
of information about the intentions of the dialogue participants. This in turn allows
dialogue agents to recognize the illocutionary acts (the intended effect that the speaker
had with her utterance) performed by the speaker in producing the utterance. For
example, if we take the first sentence in (48), the speaker may have been performing
an inform or check of the engine's location, or a suggestion to consider using the
engine in whatever plan the hearer is currently forming. If for instance, the utterance
is recognized as a suggest, this information will be added to the DRS as follows (pl
being the current plan for performing the task):
(50)
...,sugl
sugl : suggest(A, use(A ~- B, i, pl))
generate(cel,sugl)
Conversational partner B can then choose to use this suggestion and include the
engine i in the plan.
The establishment of dominance or precedence between the previous utterances
and the current one is also part of the processing of an utterance. This encodes Grosz
and Sidner's intentional structure and also includes grouping individual utterances
together into discourse segments. These are called conversational threads in Poesio
and Traum's model and are considered to be supersituations of the individual speech
acts. The fact that a speech act sugl is a subsituation of a thread ctl is therefore
added as a statement saying that the subsituation relation holds:
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(51) sugl C ctl
Further grouping takes place at the level of the contents of conversational events
(propositions). These cannot simply be taken to add to the common ground of the
dialogue partners: they first have to be explicitly or tacitly acknowledged.
To encode this, all material that can be acknowledged together is grouped into
discourse ~init.s. Each of these units has its own state that tells us whether it's
still open or has been acknowledged and thus been added to the common ground.
Acknowledgements are then illocutionary acts generated by utterances that change
the state of the relevant discourse units from ungrounded to grounded.
To summarize: the context model proposed by Poesio and Traum contains the
following information:
. conversational events, who produced them, who received them, the kind of
speech act they encode, and their semantic content (dialogue information);
. what the speaker meant with the utterance (agent information);
. what the discourse relations are between utterances (dialogue inforrnation);
. the intentions of dialogue participants (agent information);
. whether the objects and propositions introduced by utterances have been ac-
knowledged or not (agent information)
Actually, this last type of information, whether objects have been acknowledged
or not, belongs to a larger body of information which is relevant for so-called dialogv.e
control acts. These are used by communicative agents to control the processes gov-
erning the information exchange itself. We already have seen examples of such acts
in the sentences we discussed when presenting the work of Isard:
(52) I just told you that I am a foreigner.
(53) Did you say Thursday?
Dialogue control acts have been studied and cla.ssified extensively by Bunt, who
has developed a model of the context-changing effect (context taken in the broadest
possible sense) of different kinds of utterances ([Bun91], [Bun98]).
In this Dynamic Interpretation Theory, utterance meanings are analyzed as being
composed of two elements:
. The information that a speaker is introducíng (called the semantic content)
. The way to add this information to the context (called the communicative fnnc-
tion)
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Examples of the latter are functions such as INFORM, CORRECT, APOLOGY etcetera.
These communicative functions are assumed to be recognizable for the hearer from
the utterance form. Together, the communicative function and the semantic content
form a context update function that can be applied to the current context and yields
a new context. Such an update function is also called a dialogue act.
Now, dialogue acts can be divided into two kinds: task oriented and dialoyue
control acts. The first kind of acts are motivated directly b,y the underlying purpose
of the dialogue, so they are sentences like:
(54) a) What is an agierture?
b) Change the voltage of the gun.
The dialogue control acts help the dialogue partners control the dialogue itself. These
will be sentences like
(55) a) Okay.
b) Which lens do you mean?
c) Hold on...
d) Thank you.
Bunt further subdivides the dialogue control acts into three types:
. Feedback acts, which can be either auto-feedback a.cts, concerned with reporting
the status of the speaker's own input processing, or allo-feedback, providing or
requesting information about the dialogue partner's processing status.
. Interaction management acts, which consist of things like correcting previous
utterances, announcing pauses, taking turns, changing the topic explicitly and
making reports on the status of the information channel.
. Sacial obliqations management acts, which occur due to culturally defined con-
ventions of social behavior, such as greeting, thanking and leave taking.
Communicative functions can also be divided int,o several types. Bunt gives the
following classification:
. Informative, which can either be providin,g information or seekiny information.
. Task-specifcc, corresponding to the task-specific dialogue acts.
. Dialogue control, with the same subclassification as the dialogue control acts.
Now recall that communicative functions and dialogue acts differ from each other in
that the latter also include the semantic content of an utterance. An utterance with
a dialogue control communicative function will always result in a dialogue control
act, while an utterance with a task-specific communicative function will lead to a
task-specific dialogue act. An utterance with an informative communicative function
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can be either, depending on the semantic content (which could for instance have the
communication itself as subject).
Using this ontology of possible dialogue acts, all utterances in a dialogue can be
classified. Now, Bunt further expands on this hierarchy of dialogue acts by looking
at the kind of information each of the types of acts can possibly influence.
The notion conte~t is pretheoretically taken to mean `the totality of conditions and
circumstances that may influence the understanding and generation of communicative
behavior'. Bunt. notes that this interpretation, although correct, essentially defines
context to be infinitely large. He notes that a manageable not,ion of context can be
obtained, however, by concentrating on those aspects of context that can be changed
(directly) through communication. This is what he calls local conte~t (as opposod to
global context).
Bunt distinguishes five categories of conceptually different kinds of context infor-
mation. The local aspects of these categories can be characterized as follows:
. Linguistic context, linguistic material surrounding an utterance, both in surface
form and analysed form.
In particular:
- the dialogue sofar, with the hearer's interpretation of the utterances as
dialogue acts;
- the agent's discourse plan
. Semantic context, state of the underlying task, facts in the task domain.
. Cognitive context, for each participant her own processing state and her model
of all the other participants' beliefs and processing states.
The processing state includes
- the progress of various cognitive and task-specific processes;
- any problems encountered in any of these processes;
- results obtained;
- estimated further time needed by these processes to complete a task.
The beliefs about each of the other participants include
- beliefs about the participant's processing state;
- beliefs about the participant's current information and her beliefs about
the mutual beliefs concerning the task domain and each other's information
state.
. Physical and perceptual conte~t, status of the communication channel, the par-
ticipants' presence and attention.
. Social context, communicative rights, obligations and constraints of each of the
participants.
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Tl~e next step Bunt takes is to look at, representational requirements of each of these
kinds of information.
. Social context, to be modeled as pairs of Conditions and Interactive and Reac-
tive Pressures. If in a clialogue situation the conditions are met, the resulting
pressure will be triggered which in turn can result in a specific communicative
act being performed. This is used especially as the mechanism behind social
obligations management acts.
. Physical and percePtnal context, for each of the attributes (attention and chan-
nel status), a simple binary value is sufFicient since the participants are either
paying attention or not, and the channel is currently functioning perfectly or
not. Depending on the kind of communicative channel, some of these may be
bundled (since the effects are indistinguishable for the agent).
. Se7nantic context, the complexity of the semantic context depends on the com-
plexity of the underlying task. As such, it can range from rather simple and
decidable to highly recursive and indecidable.
. Cognitive context, all four features for the own processing state can be rnodeled
by attribute-value pairs, although values for these features may include links to
the semantic or linguistic cont.ext.
For the model of each of the partners' beliefs, it is assumed that we must again
have a 5-dimensional inforrnation state. This of course leads to recursion since
each of these information states a.gain includes a cognitive context.
. Linguistic context: consists of the verbatim form of previous utterances as well
as the structures the agent associated with it and the resulting communicative
function that was assigned.
This is the most elaborate proposal for a taxonomy of context information. It seems
to c~ntain about all the proposed information from other authors as well as socia.l
inforrnation.
2.3 What's in a context?
To compare the different ideas presented in the previous sections, we have checked
for each of the proposals that we discussed which kinds of information are included
in them, and to what extent they can be used in a computational system.
The five types of context information that we distinguished in the beginning of this
chapter (situational, agent, background, dialogue, socíal), can be further subdivided
into the following information types. Each of these was encountered in at least one
of the proposals we discussed in the previous sections:
. Sitnational information
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Ds Discourse situation: a specification of the contextaral paramet.ers t,o provide
the interpretation of indexicals
Cs Curreut subject: narrows down the possible intcrpretations of utterances
by forcing specific interpretations of task-related terms
Ch Channel status: contains information about t,he availability of a communi-
cation channel, and about the attention of the other discourse participants
. Agent information
Pm Partner model: a representation of the beliefs and intentions of the other
dialogue participants
Ps Processing status: contains information about an agent's problems~success
at arriving at an interpretation of utterances, and time estimates for fin-
ishing the task
Gs Grounding status: specifies whether interpreted information has been ac-
cepted and acknowledged by an agent
. Backgrov.nd information
Wk World knowledge~task information: to provide information necessary to
interpret indirect reference
Lc Language conventions: a set of plausible interpretations for certain specific
phenomena such as noun-noun compounds and instances of inetonymy
. Dialogne information
Dv Previous dialogue (verbatim): to record the occurrence of utterances
Di Previous dialogue (interpreted): contains the semantic content of the dia-
logue sofar. It should be structured to allow the calculation of the salience
of possible referents for anaphoric terms
. Social information
Rp Reactive and interactive pressures: to keep track of social obligations and
roles in conversations
For each of the information types, we also check how well it has been worked out by
each of the proposals. We distinguish three levels of specificity for the representation
and use of the types of information:
1. R: a specific representation is given for the information;
2. S: a specification is given that tells us how to apply the information in rrat.ural
language processing;
3. A: a decidable or even computational algorithm is given for the application of
the information and for updating this part of the context.
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Ds Cs Ch Pm Ps Gs Rp Wk Lc Dv Di
Barwise 8c Perry A R
Bunt A R A A R R R
Grosz 8c Sidner R S
Hobbs et al. A A
Isard R
Kamp A
Kaplan, Sag A A
McCarthy, Buvac A
Poesio 8c Traum S S A
Pustejovsky A
Figure 2.2: Information types in context proposals
Eacli of these levels of specificity presupposes the existence vf the lower ones. So if
some proposal provides a specification of how to use the context information, it also
provides a specific representation.
The table in figure 2.2 gives an overview of the proposals ordered alphabetically
by author. We will go through all rows briefly:
Situation Semantics (Barwise and Perry) offers a rich notion vf context (interpreted
as a combination of discourse situation and speaker connections). It provides a gen-
eralization of the contextual parameters and anaphoric reference, and can be seen as
a non-algorithmic meta-theory of context-driven interpretation.
Btint's dialogue context is an ama.lgam of various types of information. It contains
the contents of the previous dialogue as well as the literal occurrences of t.he indi-
vidual utterances, an agent's discourse plan, task-related informa.tion, process status
information, partner models, channel status information and it keeps track of the
socialfactors.
The discourse structures of Grosz and Sidner also contain representations of the
contents of the previous utterances. Moreover, they contain ordered intentions, and
a focus space for referent resolution.
The knowledge bases Hobbs et al. use to drive the abduction process contains
mostly task-related information. There is no way to refer to t,he communication
process itself, because the approach is aimed at the interpretation of monologues. The
krrowledge bases also contain information that might best be described as `language
conventions', for instance, which relations can be linguistically realized through noun-
noun compounding, and which can drive coercion.
Isard (section 2.2.5) has shown that the act of uttering a sentence has to be
recorded in a dynamic context model consisting of contextual parameters. This model
could also be used for the interpreta.tion of pronouns, ellipsis and speech acts.
Kamp's DRT is aimed at explaining the dynamic behavior of certain types of words
and of certain constructions. The structures present in the theory can be taken as
representations of the dialogue context.
The work of Kaplan and that of Sag exemplifies the use of contextual parameters
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for the interpretation of indexicals. Both representations and formulas for using such
parameters in a formal system are proposed. Furthermore, Sag discusses both direct
anaphoric reference as well as a form of indirect reference via predicate mapping.
McCarthy ancí Buvac's logic of contexts is used for the representation of more and
less sophisticated theories and the context-dependent interpretation of homonyms.
They allow one to formalize an agent focusing on specific bits information and ignoring
others. In this sense it can be used for instance to model the different uses of words
depending on the task.
Poesio and Traum present a model of discourse based on DRT. Beside the record
of the contents of the previous dialogue that DRT offers, their model also records
the occurrences of utterances and speech acts, and it contains information about the
intentions of the discourse participants and the interpretation status of information
coming from utterances.
Finally, Pustejovsky's qualia structures are a further refinement of the informa-
tion needed for coercion. Where the abduction approach to interpretation recovers
all information from a knowledge base, Pustejovsky's qualia structures are closer to
specifically linguistic information.
Tlre ideal context representation would of course be a. mix of all of these, choosing
one of the most worked-out proposals for each type of information that we need to
represent and combining these. However, we would probably end up with a strange
and unwieldy mixture of representation formats. Moreover, the underlying assump-
tions for some of these proposals may be mutually incompatible. One of these is the
question whether context should be viewed as an object that is independent of the
agents. For instance, in DRT it is unclear to what extent there is room for agents to
differ in the structure that they build up for a given utterance. On the other hand,
the proposals that deal with intentions leave a lot of room for agents to differ in their
opinion on what the context is.
Instead we will define, in the next chapter, our own model of context based on
Constructive Type Theory. This context rnodel is then improved upon by comparing
the information it provides with the types of information listed in table 2.2. We will
then attempt to rephrase the types of information that are missing in terms of our
CTT context and thus attain a full model of context for the interpretation of natural
language dialogues.




The semantic lingua franca that we will use for the representation of utterances and
knowledge is a formalism based on Co~cstructive Type Theory (CTT). CTT is a math-
ematical formalism that has the expressive power of higher order logic and it has
interesting connections with dynamic semantics.
In this chapter we will present this formalism and explore how it can be used to
represent the knowledge of an agent and the meaning of utterances. After that we
will check to what extent we can consider such CTT representations of an agent's
knowledge to be formal models of context, by comparing the information available
in them to the different forms of information that we found in our review of other
context models in the previous chapter.
3.2 Informal introduction to CTT
The application of various type theories to problems in logic and semantics was orig-
inally motivated by research into the formal properties of logical connectives in in-
tuitionistic logic. Subsequently, type theory has been used in the analysis of many
kinds of logic. De Bruijn ([dB80]) used a translation of mathematics in type theory
to prove the correctness of mathematical proofs.
Using type theory in formal semantics of natural language was first taken up by
Sundholm ([Sun86]). He showed how Martin-Ldf's type theory ([ML84]) can be used
to solve some problems with donkey sentences. Ranta used type theory as the semantic
input for a generation algorithm for English sentences ([Ran91]). Sundholm ([Sun89])
also reinterpreted Barwise and Cooper's generalized quantifiers in type theory. Ahn
and Kolb showed how CTT can be seen as a generalization of DRT ([AK90]), and
finally Dávila Pérez ([DP94]) presented a PTQ-style translation of a fragment of
English into Martin-Ldf's type theory.
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We will begin with informally exploring how t,o represent meaning in CTT, the
forinalism used by Ahn and Kolb, and defer an,y forcnal definitions until section 3.3.
The notation we use is similar to that of [Bar92].
Unlike standard representations of ineaning, such as predicate calculus, type-
theoretical interpretations are not so much concerned with the truth value of an
utterance. Altliough the truth or falsehood of an uttera.nce makes sense for declara-
tive utterances, it is less obvious that it plays a central role in the meaning of questions
or commands. Another notable feature is the constructive nature of type-theoretical
representations: terms can only be used if they are well-formed according to specific
rules. This well-formedness is defined with respect to a background set of terms. In
type-theoretical semantics this background set is interpreted as the knowledge or be-
liefs of an agent. This leads to a situation in which semantic interpretation is relative
to an agent. This type-theoretical semantic,s thus is inherently intensional: it assigns
meanings to sentences in terms of the knowledge of an agent. Whether or not this
corresponds to anything in an external reality is another matter.
The basic building blocks of semantic representations in type theory are expres-
sions of the form
(56) A : B
5uch expressions are called state~nents. They indicate that object A is judged (by
some agent) to have the t,ype B. When the agent sees a dog (for example Fido), we
can forrnalize the agent's recognizing t,hat, Fido is in fact, a dog by:
(57) fido : dog
Here dog is a type, and fido is called an inhabitant of the type dog.
Note that we described what has happened here as a form of recognition. We assume
that an agent who perceives the world does not see an unordered jumble of things, but
automatically categorizes what she sees. The effect of perceiving objects are therefore
statements such as (57). This means tliat the intuitive interpretation we assign to
types such as dog is an agent's ability to recognize inhabitants of the type when she
encounters them. This ability is formed and tuned by the agent being exposed to the
environment and noticing regularities. This means a.gents can actually differ in their
statements. But since the formation of these concepts, or categories, is influenced by
education and communication within a certain social and cultural environment, the
perceived classification can be assumed to exhibit a large degree of similarity between
agents.
To express that an agent knows a certain concept, we introduce the concept by means
of a judgment that involves a special kind of type known as a sort:
(58) X : ~s
3.2. h~'FOR~L~L INTRODUCTION TO CTT 43
this indicates that. h is a type in the sense of dog above. This merely means that our
agent has the ability to recognize an X when she sees one. She doesn't necessarily have
t,o know any particular instance of ?i . Think for instance of the concept `unicorn'.
The sort ~S itself is assumed to be a priori available to every agent (as the concept of
a `concept').
Sofar we have seen two types of statements: statements where the type is a concept,
and staternents where the inhabitant is a concept. The knowledge of an agent at
a specific time is not just an unordered set of such statements; they are ordered,
forming a structured collection of beliefs. The statements are ordered in such a way
that there is a dependency between them. For instance, our agent cannot form the
statement fido : dog unless she already has the beliefr dog :~S. This is true in
general: a st.atement can only be formed if the type of the statement itself is present
or constructable in an agent's knowledge as an inhabitant.
Of course, we want to model more than an agent recognizing individual objects
in the surrounding. A crucial point of type theory is that we can view propositio~s
as types and inhabitants of such types as proofs of the proposition. For instance, an
agent ma,y observe that it is raining and we can represent this by a statement:
(59) x0 : itsraining
The term x0 (a variable) here stands for the agent's reason for believing that it is
raining. Again, the type itsraining itself must have a type as well. Just as concepts
have the sort ~S as type, propositions are inhabitants of another sort: ~r.
Althougli we can express fido in natural language, inhabitants in general cannot.
Proofs of propositions cannot be directly expressed, and most objects in the world
do not have a name (think of the individual trees in a forest). So our agent may for
instance have d0:dog in her knowledge to represent some nameless dog.
Predicates are represented by functions from types (in the sense of dog) to propo-
sitions. Since dogs may like sausages, there could be a predicate:
(60) likes~ausages : (dog -3 ~p)
If an agent's knowledge contains this predicate, and also fido:dog, we can apply the
function to fido (since that has the required type) and get
(61) likes~ausages-fido : ~p
.Again, this does not mean that the agent believes that Fido likes sausages, but merely
indicates that `Fido likes sausages' is a proposition, and as such may have proofs and
thus be true or false. Note that application is explicitly indicated by an operator ..
Now, naturally, it is rather inconvenient to introduce predicates in the way we
did likes~ausages in (60), since doing it that way means it can only be applied to
dogs. If we had another type, like cat:~s, and the agent knew a cat garfield : cat,
1 We will the terms `knowledge' and `belief' in a loose manner here, allowing them to stand for
any statement in the agent's collection.
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we could not apply our predicate to Garfield. To remedy this, we introduce a form
of inheritance (indicated by the operator G) on our types and allow functions that
expect a specific type as argument to also apply to types lower in the inheritance
hierarchy. So, instead of using two predicates for `liking sausages', we introduce only
one, defined on some extra type (for instance animal):
(62) animal : ~S
dog G animal : ~S
cat C animal : ~S
likes~ausages : animal -3 ~P
Now the predicate can be applied to both Fido and Garfield:
(63) likes~ausages.fido : ~p
likes~ausages.garfield : ~r
Of course, predicates may have more than one argument. These will be represented
by functions such as
(64) likes : (dog -~ (dog ~ ~r))
which allows the agent to represent statements about dogs liking other dogs.
Functions can also be used to con~truct new individual objects. Assuming every
dog's mother is also a dog, we can have a function:
(65) dogmother : (dog -~ dog)
This allows us to derive dogmother-fido : dog. Note that the agent tlius knows that
Fido's mother is also a dog, without actually having observed this. So, an agent's
knowledge may increase by reasoning about known facts and rules, combined with
observation.
Now imagine that we would like to represent the agent's belief that all dogs like
sausages. To represent this, we have to express that for every dog we have a proof
that it likes sausages. This can be done by introducing a function f which, given a
dog x, returns a proof that x likes sausages. In other words, f-x should be a proof
of likes-sausages.x. Note that the type of the application of the function depends
on the argument it is applied to. Such a type is known as a dependent fnnction type.
They can be constructed in CTT using the II-operator. The format is IIA : B. C.
The three elements are a fresh variable A with type B, and some other term C in
which A may or may not occur. In our case, the function f has type:
(66) f : (IIx : dog . likes.-sausages.x)
Using this function, the agent can derive f. d0 : likes~ausages . d0, and f. fido :
likes-sausages-fido, proofs for both our dogs that they like sausages.
Now, the standard function notation using the -~ operator is in fact an abbrevia-
tion of a II-type. We could have introduced likes -sausages (60) as
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(67) likes-sausages : (IIx : animal . ~p)
since whenever we apply this function to an object of type animal, we get a proposi-
tion. Whenever the variable introduced by a II-type does not occur in the resultant
type, we can use the ~ notation instead.
Implications can also be modeled by using function types. The proof of an impli-
cation is a function which, given a proof of the antecedent of the implication, returns
a proof of the consequent. So, for instance, to represent if Fido likes sausages, then
it rains, we can use the following statement:
(68) g : (likes~ausages.fido -~ itsraining)
Applying g to our proof for Fido likes sausages, we get
(69) g.(f.fido) : itsraining
The availability of dependent function type allows us to represent utterances which
are difficult to represent in predicate calculus. For instance, donkey sentences have a
rather straightforward representation in CTT because we can make the type of the
consequent dependent on the objects introduced in the antecedent. As an example,
suppose the agent has the following additional statements available:
(70) man : ~s
own : man -~ (dog -~ ~y)
walk : man ~ (dog -3 ~r)
Now, to represent the donkey sentence If [a manJ` owns [a dogJ~ [heJl walks [itJ~,
with the indicated links between the pronouns and the noun phrases, we can use the
following statement:
(71) z : (IIi : man . IIj : dog . IIp : (own.i.j) . (walk.i-j))
This says that if we have a man i, and a dog j and a proof p that i owns j, we can
construct a proof z.i-j-p of the proposition i walks j. This corresponds to the strong
readings for donkey sentences, since this representation entails that every man walks
every dog that he owns.
Clearly there is a correspondence between these kinds of representations and the
ones that we have seen in DRT in section 2.2.5. In [AK90], Ahn and Kolb have shown
that CTT contexts can be seen as a generalization of DRSs.
Just as we have universal and existential quantification in predicate calculus, we
also have two operators in type theory. We have already seen the II-types, which
correspond to universal quantifiers, and to implication. The other operat.or is the
E-operator, which corresponds to existential quantification and conjunction.
The notation of E-types is similar to that of II-types. So, some dog likes sausages
is represented as
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(72) h : (Ex : dog . likes~ausages.~)
The inhabitant h of this E-type is an ordered pair consisting of a dog and a proof
that that dog likes sausages, such as our dog fido and the proof f-fido. We can use
projection functions ~r~ and ~r2 to access the members of the pair. So for instance,
~r1(h) has type dog. If h is in fact the pair (fido, f. fido), then ~rr (h) - fido. This
means that whenever we have a proof of a proposition with an existential quantifier,
we also have a witness: an object for which the proposition is true.
The use of E-types to construct conjunctions is exemplified by
(73) r : (Ex : (likes~ausages.fido) . itsraining)
which represents the meaning of Fido likes saasages and it is raining. Again, the
inhabitant of the E-type consists of two components, one is a proof that Fido likes
sausages, the other a proof that it is raining, such as (f.fido, g. (f-fido))
Negation is not a primitive operator in type theory. However, we can add it as a
function which inaps any proposition onto another proposition:
(74) not : ~p ~ ~r
So, Fido does not like sa~asages is represented as:
(75) not-(likessausages.fido)
Note that during this section we have been introducing CTT terms based on ones
we had before. This is in general how CTT works. The available terms form the
background with respect to which new terms may be proven to be well-formed.
To summarize, in CTT we view meaning relative to the knowledge of an agent. The
basic elements are types of objects, which are interpreted as the agent's ability to
classify objects of that type, and propositions. The inhabitants of propositions are
proofs for the proposition. Types may be related by inheritance statements. From
the simple terms we can create other terms corresponding to predicates, and func-
tions from one type of object to another. There are two operators, II, corresponding
to universal quantification and implication, and E, which corresponds to existential
quantification and conjunction.
In the next section we will present CTT formally. Readers who are not interested
in the details may skip this and continue with section 3.4 where we pick up the
application of CTT to semantics and show how communication can be modeled in
CTT.
3.3 Formal definition of CTT
We will use Pure Type Systems to introduce the language of Constructive Type
Theory in the net section. The version of CTT that we will work with contains
several extensions to the basic format: inheritance, definitions and E-types. These
are introduced in later sections.
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3.3.1 Pure Type Systems
Pure Type Systems ( [Bar91]) provide a format for describing a parametrized set of
systerns of lambda calculus with explicit typing. These systems describe how terms
can be constructed and what the resulting types of these terms are. In t,he case
of explicit typing, variables used in the construction of new terms are also typed.
PTSs specify a set of derivation rules that allow one t,o derive expressions of the form
I' ~ M: A, meaning that the term M has type A in the context I'. Such expressions
are called judgments. The expression A~I :.4 is called a statement.. A context is a
sequence of declarations, which are statements of the form x: A with the requirement
that x is a variable. Since we are dealing with lambda calculus with explicit t,yping,
to establish the correctness of a judgment I' ~ M: A we need to know the type of any
free variable occurring in M or .4. This information is what the context I' provides.
Definition 5
Given a countably infinite set V of variables a.nd a set S of constants
known as sorts, the set T of pseudot,ernas over S is:
T det V~S~,T-..Í~,`V . T~IIV . T
We use the notation ,4 . B to indicate functional application. ~ and II are both
variable-binding operators. Since this is a format for lambda calculus, we also have
beta-reduction: (~x : A.!V1).P ~~j ll1 [P~x], where Ill [P~x] indicates substitution of
all free occurrences of x in M by P. Beta-reduction can be closed under transitivity
and reflexivity, ,yielding the relation -~~j. The transitive symmetric closure of -~~ is
denoted by -~ (beta-equality).
Definition 6
A statement is an expression of the form M : ~4, with M, A E T. M is
called the inhabitant or subject, A the type.
Definition ?
A context is a finite ordered sequence of statements, each with a distinct
variable as its inhabitant. The empty context is denoted by []. If I' -
[xr : .4r, . . . , x,L : An], then I', x : B - [xr : .4r, . . . , xn : An, x : B].
Definition 8
A variable x is I'-fresh if x does not occur in the context I'.
Definition 9
Given a set S of sorts, a set A C S x S of axioms and a set R C S x S x S of
rules, the following rules of type assignment define the Pure Type System
with beta conversion ~~(S, A, R):
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[]~ si : sz
Ax if (si sz) E A
I'~A:s
I', x: A~ x: A S (x is I'-fresh)
I'~A:B PI-C:s W
I', ~: C F- A: B (~ is I'-fresh)
I'f-A:si I',x:A~-B:s2




AI' ~ (F.a) : B[x :- a]
I'i-A:B I'~B':s I'I-B-pB'
I'I-A:B'
These rules define the relation I' ~ A : B, stating that `A has type B' can be derived
from context I'. If this relation holds, A and B are legal terms and I' is a legal conte~t.
3.3.2 The L-Cube
The specific PTSs that we are interested in are the ones that are suited for the
interpretation of different kinds of logic. This interpretation is based on the so-
called Cnrry-Howard-De Bruijn isomorphism where we interpret propositions of a
logic as types in a typed ~-calculus. For this reason this strategy is also known as
the propositions-as-types interpretation. Under this interpretation, the inhabitants of
such a proposition type stand for proofs of the proposition. It turns out that there is
a correspondence between provability of a proposition in a logic and the existence of
inhabitant terms in typed ~-calculus.
A well-known group of typed lambda calculi, known as the Logic Cube or L-Cube
([Ber88]), interprets a number of related logics. The PTSs for these calculi have a set
of sorts S-{op, os, ~P, ~S} and the axioms A-{(~r, or), (~3, oS)}. They only differ
in the set of rules, which, as can be seen from the rules of type assignment, determine
what kinds of II-types can be constructed.
The sorts in these PTS fulfill specific functions in the interpretation of corresponding
logics. Inhabitants of ~s will be used to represent types of objects, while inhabitants
of ~p are propositions. The sorts op and os (which are also known as kinds) are the
types of ~p and ~9 respectively. They can be used in II-types to construct higher order
functions.
All calculi in the Logic Cube only have rules in which the second and third argu-
ment (s2 and s3) are identical (that is: the sort of the II-type is the same as the sort
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Figure 3.1: The L-cube
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of its range), so we can limit ourselves to only stating sl and sz in the following list:
Definition 10
The L-c~ibe consists of 8 PTSs, with the following rules:
~PROP (~P~ ~P)
~PROP2 (~P~ ~`P)~ ( oP~ ~`P)
í`PROPW (~P~ ~P), (~P~ ~P)
~PROPW (~P~ ~`p~ (~P~ ~`P)~ (~P~ ~P)
aPRED (~P~ ~`P), ( ~s, ~s), (~`s, ~P), (~s, oP)
~PRED2 (~P~ ~P), ( ~`s, ~s), (~s, ~P), (~`s, ~P ), (~P~ ~P)
í`PREDW (~P~ ~P), ( ~`s, ~s)e ( ~`s, ~`P), (~s, ~P), (~P~ ~`s), (~Pe ~P)
~PREDW ( ~`P~ ~P), ( ~s, ~`s)r ( ~`s, ~`P), (~s, ~P), (~P~ ~s), (~P~ ~p), (~P' ~`P)
When we consider ~PROP, the simplest calculus, we see that the only rule is (~P, ~`P).
Since the II-type assignment rule, the rule that allows the construction of II-types, is
dependent on the set R of rules, we see that its only instantiation in ~PROP is
I'F-A:~P I',x:A~B:~p
(76) FF-(II~:A.B):~p ~
This rule allows us to construct a proposition from two already existing propositions
A and B. This resulting proposition (II~ : A . B) behaves exactly as an implication
A-~ B in propositional logic. Note that this II-rule only specifies that implications
are propositions as well, it does not say under which circumstances an implication is
true. For this, we have to look at the inhabitants of the propositions. Suppose we
have a proof F for the implication (IIx : A. B), that is I' F- F: (IIx : A. B) and we
also have a proof a for A (so F~ a: A). The proof term x does not occur in B, since
in aPROP propositions are either atomic or formed by implication, in which case all
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subparts are also propositions. We would like to be able to construct from the proofs
that we have a proof for B, and in fact we can: looking at t,he type assignment rules,
we see that the A-rule (application) allows us to derive r~(F~a) : B[x :- a]. 5ince
x does not occur freely in B, B[x :- a] is simply B itself, so r F (F-a) : B
The difference between the ~PROP and the ~PRED calculi is that the ~PROP
rules do not allow the use of object types in II-types, so we cannot quantify over
objects. The ~PROP calculi thus correspond to forms of propositional logic, while
~PRED calculi correspond to predicate logic.
The calculus ~PRED has three additional rules. The (~S, ~S) allows the intro-
duction of functions from one set of objects to another. Similarly, (~S, op) allows
the construction of functions which in combination with an argument of the desirecí
object type yield a proposition. Such functions act as first order predicates. The
(~S, ~r) rule corresponds to the introduction of universal quantification over objects
of a specific type, since it allows us to construct terms of the form (IIx : A. B) :~~„
with A : ~S.
Second order quantification depends on the availability of the rule (or, ~F,), while
(o~, aP) allows the construction of functions that, when applied to a proposition, yield
another proposition. This can be used for instance to introduce negation as a function
not from propositions to propositions:
r~~P:oP r,x:~~F- ~p:op
r ~ (rlx : ~~ . ~~) : O~ rl
(77) r, not : (IIx : ~p . ~r) ~- not : ( IIx : ~r . ~r) S
Since x does not occur in ~P, we can write this as not :(~n ~~~,).










second order proposition logic
weakly higher order proposition logic
higher order proposition logic
predicate logic
second order predicate logic
weakly higher order predicate logic
higher order predicate logic
Classical logics can also be interpreted in PTSs, but one needs to add specific axioms
to model the use of the double-negation rule. See [Geu93] for more details.
As shown in figure 3.1, the calculi can be thought of as the eight corners of a cube.
Each of the three dimensions of the cube corresponds to the availability of a certain
kind of dependency in the systems:
. Up: systems allow the formation of types depending on kinds ((o, ~))
~ Right: systems allow the formation of kinds depending on types ((~, o))
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. Back: systems allow the formation of kinds depending on kinds ( (o, o))
The following properties hold for all systems in the cube ( see [Bar92]):
. SR (Subject Reduction):
ifM-3~M',thenI'I-M:T ~ I'~M':T
. UT (Unicity of Type):
ifI'~M:T andI'I-M:T'thenT -pT'
. I' ~ M: T? is decidable:
for any M, T E T it is decidable whether M has type T
. I' I- M:? is decidable and computable:
it is decidable whether a term M E T has a type, and what that type is
3.3.3 Knowledge representation in CTT
The calculus we will be building on to represent an agent's knowledge and the meaning
of utterances is the most powerful calculus in the L-cube: ~PREDe~. This calculus
allows us to represent the complex axioms we need to describe parts of an external
reality. We add two more rules to this calculus: (os, or) and (~r, op). The resulting
calculus we will call CTT since it is related to the calcv~lns of constrv,ctions of Coquand
and Huet~ ([CH88]).
To facilitate talking about the different kinds of pseudoterms in CTT, we partition
them as follows3:
Given a context I'
. A is a kind if A- or or A- os
. AisasortifA-~SorA-~r
. A is an (object) type if I' F- A:~s
. A is a proposition if r~ A:~~
. A is an object if ~B(I' ~ A: B:~S)
. A is a proof term if ~B(I' ~ A: B:~p)
ZThe difference between CTT and the calculus of constructions is that the latter does not distin-
guish between ~sand ~y, and between ~9and ~p. The rules that the calculus of constructíon allows
are (., ~), (~, ~), (~, ~) and (O, O). It is easy to see that there is a`forgetful' mapping from CTT to
the caculus of constructions, whereby we simply erase the subscripts from the sorts and kinds.
3I'I-A:B:CabbreviatesI'~B:C8cI'~A:B.
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CTT can be used to represent the knowledge of an agent about a certain domain.
The knowledge may encompass individuals, concepts, rules, facts, etc. We will use
CTT contexts as representations of the knowledge of an agent at some point in time.
So, knowledge is represented by a sequence of introductions.
To sliow how a representation of a particular domain can be constructed, we will
look at part of the CTT representation of an electron microscope4, used in the DErrK
prototype ([Ahn95]):
(78) bit : ~S
bit is a type, i.e. if this introduction is in the context, we can construct state-
ments of the form ,4 : bit which introduces individual objects inhabiting bit..
on : bit
off : bit
on and off are two objects. Both have type bit.
eq : (IIt : ~S . IIp : t . IIq : t . ~P)
eq is a polymorphic function. Its first argument has to be an object type. Once
applied to such a type, the result is a binary predicate over objects of that type.
eq is used to represent identity. If we did not use a polymorphic predicate
here, we would need a. different equality predicate for each possible type. The
well-formedness of this polymorphic term crucially depends on the availability
of the (os, or) rule.
quant : (IIt : ~S . ~~)
Again a higher order predicate: quant is a function that takes a type as argu-
ment and yields a proposition. Its intended interpretation is that a type has the
quant property if it represents a quantitative concept whose value may change.
voltage : ~S
event : ~s
voltage and event are types.
qv : quant.voltage
qv represents an agent's proof that voltage is a quantitative type.
incr : (IIt : ~s . IIp : quant.t . IIx : t . IIe : event . ~p)
incr is a polymorphic function. But note that once it has been applied to a
QDomains can be formalized in a number of ways. The choices that are made influence the
decidability of theorem proving about the domain. For this particular domain, the basis was an
existing representation of an electron microscope in the Looxs formalism ( [Pee95]). This models
the electron microscope in the graphical display processor ( GDP) module of the DErrK system, see
section 6.1. Since the Looxs representation and the CTT representation had to be integrated into
one system, they show a high degree of parallellism.
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type, it becomes a function that first requires a proof that the type it has been
applied to is a quantitative type. Once applied to such a proof the result is a
binary predicate whose interpretation is that object ~(for instance, a voltage) is
increased due to event e. The construction of this term depends on the (~p, op)
rule.
reflex2 : (IIt : ~5 . IIx : t . eq-t.~.~)
An axiom stating that everything is equal to itself.
Although the system CTT which we have just presented is very powerful, it lacks cer-
tain properties that we need for any realistic knowledge and semantic representation.
One thing that we need, as we have seen in the introduction, is a bit more flexibility
in the application of functions to arguments. The next section shows how we can
alter the system slightly to get this flexibility.
3.3.4 Extension 1: Inheritance
In the previous section, we saw the term eq that represents a polymorphic predicate;
a function that takes an object type as argument first and then requires individual
objects of that particular type. Such functions are convenient for specifying predicates
that can apply to all kinds of objects.
Sometimes however, we want functions to be applicable to several kinds of objects
but not to all kinds. One way to do tha.t is to introduce predicates over types, such
as the quant predicate that we saw above, and require a proof that the type has the
desired property. However, this makes for more complicated terms.
Another option is to use ireherita~cce or s~btyp~iiiy. This involves changing the
actual rules of type assignment. The idea is to impose a partial ordering on the
object types (the inhabitants of ~s) and allow functions to apply to objects that are
of a`lower' type than the one specified in the type of the function. As far as the rules
are concerned, this only leads to a small adjustment in the A-rule (Application)5:
I'~F:(II~:A.B) I'~a:C I'I-CGA:~S
I' ~ (F-a) : B[x :- a~
However, given the rules that we have seen sofar, tlie expression C G A: 'ks is not
a statement of CTT, let alone that it is provable from a context. Therefore we also
need to extend the definition of statements, and of course we need rules that allow




Note that in such a system terms no longer have a uníque type (module beta-equality), although
they do have a unique smallest type. We will stick to the more conservative definition.
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us to prove these inheritance judgments. The resulting system will be denoted by
CTT~:
Definition 11
A simple statement of CTT~ is of the form M: A, with M, A E T. M is
called the inhabitant, A the type.
Definition 12
An inheritance statement of CTT~ is of the form A G B:~S, with A, B E
T. Here .9 is called the inhabitant.
Definition 13
A statement in CTT~ is either a simple statement or an inheritance state-
ment.
Definition 14
A5 rules of inheritance in CTT~ we propose:
r~y:~s
r, x G y:~S ~ x:~5
SG1
rl-y:~s








(where x is r-fresh)
(where x is r-fresh)
(where x is r-fresh)
Note that inheritance is limited to object types only. As an example of the use of
inheritance, look at the following part of the formalization of electron microscopes in
[Ahn95]:
(79) axobj : ~S
This introduces the abstract concept `axial object': real or virtual objects some-
where along the vertical axis inside the optical system of the electron microscope.
plane : ~S
This introduces planes perpendicular to the optical axis.
p-of : (axobj -~ plane)
The function p-of yields, when applied to an axial object, the plane of the top-
most part of that object.
element G axobj : ~,S
This introduces optical elements. These are the axial objects that are real.
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Because of the introduction of element as a subtype of axobj, we can also apply the
ftmction p-of to every ob,ject of type element.
3.3.5 Extension 2: Definitions
Although we can model knowledge using CTT~ contexts, such contexts fail to capture
some of the dynamic aspects of an agent's knowledge. For instance, one would like
to be able to distinguish between an agent's implicit and explicit knowledge: given
a theory represented by a context in CTT, all facts that follow from this theory are
provable from the context (that is: a proof term can be constructed that inhabits
the type representing the proposit,ion), because of the correspondence between type
theory and intuitionistic logic. This means that if we interpret whatever is in the
context as the beliefs of an agent, propositions that are not in the context itself but
are provable from it are not beliefs of the agent. This is not strong enough. If on
the other hand we interpret everything that follows from the context as beliefs of the
agent, we find ourselves in the undesirable situation that an agent believes everything
that logically follows from her beliefs. This is too strong. We want to impose some
limitations on the agent's reasoning capabilities.
What we would like is to have sorne way to record that an agent has constructed a
certain term. The explicit beliefs then correspond to whatever is in the context plus
the terms that the agent has constructed at some point. Implicit beliefs are those
that is derivable from the context. One way of doing this is by extending contexts
with definitions.
Definitions have been introduced in the Automath project by De Bruijn ([dB80]).
The idea is that when we have the judgment I' ~ M : T, we can add an abbreviation
for the (possibly complex) term 11-7 to the context. Such an abbreviation is of the
form A- M: T, where A is a fresh variable. Using such definitions, we can model
an agent reaching a certain conclusion by adding a new term as abbreviation for the
proof term inhabiting the conclusion proposition to the context. These new terms
themselves may be used in the construction of other terms.
Note that definitions do not make the logic that the calculus corresponds to more
powerful: everything that can be derived using definitions is also derivable without
definitionss.
We will call the calculus with both inheritance and definitions CTT~. The rules
governing the introduction and use of definitions are the following:
6They may however influence the behavior of automated proof systems for CTT. Since the problem
of finding inhabitants for proposition types is undecidable, theorem provers for type theory sometimes
limit the search depth to avoid infinite searches. Using a definition instead of the term itself may
influence the depth assigned to the term, thereby making propositions provable by the algorithm
that otherwise would be undecided.
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Definition 15
. A simple statement of CTT~ is of the form hI : A, with M, A E T.
?II is called the inhabitant, A the type.
~ An inheritance statement of CTT~ is of the form A C B:~S, with
.9, B E T. Here A is called the inhabitant.
. A definition in CTT~ is of the form A- M: B, with A E V (a fresh
variable), B, M E T- Here A is called the inhabitant.
. A statement in CTT~ is either a simple statement, an inheritance
statement, or a definition.
Definition 16
~~'e have two rules for definitions, a Start rule and a Weakening rule:
I'~-y:A
r,x- y: A f- x: A S- (where x is r-fresh)
I'1-A:B I'~y:C
I', x- y: C~ A: B W- (where x is I'-fresh)
As an example of the use of a definition, imagine our agent constructing a proof for
the proposition `the on bit. is equal to the on bit', represented by the CTT term
eq. bit . on . on. This can be proven using the reflexivity axiom for eq, so the proof
term will contain the proof term for that axiom (see the terms we introduced in (78)).
Using a definition, a fresh variable can be introduced which serves as a shorthand for
the proof term:
(80) on-is-on - reflex2.bit.on : eq.bit.on-on
Besides using definitons to distinguish between proofs that have been constructed at
some point and those that haven't, we will also be using them to simplify domain
representations. Starting from basic terms that stand for basic concepts, we can
create new terms to stand for more complex concepts. For instance, in the microscope
representation, each plane is assigned a specific height:
(81) height : ~S
qh : quant - height
height is a quantitative type.
h : (plane --~ height)
The function h associates each plane with its height.
comp : (IIt : ~S . IIp : quant.t . IIx : t . IIy : t . ~p)
This introduces the polymorphic predicate comp which is interpreted as `is
larger t,han'.
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Now we would like to say that one plane precedes another if its height is higher. We
could use axioms for this, which spell out bi-implications, but it is easier to simply
introduce `A precedes B' as meaning that A's height is greater than B's height. We
can do this using a definition:
(82) precedes -
~p : plane . ~q : plane . comp.height.qh.(h.p).(h.q) :
IIp : plane . IIq : plane . ~p
Note the use of the lambdas here to create a funct,ion that takes two arguments of
type plane.
Once such a definition is added to the context, we are allowed to use the precedes
predicate in any subsequently introduced terms.
3.3.6 Extension 3: ~-types
E-types, or existential types, were introduced by Martin-Ldf ([ML84]). They are types
of dependent pairs: from a type A and a family of types B in which ~ : A may occur,
we can form the sum type E~ : A. B. If x does not occur in B, this yields the
cartesian product .9 x B of :4 and B. Inhabitants of such a t,ype Ex :.9 . B are pairs
(a, b) where a: A and b: B[~ :- a].
We will be using the so-called strong E-types. This means that we allow the use of
projection r~ales to recover the individual elements in the pairs that inhabit E-types.
Again, we extend the definition of statements and add rules:
Definition 17
Given a countablv infinite set V of variables and a set S of constants known
as sorts, the set T of pseudoterms over S is extended with T ~e~ EV . T
Definition 18
A E-extension of a PTS (S, A, R) is a set E of triples (sl, s2i s3), where
sl, s.~, s3 E S.
Definition 19
The rules for the formation and use of E-types are:
r~A:sr I',x:Al-B:s2
I' f- (Ex : A . B) : s3 ~ if s1i sz, s3 E E






I' ~ ~rzp : B[~ :- ~rlp]
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~4oreover, the definition of l3-reduction is extended with the following clauses:
Definition 20
The reduction rules for r-types are:
. ~1(a, b) -~p a
. ;~,, (a, b) -r~ b
Such ~-types are not used in the representation of the knowledge of an agent7, but
they do occur in our translations of natural language to extensions of contexts.
We will use the extension
(83) E - {(~s~ ~n~ ~`r~), (~n~ ~v~ ~v)}
Tlie first rule allows us to construct E-types where the first part is an object type, and
the second part, a proposition. These correspond to existential quantification over an
object, as in there is a Pattern on the screen. The second rule allows the introduction
of t,ypes that correspond to a conjunction of two propositions. Such a type can be
used to represent the meaning of sentences sucl~r as there is a~attern on the screen
and ~it is visible.
This concludes the presentation of our particular variant of CTT. In the next section
we focus on how we use this formalism to model communica~tion between agents.
3.4 Modeling communication in CTT
Sofar we have only talked about representing the knowledge (ancí beliefs) of a single
agent in CTT. This knowledge may have connections to some external reality, but this
is not required. Communication is the process whereby agents try to exchange their
knowledge. This means that what is communicated are elements from the s2ibjective
view of agents on the world. In communication, these elements, which are private t~u
the agent, are converted into an utterance which is public. Other agents can pick up
this public utterance and try to decode it in order to recover the private message.
In [AB97], Ahn and Borghuis describe how such an exchange of private concepts
is possible. Limiting ourselves to the case where we have two agents, we rnodel their
knowledge by t,wo separate CTT contexts. We assume that they share some language
t.o communicate in (say English). For an agent to know the language, she has to
be able to linguistically express certain terms in her context. For instance, agent
A expresses the term dog-a by the word dog. Agent B expresses term dog-b as
dog. Now dog-a and dog-b are different terms. The concepts in each of the agents'
contexts are known to the agents only. So each agent links her own concept `dog' to
tlie word dog. Tliey may actually have different ,judgments as to what counts as a dog
and what doesn't. However, since A and B have similar experiences of the world, we
can expect the private concepts of both agents to overlap to a high degree, especially
~Note that the comma in contexts is interpreted as conjucntion, while objects in the context are
implicitly interpreted as being existentially quantified over
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for concepts such as `dog'. If a word in a language corresponds to a concept, this
concept must be shared among agents speaking the language. On the other hand,
individual objects usually don't have a name, even though agents may have terms
representing them. This means that if an agent warrts to communicate about such
an object, she has to describe it in some other way using type information and any
predicates that are true of it.
We assume that for each agent there is a partíal mapping from CTT terms to
words irr the language. The domain of this mapping consists mainly of the object
types and propositions. Kinds and sorts have no linguistic realization. Inhabitants
orily sometimes do: individual objects may in some cases have names assigned t,o
them.
3.4.1 Segments
Suppose an agent wants to communicate part of her knowledge. She has to encode
certain terms in the CTT context that represents her knowledge. For instance, our




dog-a : ~s dog-a Mdog
fido-a : dog-a fido-a MFido
likes-sausages-a :(IIx : dog-a . ~y) likes-sausages-a ~ like sau.sages
p-a : likes-sausages-a~fido-a
B mapping
dog-b : ~s dog-b Mdog
fido-b : dog-b fido-b MFido
likes~ausages-b :(II~ : dog-b . ~p) likes-sausages-b ~ like sausages
We see that agent A has some information that B doesn't have, the proof p-a that
Fido likes sausages.. A can now try to inform B of this fact. So, A selects p-a :
likes~ausages-a.fido to be uttered. In general, more than one statement can be
cornmunicated by a single linguistic utterance, so we assume that the first thing an
agent does when communicating is selecting a sequence of statements to be uttered.
Such a sequence is called a segment.
To communicate the segment [p-a : likes-sausages-a.fido-a], A cannot use the
mapping directly since it is not defined for p-a. That is not so surprising because that
is an inhabitant and we have seen that these usually do not have linguistic realizations.
However, the rules for communication allow A to communicate the e~istence of
a proof for a proposition by uttering a linguistic realization of the proposition itself.
So A has to find a mapping from likes~ausages-a.fido-a to language. Both of the
elements in this complex term have a phrase assigned to them, and by combining
these A can form the phrase Fido likes sav,sages.
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Upon receiving the utterance, B has to do something with it. One of the assump-
tions that B can use is that the utterance is meaningful to her. ~~'hat this means is
explained by the following definitions:
Definition 21
. The empty segment [] is an extending segme~at.
A segment [.~1 : Tr, Az : Tzi ..., An : Tn] is an extending segment of a
context F if ~T I' ~ Tl : T and [A2 : T2i ..., A„ : T„] is an extending
segment of I', .Ar : Tr
. An utterance is meaningfv,l to an agent X if it corresponds to an
extending segment on X's context.
So, B can assume that the meaning of the sentence is an extending segment of her
own context. Using the mapping function backwards, B can decode the utterance to
mean [x : likes~ausages-b.fido-b], where x is some fresh variable. If B believes
what A is telling her, she can accept the segment and extend her c.ontext with it.
Now what would happen if B did not have the statement fido-b -~-~Fido in her
context? In that case A could not use Fido likes sa~asaqes, since it is not meaningful
to B. The most that A could succesfully c.ommunicate is that sonce dog likes sausages,
by selecting a segment to be uttered that does not contain any reference to Fido:
(85) [x : dog-a, p-a : likes~ausages-a.x]
There are several linguistic realizations of this: A dog likes sa~~sages or Tlrere i.s a
dog that likes sa~isaqes. When B receives that, it does correspond to an extending
segrnent for her:
(86) [x : dog-b,y : likes-sausages-b.x]
Again, if B wants to believe this, she can simply extend her context with the segment.
3.4.2 Common and private context
In order for A to be able to decide whether it is better t,o use the segment [p-a :
likes~ausages-a.fido-a] or [x : dog-a,p-a : likes~ausages-a.x] to communicate
Fido likes sausages, she has to know whether B knows Fido. We will assume that
each agent, aside from a context representing her private knowledge, also has a context
representing information that the agent believes to be shared. We will call tlris the
agent's common context. Note that this context is one agent's view of what is shared,
so each agent has her own common context. The context representing the private
knowledge will be called the agent's private context.
Naturally, statements that are in the comnron context have to be present in the
private context as well. That is, the common context can be viewed as subcontext of
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the private context. The common context is also a legal context. It should at least
corrtain those object types and predicates ~vhich are mapped to natural language (after
all, this is what defines the language that both participants are assumed to share).
There are several ways in which we can define the relationship between these
contexts:
. Let the private and the common context be independent structures, and ensure
that the part-of relation is maintained by means of explicit update rules.
. Define the common context as a projection from the private context, for instance
by introducing tags on the statements in the private context.
. Use a modal extension of CTT to define the common and private context as
accessible structures from another, external context.
The third alternative has been studied in [Bor94]. A brief introduction to this modal
extension will be given in section 7.2.2. For now we will simply assume we have some
way of distinguishing between the private and common beliefs of an agent.
Using the common context, an agent can check while selecting a segment to com-
municate which of the statements that she intends to use, are known to the other
agent. Because the common context is a legal context in itself, this means that any
such segrnent will in fact be an extending segment with respect to the common con-
text.
.Iust as the private context can be extended with new statements, the common
context can grow as well. In modeling communication we will assume that once
something has been uttered, both agents will be aware of it, so any extension to the
private context because of such an utterance will also be made to the common context.
3.4.3 Statement polarity
Sofar we have looked at two cases where the information that agents exchanged was
simply added as an extension to the receiving agent's knowledge. However, in many
cases, utterances not only contain new information, but also references to object and
situations which the hearer is supposed to be aware of alreadyg. Such references must
be solved by the hearer by connecting them to the objects before we can say that the
agent has `understood' the utterance. We will call statements corresponding to such
objects negative statements. Statements that represent new information are called
positive statements.
Suppose agent A does not know Fido's name. This means A's mapping function
for fido-a is not defined. However, she does know a dog. And she also knows that
B knows the dog, so fido-a:dog is a statement in A's common context9. Suppose A
again wants to communicate [p-a : likes~ausages-a.fido-a]. Now, A knows that B
81n fact, the word Fido can be seen as an example of this, but names behave slightly differently
than other linguistic vehicles of `given' information.
9Recall that fido-a is just a term we use which could just as well be dog23. t is the mapping
that determines whether an agent knows this dog's name.
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knows this dog. And she also knows that there is no other dog commonly known to
them. In such a case A can use the uniqueness of the dog to provide a clue to B which
object she is referring to. In other words, A can choose to use a definite description
the dog, based on the fact that only one object of this type is common. So A says
The dog likes sansages.
Upon receiving the utterance, we assume that B assigns it a segment much like
the one for A dog likes sa~esages:
(87) [x : dog-b, y : likes-sausages-b-x]
However, in this case, the variable ~ is just a`placeholder' for some actual object (CTT
term) that B has to find in her own common context. We will call such a variable that
needs to be linked to something else a para~neter. Looking in her common context,
B realizes there is indeed a unique dog, fido-b. Once x has been linked to this terin,
the statement ~: dog-b is no longer relevant, and the extending segment becomes
(88) [y : likes~ausages-b.fido-b]
Definite descriptions can correspond to multiple statements. Suppose that both agents
know two dogs, dog 1 and dog 2, and both know that dog 2 is fat. So they will have
proof terms pf-a : fat-a.d2-a and pf-b : fat-b.d2-b, and both of them know how
to express their individual `fat' concept. Then agent A can tell agent B that, dog 2
likes sausages by saying the fat dog likes sansayes, which to agent B corresponds to
the segment
(89) [~ : dog-b, y : fat-b.x, z: likes-sausages-b.x]
In that case the referring expression has given rise to two parameters that need to
be bound simultaneously to objects in the context: ~ and y. If B knows that it is
common knowledge that dog 2 is the fat dog, she can instantiate z as d2-b and y as
pf-b. Again the negative statements become irrelevant and B's segment is
(90) [z : likes-sausages-b-d2-b]
Parameters also form the difference between a declarative utterance and a question. In
the case of a declarative utterance, the listener can simply add the extending segment
to her knowledge. In the case of a question some variables are parameters, and the
process of finding an answer is actually t.he process of finding possible referents for
the parameters.
To represent the difference between parameters that need to be filled in and other
kinds of terms, we need to extend the representation formalism. In the next section
we will therefore introduce annotations for segments.
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3.5 Annotated segments
In the previous sections we have seen that CTT segments can he used to represent
the semantic content of an utterance. For a dialogue system t.his is not enough.
An utterance also has prag~natic features. For instance, we need to have different
represent,ations for the meaning of the sentences
(91) (a) Which Lundle reaches the screen?
(b) Is there a óundle t.hat reaches the screen?
When converted to CTT, the semantic contents of both sentences are representable
by the same segment:
(92) [b : bundle, s: screen, q: reach.b-s]
The fact that the bundle b is actuall,y introduced by a wh-element in the surface
string (91a) is not clear from this representation. Now we could extend our CTT
forrnalization with a predicate to encode this information:
(93) iswh : (IIa, : bundle . ~r)
We could then represent (91a) by:
(94) [6 : bundle, s: screen, q : reach.b.s, w : iswh.b]
There are several reasons for not doing this:
. Encoding information inside the CTT representation means it. is provahle at any
time. So, we cannot use this for information that is time-dependent. However,
a lot of the pragmatic information that we want to represent does change over
time.
. We do not need the full reasoning capacity of CTT for the pragmatic informa-
tion. Most of the information can be encoded by simple attribute-value pairs
that can be examined and updated. Putting these inside the CTT representa-
tion complicates the reasoning about the domain a.pplication.
. The most serious problem with such an option is that it does not reflect the fact
that there is a funcíamental difference between information that is conveyed by
a message, and information that is needed to interpret that message. It also
leads to circularity: the agent does not know that the parameter w in (94) is a
proof term that does not need to be bound but is new information. For all she
knows it could be something that needs to be checked in the context. And to
determine this, one again needs information about the pararneter w itself!
So instead, we have opted for adding an extra level of information to the CTT seg-
ment formalism: annotations.
64 CHAPTER 3. CTT AND COMMUNIC.4TION
Definition 22
. Let N be a set of constants called featv,re na~nes.
. Let App be a function from N t,o a set of appropriate list values V.
. An annotation or featnre is a pair (N,V), s.t. N E N and V E
.9pp(N). The set of all annotations is denoted by A.
. fn is a projection function from .A ~ N such that for all (N, V) E A,
fn((N,V)) - N.
. f v is a projection function from A-~ V such that for all (N, V) E A,
fv((N,V)) - V.
. An annotated seg~rcent is a pair ( S, A) consisting of a CTT segment
S and a set of annotations A such that `dal E A, da2 E A(( fn(ar )-
fn(az)) ~ ar - az), i.e. each annotation has a different name.
The original specification of the annotated segment language can be found in [Piw95].
These annotations contain pragmatic information in the form of attribute-value
pairs. One of the features that we will assume is wh, the value of which is a list
of those CTT parameters in the segment that correspond to objects introduced by
wh-phrases. This information can be checked when trying to produce an adequate
response to the input. For instance an agent can try to answer a wh-question by
finding possible instantiations of the marker in one of the contexts. These can then
be communicated back, the result being that the partner receives an answer to her
question.
We also use annotations to be able to represent information that we do not want in
the segment but which strictly speaking is part of the propositional content, such as
temporal information. Likewise the meaning of several verbs, dealing with intensions
of the participants, are represented through annotations.
The value of every feature is a list. If in the annotation set a certain feature name
does not occur we assume that the corresponding feature has value [].
The features that we assume for the representation of utterances are:
. rb (requires binding) Value: a list of lists of parameters
Description: indicates which parameters in the segment need to be bound to
objects in the context. Since an object can be represented by several statements,
each object is represented by a list of parameters in the rb annotation.
. mt (marker type)
Value: a list of marker-markertype pairs
Description: for each element in the rb annotation, there is one entry in mt
indicating the marker type used to introduce the object. This reflects whether
we are dealing with a definite description, a pronoun, or a demonstrative etc.
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. exta (external agent)
Value: a list of marker-participant pairs
Description: records information about events that are perceived to be caused
by one of the participants; the user or the system.
. rp (responsible participant)
Value: [rp(P, [Para7rze.ters])]
Description: keeps track of who uttered the sentence. The value contains the
markers of the `new' inforrnation in the sentence, and P which is a referent for
one of the participants.
. vc (complex verb construction)
Value: [verb-cons ( P~ , Lï , Pz , Vz ,11~I ) ]
Description: used to represent verbs that refer to things outside the domain,
such as the participants themselves. Vr represents modal verbs (can, must, ...)
and attitude verbs (want, wish), and Vz meta-communicative verbs (tell, ask,
know, mean). Pr is the subject of Lí, Pz the subject of Pz (both are participants).
ll1 contains the parameter that correspond to the event that is modified by these
verbs.
. tt (temporal tags)
Value: [temp-tags(C,T3,T„~)]
Description: provides limited support for representing temporal information. C
stands for a temporal connective, such as while, until etc. that relates TS, the
event in the subordinate clause, to T„~, the event in the main clause. Both Ts
and T„~ are temporal markers: predicates on CTT parameters.
. imp (imperative)
Value: parameter-boolean list
Description: records which proof parameters correspond to imperatives in the




Description: lists the punctuation type (question mark, exclamation mark, etc.)
in the original sentence for each proof parameter.
. inv (syntactic inversion)
Value: parameter-boolean list
Description: tells us which parameters are inhabitants of proposition types that
come from inverted verb phrases. This indicates that those propositions are
actually questions.
. whval (wh-elements)
Value: list of parameters
Description: lists which parameters were introduced by a wh-element.
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. ri (requested information)
Value: list of parameters
Description: keeps track of which objects are to be identified, and which propo-
sitions (referred to by the proof objects) have to be explained by the system.
. ra (requested action)
Value: list of parameters
Description: keeps track of the actions that the speaker has requested the hearer
to perform, directly or indirectly. They are denoted by the inhabitants of the
propositions that stand for the actions.
. rel (discourse relation)
Value: [answer(U)]
Description: indicates which utterance this is an answer to. The utterauce that
was the original question is denoted by the utterance referent U.
. error (error messages)
Value: list of problems
Description: this is used in case there is a problem during interpretation. The
nature of the problem is added as a value of this feature so that it can be used
to inform the user.
. du (discourse update)
Value: list of statements
Description: the value is a list containing statements that must be added to
the dialogue context if this annotated segment is selected as the intended one.
Allows us to postpone updating the dialogue until after the selection process.
For example, the sentence can yon increase the voltage?, when spoken by an agent u to
a hearer s, is assigned the following segment (see (78) on page 52 for the explanation
of the terms):
(95) [v : voltage, e: event, p: incr.voltage.qv-v.e]
This contains the propositional part that refers to the domain, i.e. a voltage increases.
The information that v is a definite and that the speaker wants the hearer to do it
(that is, find a referent for the event e), is represented by annotations:
(96)
ra - [e]
rp - [rp(u, [e] )]
tt - [temp-tags(nil,nil,presentsmperfect(e))]
exta - [e ; s]
rb - [[v]]
mt - [v ; def-art]
imp - [e;false]
vc - [verb-cons(s,can,nil,nil, [e])]
punc - [e;questmrk]
inv - [e;true]
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The first annotation, ra, represents that e is a parameter that needs to be bound by
performing an action.
The value of rp contains the referent u for the speaker.
The temporal information tt for this sentence is limited: there is onl,y one event,
and no temporal connective. The tense for event e is present imperfect.
The exta annotation informs the hearer that it is supposed to do the action that
leads to the existence of the event e.
The annotation rb indicates the negative polarity of the v: voltage statement,
while the mt annotation informs the interpreting agent in what wa~y it should be
linked to the context.
The imp annotation is set to false here, because there is no imperative used in
the utterance.
The fa.ct that the speaker asked whether the hearer can do it, can be read off
from the vc annotation. The hearer needs this information to decide whether this
is a question about the hearer's ability to perform actions, or an indirect request to
actually perform the action. This depends on whether it is already common knowledge
that the hearer can perform such kinds of actions.
Finally, from the punc and inv action, it is clear that the syntactic form used in
the utterance is that of a question.
So, the segment and the annotations together form the full representation of the
meaning of the utterance. The segment contains that information that is about the
dornain, while the annotations guide the system in connecting the information to the
context and tell it what to do with it after it has been disambiguated.
3.6 The basic context
As we saw before, for communication to take place, agents rnust share at least the
same kinds, types, predicates and propositions. Of course, what exactly is included
in the vocabulary depends on the precise formalization of the domain.
Independent of the precise domain, communication through natural language pre-
supposes the availability of some basic predicates in any agent's context. These pred-
icates in a way encode the linguistic knowledge agents must have for talking about
any domain. This knowledge includes what lexical semanticists would call se~nantic
~rimitives such as for instance a theory of causality, a theory of identity, and a theory
of plurality. Needless to say the specifics of this knowledge depend on the actual
natural language that is used by the agents.
Some words in a natural language are more general than others, in the sense that
they will occur in conversations about almost every subject. These are connected to
relations in the underlying domain that we will also encounter in the next chapter
because they are important in various disambiguation algorithms.
We will look at some of these words here and see how we could represent their meaning
in CTT.
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The first thing we need to look at is the verb to be. We will assurne that this verb
has two basic uses in English:
. to denote ident.ity of two objects, as in Fido is my doy
. t,o assign a property to an object, as in The doy is mea~a
In the seconcí type of sentences, the meaning of the verb seems to be rather empty:
the verb is there to indicate tense, but the property is derived from the meaning of
the predicate.
However, to denote the identity of two objects, we have to assume the presence of
some identity predicate. We have seen an example of such a predicate already in the
form of the term eq in the formalization used in DENK of an electron microscope:
(97) eq : (lIt : ~s . IIp : t . IIq : t . ~p)
Because of the polymorphic nature of this term, it can be used with any object type
and thus is domain-independent.
Another verb that should probably be included in any domain, would be the verb
to have. This verb also has several meanings: it might incíicate legal possession,
actual possession, a part-whole relation etcetera. Because of this vagueness in the
meaning, it is almost irnpossible to enumerate all these meanings, although in any
given domain, it should be clear for specific cases what the precise relation is that
holds between the objects.
For now however, we shall simply assurne the existence of a predicate that may hold
bet,ween any two objects. One might therefore be tempted to introduce a term such
as
(98) has : (lIt : ~, . IIs : ~S . IIp : t . ITq : s . ~r,)
But note that this creates very complex propositions, and unlike the case for eq,
where the object type is required to be identica-1, or at least compatible, between the
two individual objects that the predicate applies to, the type of the objects is not
important for the truth of the proposition. For this reason we propose to use a more
simple version of such a term, based on the following assumption:
In every formalizat,ion of a task domain, we let every object type inherit from a
highest type calleci toptype.
So every object type T will be introduced through an inheritance statement T C
toptype :~S. Note that due to the transitivity of the inheritance relation a type
doesn't have to be introduced as a subtype of toptype directly, but can also be
specified as inheriting from some other type that ultimately inherits from toptype.
Using this toptype, we can introduce our predicate that representes the meanirrg
of to have as a sirnple binary II-term:
(99) has : (IIp : toptype . lIy : toptype . ~r,)
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Figure 3.2: An agent's initial common context
Another predicate that will be introduced in the same way is a related one that can
be used for the representation of a generic possessive relation such as can be found in
noun phrases of the form the X of Y. To represent this we also introduce:
(100) of : (IIp : toptype . IIq : toptype . ~p)
And of course, we assume the existence of a negation function on propositions:
(101) not : (~r -3 ~p)
Aside from such general predicates, we should also consider adding several ling~eistic
th.eories to the context, which allow the representation of such phenomena as tense,
aspect, number, gender etc.
Since CTT corresponds to higher-order logic, an,y existing theory about these phe-
nomena can be encoded into type theory. However, in some cases we can actually
exploit the added power that type theory gives us compared to predicate logic, and
use theories that are strictly beyond those presented in predicate logic. In appendix A
we give an example of one such theory: a theory of plurality.
So, to be able to interpret natural language utterances, we will assume that an
agent who can speak the language has an initial private context that contains the
following components (see figure 3.2):
. The top type toptype
. Several dornain-independent predicates such as eq and of
. Several linguistic theories (events, plurals)
. The domain dependent types and functions
Given the presence of this initial context, an agent can engage into conversation with
other agents since she has concepts for words in the language. Note that because all
agents in the communication share at least thís initial context, we can assume that
the common context for an agent consists of at least the initial context as well.
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In this section we have seen how communication between agents can be defined as
the exchange of encoded elements from their knowledge. The way the information is
expressed depends on what knowledge is shared with other agents. These considera-
tions led to a model of the information available to communication agents. A question
that comes to mind now is to what extent we can use this information as the basis of
a model of context. This is the topic of the next section.
3.7 CTT contexts as a model of context
From a general perspective, the problem of interpretation has the following properties:
For the interpretation of an utterance we need information about many aspects of
the physical situation, the beliefs of the participants, the social situation, the recent
unfolding of the dialogue etc. A11 these factors together form the context of the
utterance arrd must be t,aken into account during its interpretation (see chapter 2).
We can simplify this somewhat by only taking into account the model of this
context that the hearer has: after all, she is the one having to interpret the utterance
by cornbining the different kinds of information. This rneans the only contextual
information that is relevant is that which she has access to. This does not mean that
we can restrict ourselves to using the current beliefs and knowledge of the hearer
as the only source of contextual information: the hearer might have to use direct
observation of the task domain to extend her knowledge with facts that she had not
noticed thusfar (see next section).
Given that all the contextual information that can influence an agent's interpreta-
tion of an utterance has to be known by the agent, and given that we have modeled
an agent's knowledge using a sma.ll nurnber of CTT contexts, the question arises to
what extent this CTT representation sufFrces as a context rnodel for natural language
interpretation.
In clrapter 2, we listed the following kinds of information that have been proposed
in the literature about context:
. Previous dialogue (verbatim): to record the occurrence of utterances
. Previous dia.logue (interpreted): contains the semantic content of the dialogue
sofar. It should be structured to allow the calculation of the salience of possible
reference for anaphoric terms
. Partner model: a representation of the beliefs and intentions of the other dia-
logue participants
. Discourse situation: a specification of the contextual parameters to provide the
interpretation of indexicals
. World knowledge~task information: to provide information necessary to inter-
pret contextual operators, negative intensional adjectives and indirect reference
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. Current subject: narrows down the possible interpretations of utterances by
forcing specific interpretations of task-related terms
. Processing status: contains inforrnation about an agent's problems or success
at arriving at an interpretation of utterances, and time estimates for finishing
the task
. Grounding status: specifies whether interpreted information has been accepted
and acknowledged by an agent
. Reactive pressures: to keep track of social obligations and roles in conversations
. Charinel status: contains information about the availability of a communication
channel, and about the attention of the other discourse participants
We will checlc these one by one and see whether it is present in a CTT context.
. Previous dialogue (verbatim)
Unless we extend the linguistic knowledge represented in CTT with objects such
as strings, it is hard to represent utterances verbatim.
. Previous dialogue (interpreted)
We are interpreting utterances as possible extensions of the context, such exten-
sions could in theory be added to the context itself in the form of introductions
and definitions. The introductions represent new information available to the
agent, such as new facts and new objects. Definitions simply record the fact
that objects and facts have been mentioned again. This allows us to derive a
notion of salience from the context.
. Partner model
Using modal operators (see section 7.2.2), beliefs of other agents can be included
in an agent's context representation. Through the use of definitions, this could
also include information about other agent's current view of the salience of
objects.
. Discourse situation
We cannot simply use predicates to represent the contextual parameters because
the knowledge of an agent as modeled by a CTT context is monotonous: once we
add information that a certain person is the speaker, this will always be provable.
So we rnust in some way make this information dependent on time, for instance
by adding a type utterance the inhabitants of which are representatives of
the utterances. We can then have functions such as speaker :(utterance ~
person). Such a strategy of having objects inside the context that represent
individual utterances is also convenient for the representation of other kinds of
contextual information, as we will see below.
. World knowledge~task information
Since CTT corresponds to arbitrary higher-order predicate logic, this should be
no problem.
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. Current subject
To represent this, one would need some kind of inechanism of focusing on specific
parts of the knowledge of an agent. In secion 7.2.2 we will sketch how the context
logic of McCarthy and Buvac could be incorporated in CTT.
. Processing status
As with the representation of the contextual parameters, this is highly dynamic
information and as such cannot get a simple representation in CTT itself.
. Grounding status
This too is a form of information that is dynamic and changes with time.
. Reactive pressures
The reactive pressures ca.n be modeled as functions that take representations of
utterances as arguments.
. Channel status
The channel status is highly dynamic and may charrge between the interpreta-
tion of utterances. It should not be represented inside CTT.
Given some representation of individual utterances, we are left with the following
types of information that fall outside of what can be represented within CTT contexts:
. The verbatim representation of the previous dialogue
. The current subject (will be taken up in section 7.2.2)
. The processing status
. The grounding status
. The channel status
In the next section, we will present the actual model of context that is used in the
DEtvK system.
3.8 The DENK context model
In the DE1vK context model, which is based on the underlying triangle view on com-
munication, we have two sources of contextual information: the cooperative assistant's
beliefs and the domain as it is represented in an animation system, which is observ-
able by the assistant and the user. However, we will re-integrate these two sources
of information (current beliefs and possible observations) by modeling the possible
results of direct observations as just another mode of knowledge: just as we distin-
guish between private beliefs and common knowledge, we will discern a third mode:
observable knowledge.
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Intermission: Non-monotonicity
Most domains exhibit some degree of non-monotonicity: facts that hold at one moment,
may not hold at another time. To model this in a type-theoretical setting, we have
several options:
~ Do non-monotonous updates on the contexts.
This means we might have to remove statements from the contexts. This will
lead to other statements becoming ill-formed, and these also have to be removed.
However, CTT is quite suited for doing this, since any information that depends
on some information that gets removed, will have the inhabitant of the removed
information as a term inside its own proof term. This makes truth-maintenance
in a CTT system ]ess difficult that in a system that lacks such explicit relations
between of propositions.
~ Use time-dependent ob,jects.
The representation of CTT terms can be extended with a time parameter, that
encodes the `perishability' of information, for instance by tagging each inhabitant
with a tuple representing the interval in which it is true. The CTT rules should
then be extended with requirements on these intervals.
~ Change the perspective.
This idea is presented by Ahn in (Ahn96]. Instead of thinking about entities as
that exist in time and change in time, we can take the opposite view: objects
do ttot change. Any change in an entity is actually the creation of a new object.
An object, in this view, only has fixed properties, so information cannot be true
at one time and false at some later time. The price for this is that we lose the
notion of an `individual' in the representation. An individual will consist of a
series of objects connected through events that somehow changed the individual.
~ Use non-reusable objects.
This is the actual strategy that is followed in the DenK system. Certain proof
terms have a limited life-span, namely those that are linked to observations.
The observation of a fact leads to the creation of a CTT representation of that
fact, with a fresh inhabitant. However, this inhabitant comes from a certain
subset of variables. At meta-level, it is known that these variables correspond
to observations, and hence any propositions containing such variables will not be
added to common knowledge or in any other way be allowed to be represented
in any of the other CTT contexts. This way, the only information in the CTT
contexts corresponds to information that is always true.
This last option, using observations as the basis for non-monotonous information, also
provides us with a possible representation for the channe! stntus, which as we have
seen, should not be represented inside CTT contexts precisely because of its dynamic
character. If we make the channel status observable, it can be accessed by the agent in
the same way as other dynamic domain information.
The three modes of knowledge: private, common and observable, form the se~nantic
background against which we interpret utterances: they contain information that is
related to the domain. However, which information is contained in which subcon-
text is relevant for certain prag~natic phenomena, since this for instance allows us to
distinguish between given and new information: parts of the utterance that are pre-
sented as given will have to be interpreted as information which the speaker and the
hearer already share, whereas parts of the utterance that are new, should be either
private information (for instance, if the utterance is to be interpreted as a question)
or information that is private to the speaker, ín which case the hearer has the option
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Figure 3.3: Three forms of knowledge form the `semantic background'
of adding this to his private and the common knowledge (for instance, in the case of
a cornmand).
~'Ve saw in section 2.2.G that in order to have cooperative dialogues, we should
include some system of extending the representation format of utterances with extra
struct,ure to allow representing utterances which, from a domaín perspective, are ill-
formed. One of the reasons an utterance is ill-formed is that some of the information
which is encoded as `given', cannot be identified by the hearer in his own knowledge.
We cannot simply ignore such utterances and discard them, since the speaker may
continue wit,h further utterances that build on these non-interpreted parts of the
cunversatiou. To this end, we add a component to the context model that holds such
pa~rtially interpreted utterances. This has the following effects:
. Information in the partially interpreted utterances can serve as`forward looking
centers' which further utterances can make anaphoric links to.
. The agent can ask for clarification to try and solicit the missing inforrnation
from the speaker, and on when further information, is given, try to interpret
the utterance again.
Following [Piw95], we will assume the presence of a pendiny stack that contains an-
not,ated segrnents. This stack serves as the work space that underlies the functioning
of a dialogue management algorithm. Dialogue moves are defined that are sensitive
to the current state of the stack, and that change the stack itself, i.e. they perform
pushes and pops on the stack.
So, our context model is composecí of two major components: the representation of
the semantic information in the form of three nested CTT contexts, and the pending
stack, containing uninterpreted and~or unacknowledged utterances (figure 3.4). It is
this model that will serve as the basis for our disambiguation algorithm. In the next
section, we will indicate how such a model of context compares t.o the context notions
found in the literature.









3.9 Comparison with other models of context
The most inrportarrt feature of the way we model context is that we only concern
ourselves with an agent's view of the context, rather than some absolute notion of
`the' context of an utterance.
If we compare our model with the notion of context that we assumed was present in
DRT, this is one of the major differences. Although Ahn and Kolb showed that CTT
is a generalization of DRT, and CTT contexts generalizations of DRSs, this is only
true if we assume the CTT context reflects the beliefs of an omniscient being. In that
case the notion of context becomes absolute of course.
The observations that we allow in our context model enable us to get the information
that Kaplan and Sag and others introduced into their semantics via contextual pa-
rameters. So, we assume that the identity of the speaker and the audience, the time
and even the presence and absence of objects can be observed in the domain. We
can also use observation for accessing the information which Bunt proposed regarding
channel status.
What is somewhat missing from our context model is any reference to discourse
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structure and discourse relations. The only discourse structure we allow is represented
in the pending stack. The utterances that are on this stack bear some relation to each
other, such as question~answer or sentence~clarification question. However, once aar
answer has been acknowledged or an uninterpreted sentence has been clarified, they
disappear from the stack. This means we do not have any representation of the
discourse structure of the entire communication process. However, we do not expect
that it would be useful to have such information since the types of dialogue that we
wish to be able to interpret do not exhibit the kind of segmentation and interruptions
that prompted the introduction of discourse structures. The intentional state on the
other hand is present, but not as part of the context. The intentions of the speaker
are recognized by the system on the basis of syntactic information in the sentence or
the occurrence of certain types of verbs in the utterance. The deduced intention of
the speaker with each sentence is added to the representation of that sentence a.nd
subsequently the system will try to fulfill the intentions of the speaker. Once it has
done that, all pragmatic information about the sentence is discarded.
Similar remarks can be made when we compare our context model with the conversa-
tional contexts of Poesio and Traum. However, their model also includes information
about the grounding status of objects and propositions. Our model contains such
information as well, in the pending context.
If we compare our model to what has been proposed in Situation Sernantics, it is ob-
vious that there are some similarities. Again, what they call the discourse situation,
containing information about the speaker etc, is available in our model as through
observations. However, the `speaker's connections' that they propose for the inter-
pretation of referring expressions is absent in our model for the simple reason that
it is the hearer who has to determine the referents of such expressions, and she has
no access to the beliefs of the speaker. She does have access to her representation of
what she thinks is shared knowledge between her and the speaker and she will use
that to guide her search for possible referents. A similar argument can be rnade for
the absence of resource situations that determine the referents of definite descriptions.
The approach to contexts that McCarthy and Buvac have proposed is not currently
available in our model of context. However, we will discuss possible ways to integrate
it with CTT in section 7.2.2.
Given the above considerations, we conclude that our context model should be rich
enough for the succesful interpretation of natural language by resolving a substantial
amount of the ambiguity in a fixed domain. In chapter 5 we will present disambigua-
tion algorithms that exploit our context model. But first we have to specify in what
format the input of such disambiguation algorithms can be given. This is the topic




In chapter 2 we have examined the information that needs to be available in our
context model as well as possible representations for this information. We also need
to consider what kind of representation is most useful for the information provided
by the input (the user's utterance) at the point in a system where this is combined
with c.ontextual information.
Starting from a simple string representation of a text, there are three difFerent
architectures possible for a natural language understanding system that uses context





















Figure 4.1: Three possible architectures for a system using context
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. Interleave the syntactic parsing of the string with contextual disambiguation:
this means at every possible choice point in the analysis process, the context
model can be applied for guiding the parsing and interpretation (the interleaved
inodel).
. Use a specially designed language that can encode ambiguities, and let the
parsing component yield one representation (or at least a very small number of
representations) in such a language as output (the underspecification model).
. Allow the parsing component to yield multiple unambiguous outputs, which
are then checked against the context model for consistency and relevance (the
generate-and-test model).
The underspecification model, wliere we have separate parsing and interpretation
steps, is the most general of the three. The other two can be seen as borderline
cases. First observe that for any given string, the string itself is an underspecified
representation. In this extreme case, t.he `parsing' step would in fact do nothing and
we have something similar to the interleaved model. The other extreme case is to
take as `underspecified' representation the set of all possible interpretations in some
target language. This of course gives us the generate-and-test model.
The underspecification model separates the parsing problem from the interpre-
tation problem, without dramatically increasing the number of structures that are
generated. However, it does assume that we can actually find a format for repre-
senting the ambiguous output of the parsing component, and it requires a parsing
component that is tailored to take advantage of such an underspecified representation
format.
In the next section we will look at languages for underspecified representations in
more detail. For the moment we will concentrate on the question of what t,he minimal
requirements are for such underspecification languages.
There seems to be a trade-off between the number of structures that a parsing
component returns for a given input, and the depth of the interpretation that it
performs (that is, how much ambiguity is left in the representation). To be useful, an
underspecification language should be such that a parsing component returns fewer
structures than there are possible interpretations (otherwise we might as well use the
generate-and-test model), and encode a deeper level of interpretation than the surface
string. See figure 4.2.
Given an underspecified representation and a formalized context, disambiguation
can have one of the following three effects:
. The result is a single expression in the target language.
. The result is more than one expression in the target language (i.e. the utterance
contains an unresolvable a~nbiguity).
. The result is not an expression in the target language (i.e. the utterance is
v.ninterpretable).

















Figure 4.2: The trade-off between depth and number of interpretations in the different
models
For a dialogue system, the last case is undesirable. If an utterance yields an un-
interpretable meaning representation, no adequate response can be calculated. To
avoid this, a target language should be constructed such that a large number of phe-
nomena that might cause problems with interpretation can be represented inside the
language. This means that the target language chosen should be more expressive than
the language that describes the domain of conversation.
4.2 Underspecification languages
First we will define some terms that we will be using throughout this chapter. We
use the term interpretation to denote any representation in some specific language.
This means that the notion of what counts as an interpretation is defined by that
language. Arry meaning representation that corresponds to a number of possible
interpretations is assumed to be an underspecified representation. On the other hand,
if that language, according to our intuitions, also allows some aspects of the meaning
of an utterance to be left open, we will not call tlrat underspecification. So, when Allen
([A1193]), in talking about strategies for tlre representation of ambiguity, notes that
ambiguity must be representable in the knowledge representation language because
it rnay remain over several sentences, such a representation will not be considered to
be underspecified by us.
On the other hand, given some a language L[, we may have another language LZ
which supports underspecification with respect to Lr, and we can decide to use this
L.~ as the final representation language for utterances. In such a setup disambiguation
does not necessarily yield an interpretation with respect to L[.
In this section we will review some of the underspecification formalisms and techniques
that have been proposed for different forms of ambiguity. The kinds of ambiguity that
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are most often dealt with by such proposals are:
. scopal ambiguity and distributive~collective readings
Sentences involving multiple quantifiers or other scope-bearing elements usually
have more than one logically possible interpretation. For instance, the sentence
every liny~istic stu,dent has read a book by Chomsky might mean that there is
a single book by Chomsky which every linguistic student has read, or it might
mean that for every linguistic student there is some book by Chomsky that he
or she has read. Similarly, the sentence two exa~niners rnarked six scripts has
severa.l interpretations depedning on whether we assume that each examiner
marked six scripts individually or that they shared the work between them.
. attachment ambiguity
Tliis kind of ambiguity arises for instance with sentences containing preposi-
tional phrases at the end such as John saw the ~nan with the binoculars where
either John could be the one holding the binoculars, or the man that he saw.
This ambiguity is usually considered to be of a syntactic nature: the different
interpretations correspond to different grammatical analyses.
. lexical ambiguity
Lexical ambiguity is the kind of ambiguity that we have in the case of homonyms:
words that are spelled the same and have the same syntactic category, but have
different meanings. An example is John walked towards tltie bank, where we could
either mean a building that houses a financial institution, or an area along a.
river.
. semantic vagueness
Semantic vagueness is used to describe any situation in which we have an unspec-
ified semantic relation between objects. An example are noun-noun compounds
such as co~nputer ~nessage, which might mean a message generated by a com-
puter, or intended for a computer, or sent through a computer etc. The different
semantic functions that we encountered iri the work on extended reference and
coercion (section 2.2.2) can also be seen as a form of semantic vagueness.
. referential ambiguity
Referential ambiguity is quite common in natural language. Pronouns, demon-
stratives, definite descriptions, all refer to objects, events or people, and only
by looking at the context can we determine what the referents are.
In the following sections proposals to represent these different forms of ambiguity are
presented. In section 4.2.6 we will summarize the techniques used in the different
approaches and draw some conclusions.
4.2.1 Scopal ambiguity
Scopal ambiguity has been the subject of much of the work on underspecification.
One of the reasons for this is that the number of interpretations for a sentence with n
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quantifiers can be as high as n!, so for some sentences it might be almost impossible
to generate and test all possibilities. The approaches can be divided into four types:
minimal readings, in-situ quantifiers, meta-languages and ambiguous operators~terrns.
Each of these will be described in the next sections.
Minimal readings for quantifiers
An idea that appears in several authors' work, is to use a minimal readiny to encode a
scopally ambiguous meaning. This kind of proposal may be found in [KC81], [VV96]
and [Hob83].
Kempson and Cormack begin with discussing sentences with a universal and an
existential quantifier such as:
(102) Every liny~aistic student has read a book by Clzomsk,y.
They propose to use a single semantic representation for this sentence because
the two possible readings are not independent. After all, if there is some book by
Chomsky that every linguistic student has read (the strong interpretation), then it is
also true that for every linguistic student there is some book by Chomsky that he or
she lias read (the weak interpretation). Such sentences should be analyzed as being
unambiguous, having only the weak interpretation.
Similarly, they try to find some representation that may be used to express all
possible readings for sentences involving other quantifiers. For example the sentence
(103) Two e~aminers marked si~ scripts.
Logically, we can distinguish four irrterpretations for this sentence:
. Two exanriners marked six scripts each (subject noun phrase has wide scope)
. Two examiners as a group marked a group of six scripts between them (`incom-
plete group' interpretation)
. Six scripts were each marked by two examiners (object noun phrase has wide
scope)
. Two examiners each marked the same set of six scripts (`complete group' inter-
pretation)
Kempson and Cormack argue that these difierent interpretations are not unrelated.
The sentences are not semantically ambigv,ous with respect to the inter-relations be-
tween the individual numbers of the sets, but are rather unspecified as to the nature
of this inter-relation.
Although none of the interpretations of this sentence is entailed by the other
three, there are relations between them: the incornplete group interpretation entails
both the subject wide scope and the object wide scope reading, while the complete
group interpretation entails the other three interpretations, so it is the strongest
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reading. Since none of the readings is the weakest, in that it follows from each of the
others, Kempson and Cormack propose the following formula to represent the general
meaning of the sentence
(104) ~X2 dx E X2 3S6 ~s E S6 111xs ~~S6 b's E S6 ~X2 ~x E Xz Mxs
where X2 C X is a set of two examiners, and Ss C S is a set of six scripts. This
formula can be paraphrased as: there are at least two examiners for each of which
it holds that he marked a script, and there are at least six scripts, each of which
was marked by an examiner. Note that this itself is not a valid interpretation of the
sentence; it is too weak. A similar idea can be found in [Bun81], where it is called
~,nspecific q~an,tification..
To generate the specific interpretations from this general representation, the au-
thors propose the following two procedures:
(105) Replace `~x E X,~' by `dx E Xn' ( generalising)
Replace `b'x E X,~~Y' by `~Ybx E Xn' (uniformising)
If we apply the generalisation rule to the first conjuct of (104), the second conjunct
becomes redundant and we get the subject wide scope interpretation:
(106) ~XZ dx E X2 ~S6 d s E S6 Mxs (~~56 ds E S6 3X2 ~x E XZ Mxs)
If on the other hand we apply the generalisation rule to the second conjuct of (104),
then the first conjunct becomes redundant and we get the object wide scope interpre-
tation:
(107) (~X2 da, E Xz ~S6 ~s E Ss ll7xs n)~S6 b's E S6 3?~'., dx E.~l ll~Ir:s
Applying uniformisation to this object wide scope interpretation (or to the subject
wide scope interpretation) yields the complete group interpretation:
(108) ~Ss 3Xz ds E Ss b'x E Xz Mxs
Finally, if we directly apply uniformising to both conjuncts in (104), we get this
formula:
(109) ~XZ SS6 dx E Xz ~s E S6 Mxs n~S6 ~Xl b's E S6 ~x E Xz Mxs
If we furthermore add the constraint that every noun phrase that has a reference has
precisely one assignment of reference, the existential quantifications can be collapsed
and we get the incomplete group interpretation:
(110) ~XZ 3S6 (dx E X2 ~s E S6 Mxs h ds E Ss 3x E Xz Mxs)
The example with the first-order quantifiers, (102), can also be handled by these
procedures, given that we give the first order quantifiers a higher-order meaning by
adding an existential quantification over the sets. Then the mimimal reading of (102)
is represented as
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(111) ~S d.s E S~Bl ~b E B, Rsb n 3Br db E Br ~S ~s E S Rsb
but here the second conjunct is redimdant since the second noun phrase is interpreted
as a singleton set Bl. This means the first conjunct by itself may be taken as the
minimal reading and this corresponds to the subject wide scope irrterpretation since
the singleton set of books can vary with each student.
Applying generalisation does not strengthen this interpretation, since ~b E B1 is
just as strong as db E Bl if Br is a singleton.
On the other hand, applying uniformisation to the first conjunct does give another
interpretation: the object wide scope interpretation, since Br is a singleton set the
~b E Bl cannot result in a different book for different students:
(112) ~S ~Br ds E S~b E Br Rsb(n~Br db E Br ~S ~s E S Rsb)
A similar idea about a minimal reading is found in [VV96]. The authors introduce
the notion of a Path. This path can be seen as exactly describing the `inter-relation'
that Kempson and Cormack talk about.
Van der poes and Verkuyl restrict their attentiorr to transitive verbs, whose mean-
ings correspond to 2-place relations. In that case the path will be of the following
typer :
(113) ~rR : DoM(R n A x B) ~~(Rrrc(R n A x B))
The relation between this path function and the original relation R is as follows:
suppose the relation R is a relation between sets A and B, then we have R C A x B.
Now we can form the characteristic function of this relation Rk : Ax B-~ {0, 1}. This
function maps every possible pair consisting of an element from A and an element
from B on either 0 or 1, depending whether the pair is in the relation or not.
We can perform currying on this function and get R~S : A~(B ~ {0, 1}): a
function that first requires an element of A as argument and then an element of B.
The result is again 0 or 1. Now, B ~{0, 1} can be seen as the characteristic furrction
of some one-place relation on B, so it describes some subset of B, an element of y~(B).
This means from R~.S we can form Rks,. : A~ y~(B). The path function given above
is a generalization of this.
The path function ~r can be defined as
(114) ~rR -{(a,RQ)~a E A n Ra -{b E B~ aRb }}
This path function assigns to every element in the domain of R(restricted to A) the
set of elements in B it is R-related to. The difference between the interpretations
of sentences like (102) can be analyzed in terms of different properties of the path
function: if this function is constant, we get the complete group interpretation of the
sentence. If the function is injective (b'a, a' E A a~ a' -3 ~r(a) ~~r(a')) we get some
1 y~(x) denotes the powerset of x, the set of all possible subsets of x.
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form of the incomplete group interpretation, with the difference that we exclude the
possibility that some element in the domain is R: related to a subset in the range that
is also the image of some other element in the domain. If the function is strongly
injective (da, a' E.-1 a~ a' -a ~r(a) fl ~r(a') -~) we get the subject wide scope
interpr~etation.
In-situ approaches
A well-known underspecification strategy for scopal ambiguity is the use of deter~niner-
~in,-sitzi representations, t,hat we can find in the so-called `conventional translations'
([SP82]), situation schemata ([FHLvB87]), QLF ([AvE87], [A1s92]) and Underspeci-
fied Logic 1([A1s96]). In these formal languages we find representations of sentences
where the relative scope of quantifying substructures is ]eft undetermined. Instead we
find the quantifiers (or elements corresponding to them, so-called q~easi-deterrniners)
in a position that is structurally similar to the position of the corresponding words in
the natural language expression. For example, the sentence
(115) Every stv,dent read a book
would be represented in the following ways:
(116) `Conventional' translation:
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Obviously, there are differences l.~etween these representations, but it is clear that the
way quantifying terms are handled is in principle the same in all four: the quantifi-
cational elements occupy relatively low positions in the structure. Naturally, a lot of
work has to be done to get from these representations to interpretations. The quanti-
fiers have to be assigned a scope. So, for instance the QLF way to disambiguate with
respect to scope involves
1. replacing the qterm substructures with just the parameters X and Y
2. for each of the qterms creating a quant structure in which the quasi-determiners
is replaced by some logical quantifier. These structures have an explicit repre-








in section 5.3 we will give a detailed description of scoping procedures for such in-situ
determiners.
Meta-structures
An interesting kind of representation for scopal ambiguity can be found in [Rey93].
Reyle presents an underspecified version of DRT (see section 2.2.5) called UDRT,
which consists of the language of DRT extended with
. labels on every discourse referent and condition statement,
. sv,bordination staternen,ts, representing inclusion relations between DRSs.
In such a representation the universal quantifier is represented by an implicat,ion
between two DRSs, while the existential quantifier is represented by a simple DRS,
exactly as it is in DRT. However, the relative positions of these DRSs in the main DR.S
is underdetermined. Scope restrictions are represented by means of the subordination
statements.
A sentence like (115), every stv,dent read a book, would be represented as
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(121)










The subordination statements follow from the syntactic structure of the sentence.







Figure 4.3: Underspecified DRS
2 vbook ( y)
Disambiguation is done by identifying labels with each other until the restrictions
on the labels only allow for one possible structure. In our example case, if we identify
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This same strategy of defining an underspecified structure by means of a metalan-
guage, can be found in Minimal Rec~rsiorl Semantics (MRS, [CFS96],[CFM}ar]). In
MRS, feature structures are used to describe possible formulae in some object lan-
guage. Every underspecified MRS representation consists of an outer feature structure
(represented by an attribute-value matrix, or AVM) containing a multi-set of parts
of the described formula. Each of these parts has a unique handle which can be used
to identify the relation's relative position in the described formula. Our example
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As in UDRT, disambiguation is achieved by monotonically adding restrictions on the
handles. For instance if we choose 0 as the value of the top handle, that means our
described formula has the existential quantifier ( a-rel) as its outer quantifier. The
only way to create a well-formed formula then from all the material in the list is by
fixing the body of a-rel as OO . This means the next embedded formula containes the
universal quantifier (every-rel). Again, we have to fix a body for that quantifier, and
the only remaining option is ~, the handle of the relation that describes the main
predicate read. The resulting AVM represents the object wide scope reading:
2The Di , ~2 etc. indicate that the attributes share the same value. They should be thought of as
pointers, acting as variables here.






































The subject wide scope interpretation can be obtained irr a similar way, by startirrg
from the other possibility for the top handle: 0. In both representations, UDRS
and MRS, the labels and handles act as rneta-varinbles: variables over parts of the
meaning representation in the object language. Such variables can be thought of as
disjunctíons, since they can only take a specific number of values. Moreover, since
choosing a value in disambiguation affects the possible choices for other labels or
handles, the disjunctions they represent are dependent.
Scoping operators
In [Bos96] a special operator is introduced to represent scopally ambiguous expres-
sions. The specific proposal he makes is for predicate logic. The language of predicate
logic is extended with two operators: c~ and o, resulting in Underspecified Predicate
Logic (UPL). The O operator is called the scoper, while o is called a hole. The basic
idea behind the representation is that a hole represents formulas into which other
expressions can be plugged. The interpretation of the scoper is such that a formula
~p O~ means that either cp must be plugged into a hole in z~, or vice versa. How this
may help represent scopal ambiguity can be seen in the following example. Again we
consider the sentence every student read a book, of which the UPL representation is:
(126) (b'x (student(x) -~ o)) 0 ((~y (book(y) n o)) O read(x, y))
Consider the highest occurrence of the scoper. The possible interpretations of this
operator correspond to the following two options:
(a) b'x (student(x) ~ o) is plugged into (~y (book(y) n o)) C~ read(x, y), resulting
in: (~y (book(y) n(dx (student(x) ~ o)))) ~ read(x, y)
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(b) (~y (book(y) n o)) ;~ read(~, ~y) is plugged into da; (student(x) --~ o), resulting
in dx (student(x) --~ ((3y (book(y) n o)) ~:, read(x, y)))
If we theri look at the meanings that are associated with these representations, we
must consider possible `pluggings' of the lower occurence of the scoper
(a') read(~, y) is plugged into ~y (book(y) n(d~c( student(x) ~ o))), resulting in
~y (book(y) n (b'x (student(~) ~ read(~, y)))).
(b') read(x, y) is plugged into b'~ (student(x) -~ (~y (book(y) n o))), resulting in
d~ (student(x) ~ (~y (book(y) n read(~, y)))),
Observe that the other options for the scoper are unavailable: if an expression doesn't
contain a hole, plugging cannot be done.
In Bos's proposal, the ambiguous nature of the representation is located in the oper-
ator O, which has two possible interpretations. Disambiguation thus means selecting
onc: of the interpretations and calculating the effect of that. A similar proposal for
underspecifying scope can be found in [Bun93]. Bunt proposes to use an ambiguous
`scoping function' a. This function occurs somewhere in the underspecified represen-
tation and allows us to get the possible interpretations by fixing its meaning.
Again, we show how this works by means of our example sentence. The meaning
of the whole sentence every st,udent read a book is built up from the meaning of
the subject noun phrase every student and the verb phrase read a book. In Bunt's
proposal, the meaning of such a verb phrase is a pair consisting of the semantics of
the verb and the semantics of the object noun phrase. The elements of this pair can
he retrieved by means of projection operators ~rl and ~r2.
In our example, the meaning of the components are assumed to be:
. Subject: ~P.b'x (student(x) ~ P~)
. Ob,ject: ~Q.~y (book(y) n Qy)
~ Verb: ~p~q.read(p, q)
The verb phrase reads a book is assigned the meaning
(127) ((~Q.~y ( book(y) n Qy)),,~p~q.read(p,q))
Now, the rule for combining a subject and such a transitive verb phrase ís:
(128) S' - (~T.(Q(NPs,~ri(T)))~z(T))VP'
Note the occurrence of the ambiguous function Q, and the projection operators (which
will be applied to VP').
For our example sentence, the application of the rule results in:
(129) (aT.(~((aP.v~ (student(~) -~ P~)),~~(T)))~~(T))
((~Q.~y (book(y)nQy)),.~p~q.read(p,4))
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This reduces, by .~ reduction and projection, to
(130) Q((~P.b'x (student(x) ~ Px)), (~Q.~y (book(y) n Qy))).~p~q.read(p, q)
This is the underspecified representation of the meaning of the sentence. It consists
of the ambiguous scoping operator applied to a pair, consisting of the individual
meanings of the noun phrases, and the translation of the verb.




The first option will instantiate (130) to
(131) ~~p.~H.(~ri(y~)(aa.(~r2(~p)(~b.Hab))))((aP.dx (student(x) ~ Px)),
(.~Q.~y (book(y) n Qy)))~p~q.read(p, q)
This reduces to:
(132) aH.((~P.b'x (student(x) ~ Px))(~a.(aQ.~y ( book(y) ~ Qy)(ab.Hab))))
~p~q.read(p, q)
Which in turn gives:
(133) .~P.dx (student(x) ~ Px))(aa.(.~Q.~y (book(y) n Qy)(.~b.read(a, b))))
Now we see that the universal quantifier has received wide scope, since the subject
noun phrase's meaning can be applied to the object noun phrase's meaning:
(134) dx (student(x) -~ (.~a.(~Q.~y (book(y) nQy(.~b.read(a,b))))x))
This formula can be reduced further to:
(135) tlx (student(x) ~ (~y (book(y) n (~b.read(x,b))y)))
which finally leads to
(136) b'x (student(x) ~ (~y (book(y) n read(x, y))))
The other interpretation can be obtained by choosing the other option for the am-
biguous function ~. We leave the details of that as an excercise for the reader.
These scoping operators and functions are ambiguous terms in the language. They
represent a disjunction between two possible choices. But whereas the handles and
labels that we saw earlier can be seen as dependent disjunctions, the disjunctions in
this section are strictly local: the choice made for one ambiguous term does not affect
the possible choices for other ones.
We now have seen four alternatives for representing scopal ambiguities: minimal
readings, in-situ approaches, meta-structures and scoping operators. Some of these
techniques can also be applied to other forms of ambiguity. In the next section we
will look at possible representations of attachment ambiguities.
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4.2.2 Attachment ambiguities
Attachment ambiguities arise because a sentence has more t,han one syntactic analysis.
We already saw that PP-attachment can cause this ambiguity, as in
(137) John saw the man with the binocnlars.
where it isn't clear who is holding the binoculars, John or the man. The different
syntactic analyses reflect this: in one analysis the PP is attached to the object the
man and thus modifies that noun phrase3, in the other analysis, the attachment is
to the verb phrase saw the man which leads to the conclusion that John held the
binoculars.
Another case of attachment ambiguity is:
(138) All old men and women get a discov,nt.
Here the question is whether all women get the cliscount or only the old women. The
attachment options are either having old modify just the noun men or the whole
phrase men and women.
Shared trees
One way to represent this kind of ambiguity is through the use of shared trees
([Tom86]). Developed as a parsing strategy for finding all syntactic analyses for a
given sentence with a minimum amount of processing, the structure that is built up
is a representation of all possible syntactic trees. If a substring can be analysed in
several ways, the structure will contain subtrees for each analysis. If the syntactic
categories for different analyses match, the top nodes are merged into a`packed' node
since all of them can fulfill the same role in the superstructure. For instance, in our
example sentence John saw the man with the binoculars, we have two analyses for the
verb phrase. Both are included in the shared tree and because they have the same top
node category, these are packed. This packed top node is connected to the subject
noun phrase to complete the analysis as a sentence (see figure 4.4).
Under the assumption that the semantic structure is built up on the basis of the
syntactic structure, the shared trees will indirectly encode underspecified semantic
representations as well.
Disambiguation for shared trees comes down to selecting, for each packed node,
which substructure to follow: the packed nodes represent local disjunctions. In fig-
ure 4.4, choosing the left verb phrase inside the packed node leads to the PP modifying
the verb phrase, whereas selecting the right verb phrase node gives us the reading
where the PP modifies the direct object.
30r just to the noun man, depending on the precise grammar that is used.
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NP V Det N P Det N
John saw the man with the binoculars
Figure 4.4: Shared (syntactic) analysis tree
Switches
A different representation for attachment ambiguity is given in [Kie94]. In that pro-
posal we use triples named switches. These switches contain:
. the main structure without the substructures that can be attached in more than
one location. Each location is marked by a meta-variable.
. a list of the substructures themselves
. a list of lists of the meta-variables that represent locations for the substructures
in the main structure
Each branch that can be attached in several locations is represented as an element of
the list that forms the second element of the switch. The corresponding item ín the
third argument lists for each branch to which location it can be possibly attached.
For instance, the syntactic structure for John saw the rnan with the binoculars
would be represented as shown in figure 4.5, where we have as second element a list
containing just one branch, and as third element a list of the possible locations it can
be attached to, represented by the meta-variables X and Y.
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~ ..~
NP V Det N Det N
John saw the man with the binoculars~
Figure 4.5: Attachment ambiguity represented with switches
Disambiguation is achieved by instantiating one of the meta-variables with the
corresponding substructure. The other meta-variables for that particular branch are
instantiated with some dummy value, such as true. This means that these meta-
variables are actually dependent disjunctions.
Branchings nodes that have one daughter true are interpreted as being identical
to the other daughter. Note that this means the switching representation can only be
used for ambiguous attachments of ~m,odifiers where the content of each node that has
a meta-variable as daughter is of the same type and category as the other daughter.
In our example disambiguation leads to the two structures in figure 4.6.
Now that we have seen two possible representations for attachment ambiguity, we
go on to the next form of ambiguity: lexical ambiguity.
4.2.3 Lexical ambiguity
Lexical ambiguity is perhaps the most familiar kind of ambiguity. Many words in
natural language have more than one meaning4. Some of these are metonyms, words
with slightly different meanings that can be traced back to one single meaning (see
section 2.2.2). Other are just homonyms, words that accidentally have the same ap-
pearance. Examples of homonyms are the words bank, which means either a financial
institution (and related senses, such as the building it is housed in), or the area of
4Depending on the definition of `word', one could alternatively say that many words share their
spelling with other words.
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S
NP V Det : N.' P Det N
John saw the man ~1~ith the binocu(at-s
NP V Det N
John suw the man
P Det N
with the binoculurs
Figure 4.6: Instantiation leads to unswitched interpretations
land along a river, and pen, which is either a writing instrument or an enclosed area
for keeping animals.
Ambiguous terms
The standard approach to representing lexical ambiguity is the one found in the
PHLIQA system ([BBLf80],[Bun81]). The ambiguous word is represented by a single
term in the underspecification language. This term has several possible interpretations
in the target language. Such terms behave like a restricted kind of ineta-variable,
similar to Bunt's ambiguous function for scoping that we saw in section 4.2.1. Agairi,
these correspond to local disjunctions.
For instance, if the target language has two predicates representing bank, say
bankfinance and bankriver, then we can underspecify
(139) John sees a bank.
by using a special term bank0. So we get a formula
(140) ~~(bank0(x) n sees(j, x))
The disambiguation procedure now has to know what the possible interpretations
are for this term bank0. It can then substitute bank0 with one of thern to get arr
interpretation.
This approach can be found in many other underspecification formalisms as well
([SP82], [A1s92], [vD90], [Poe94].
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Shared trees
The shared trees approach that we discussed in section 4.2.2 is also usable for the
representation of lexical ambiguity. Both analyses of John sees a bank can be capt.ured
in a single shared tree by using a packed leaf node for the noun, as in figure 4.7.
S
John sees a bank
Figure 4.7: Lexical ambiguity through packed leaves
Again, disambiguation is done by making a choice for each sharing node.
4.2.4 Semantic vagueness
Semantic vagueness occurs when there is an unspecified semantic relation between two
objects. Examples of this are noun-noun compunds, such as computer message. This
is a message that has some relation to computers, but it isn't clear which relation.
A similar phenomenon occurs with genetive constructions, such as John's book which
could mean a book that is owned by .Iohn, or a book that is written by John etc..
Meta-variables
In the QLF language ([A1s92], meta-variables are used to represent such unspeci-
fied relations. For instance, to represent the noun phrase a comp~~ter message, the
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Here, the computer message object is represented by the variable X which has a
complex restriction: it is both a message and bears some relation R to the kind
computer (that is, to computers in general rather than a specific computer). This
relation is unspecified, so it is represented by a variable R.
Disambiguation of such semantic vagueness is done by finding an appropriate value
for the meta-variable. For instance, a relation origin, indicating that in this case we




Because the range of possible choices for the meta-variable is - in principle - without
limit, these meta-variables correspond to local infinite disjunctions.
Complex predicates
Another option for the representation of semantic vagueness can be found in the lan-
guage ULF ([Kie96]). This language will be described in detail in section 4.4. For
now it suffices to note that in ULF we represent semantic vagueness not by an explicit
meta-variable for a relation between objects, but by cornple~ predicates. Instead of
having only predicates like message and computer, we also allow the construction of
new predicates such as [computer,message]. Each predicate receives an interpreta-
tion from a lexicon of concepts, which tells the interpretation module how to interpret
the unspecified relation for each specific case. Note that this means that this does
not support full productivity of compounding: sorne combinations of nouns will not
receive an interpretation. Also, the complex predicates cannot be disambiguated into
each of the possibilities that might ontologically exist since a specific domain-defined
interpretation is assigned directly.
4.2.5 Referential ambiguity
Referential ambiguity is different from other kinds of ambiguity in the sense that
it occurs, at least for a brief period during interpretation, every tirne a referential
term is used. This means any senrantic interpretation algorithm that tries to handle
anaphors, provides ways to represent referential ambiguity. So for instance DRT
uses a fresh discourse referent for any anaphoric term that is introduced, and any
subsequent binding of the anaphor is done by adding a new link (see section 2.2.5).
So, it seems we don't need a specialized underspecification language to represent
referential ambiguity. However, to be able to explicitly distinguish between fully
interpreted and ambiguous representations, it is convenient to use another type of
fresh variable for the representation of referential terms than for quantification for
instance. The presence of such meta-variables in a formula then indicates that it
cannot be an interpretation.
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A formalism that uses meta-variables for the representation of referential ambigu-
ity is Alshawi's underspecified logic UL1 of ([A1s96]). A sentence like
(143) She. snw hi~n,.
has as its ULl representation
(144) saw(fernaleM Xl, male~ X2)
Here, expressions of the type p~ X represent restricted referential terms. In the
interpretation clauses for Alshawi's logic, any meta-variables that appear in the rep-
resentation are mapped by an assignment function onto UL1 expressions without such
meta-variables, allowing the interpretation to be defined in terms of possible disam-
biguations, encoded in this assignment function. A~eta-variables used in this way
again correspond to local disjunctions, albeit possibly infinite ones.
4.2.6 Summary of underspecification techniques
In the previous sections, we have examined specific proposals for the representation
of a number of manifestations of the general phenomenon of non-specific meaning,
both ambiguity and vagueness.






Sorne of these can be used to create extensions of unambiguous languages: QLF for
instance is an extension of a format namecl LF and is an ambiguous representation
with respect to that. The extensions consist of complex in-situ terms for the repre-
sentation of scope ambiguity, and meta-variables for the representation of lexical and
referential ambiguity.
All these encode some kind of disjunctions. But there are differences: ambiguous
terms and the packed nodes in shared trees correspond to finite local disjunctions,
while meta-variables and meta-structures correspond to possibly infinite, possibly
dependent disjunctions. The in-situ approach leads to choices at the processi~ig level
rather than at the representation level.
The question of what is the best representation of ambiguity is not easily an-
swered. There are several possible criteria. Some representations have the advantage
of being better suited for monotonons disambiguation: using meta-variables allows
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one to disambiguate by instantiating the variable, so only information is addecl. For
in-situ approaches this cannot be done since part of the representation needs to be
deleted during disambiguation. Another criterion is of course how easy it is to get
the representations as output from a parsing stage. The choice for a representation
thus depends heavily on the situation in which one plans to use it. For the system
we are discussing in this thesis, the DEtvK system, we have designed our own partic-
ular underspecification language ULF, which incorporates several techniques. ULF is
presented ín section 4.4. First we look at the status of underspecified representations
with respect to meaning and inference.
4.3 The status of underspecified representations
An interesting question to ask is what the status of underspecified representations is:
do they have a semantics? Can an ambiguous representation be said to be true, and
if so, what does that mean?
There are several ways we can look at the different forms of ambiguous represen-
tations sketched: in the case of minimal readings for scopally ambiguous sentences
it is clear what the representation means. Since the representation is in a language
that has a semantics, that also determines the meaning of the minimal reading. In
the case of separate representations for ambiguous structures, such as `conventional'
t,ranslations, QLFs, forests, ambiguous terms, UDRSs etc., it is less clear what they
mean.
Semantics for underspecified representations
A possible way to define a semantics for such representations is by supervalv,ations
([vF66]). The semantics of the representation is defined in terms of the semantics
of all possible interpretations that can be deduced from it. Consider an arnbiguous
representation U, the set D of all of its interpretations, and a model Nl. There are 3
options now:
~.M ~ U iff b'd E D, Nl ~ d (the universal option).
~.M ~ U iff ~d E D, Nl ~ d (the existential option).
~.M ~ U if dd E D, ~1~1 ~ d, and Nl ~~U if b'd E D, .M ~~d (the `three-valued'
option).
In the universal option, we only consider an ambiguous representation true, if all of
its interpretations are true, otherwise we say it is false. If we adhere to the existential
option, we already call an ambiguous representation true if there is some way of
disambiguating it that leads to a true proposition. The representation can only be
false if all possible interpretations are false. In the three-valued option, we call a
representation true if all of its disambiguations are true, we call it false if all of its
interpretations are false, and say it is undefined otherwise.
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Reasoning with underspecified representations
Many authors have claimed that people do not always completely disambiguate an
utterance: first of all, it may not be possible, because the context does not provide
enough information, and secondly, it may not be necessary for the purpose of the
utterance. As an example, consider the following two sentences (taken from [vD90]):
(145) All old plants and trees were green
(146) All very old plants and trees were yree~a
In the first sentence one of the ambiguities arises due to the different scoping
possibilities of the adjective old. It could take scope over the noun plants, or over
the phrase plants and trees. If we take the first interpretation, then it is clear that
the second sentence follows from the first sentence, assuming that very old only takes
scope over plants. If we take the second interpretation of the first sentence, the
second sentence follows from the first sentence, under the assumption that very old
takes scope over the whole phrase plants and trees. So what we observe is that for
these two sentences, the entailment holds for both disarnbiguations.
Two `logics of ambiguity' that attempt to capture this phenomenon, are the ones
proposed by Van Deemter ([vD90],[vD91]) and Reyle ([Rey93]). We will briefly discuss
these.
What Van Deemter tries to construct is a logic that formalizes the notion of
`sameness of disambiguation'. This means in his logic the same disambiguatiorr (what
he calls a ~node) must take place in both the antecedent and the consequent of an
entailment relation.
He defines such a logic for a language where lexical ambiguities are represented by
means of ambiguous constants. Every occurence of such a constant is marked with
a unique label. A mode now consists of a domain D and an extended interpretation
function s, which maps non-ambiguous terms and occv.rences of ambiguous constants
to objects in the domains. Such disambiguations (modes) can be ordered by the
number of identical ambiguous constants that they map onto the same non-ambiguous
expression. A coherent mode is now defined as a disarnbiguation which maps the
highest number of identical ambiguous constants onto the same value. Coherent
modes thus are those modes that assign the sarne object to as many occurrences of
each ambiguous constant as possible. In general, there will not be a unique coherent
mode, since the agreement ordering could give the same results for different modes.
These notions of mode and coherence are extended by Van Deemter to also in-
clude attachment ambiguity. The idea is that structurally ambiguous expressions are
characterized by the possible derivation trees that have them as result. Each of those
derivations plays the same role for this kind of ambiguity as the objects in a model
played for ambiguous terms. In this way such an extended mode defines a coherent
SThis extended interpretation function can be compared to the assignment function in UL1
([A1s96]), although in that logic, the disambiguation takes place by assigning non-ambiguous
values
to meta-variables instead of constants.
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disambiguation for a certain text. It may be that there are several coherent disam-
biguations possible. To talk about this set of complete modes, we need the notion of
an incomplete mode. Any set of complete modes is an incomplete mode.
~'alidity and entailment can be defined with respect to such incomplete modes.
Van Deemter argues that the best way to define entailment would be such that a set
of formulas r entails a formula A iff under every mode that is coherent with respect
t:o T U{.9}, a disambiguation that makes all formulae in r true, also makes A true.
Such an entailment relation would account for the validity of the following derivation
(197)
All old men and women get a discourct
All very old men a~ad women get a discount,
and the non-validity of
(148)
Old men and wonaen yet no discount
Women get no discount
In the latter case; one of t:he interpretations of the premisse is the one where old is a
modifier of inen and women. In that interpretation, nothing is said in the premisse
about women that are not old, so in that mode the conclusion is invalid.
Another proposal for reasoning with ambiguous representations can be fotmd in
[Rey93]. In this paper inference rules are given that operate on UDR.S represen-
tations (see section 4.2.1). These rules are adapted from inference rules that are
defined for normal DRSs. We will not go over the exact details of the inference rules,
since this would involve discussing many details which are of no interest to us. The
rules given are
. Direct Proof corresponding to identity axiorns in propositional logic.
. DET a generalized version of Modus Ponens, corresponding to -3 E in propo-
sitional logic.
This rule enables us to use implications with ambiguous premises and ambiguous
assumptions, and still get the desired conc.lusions.
. COND corresponding to ~ I
This rules allows us to add the premise of an implication to the premise set in
order to prove the implication itself.
. RAA corresponding to Reductio ad Absurdum.
A goal may be proven b,y assuming the negation of that goal and deriving
inconsistency.
These are examples of two ways of setting up a logic for reasoning about ambiguous
representations. Van Deemter starts from the model-theoretic perspective and defines
validity arrd entailment. Reyle on the other hand offers a set of inference steps and




For the DE:vK project, an underspecification language has been developed to allow
the independent development of a parsing and interpretation module. This language
is called Underspecified Logical Form (ULF). It is based on the language with the
same name that was developed for the PLUS project ([GR93]), and which is also used
in the PI,INIUS project ([tS96]).
The basic format in ULF is reminiscent of QLF, but where QLF is an extension of
an unambiguous format LF (logical form), the ULF syntax has no direct connection
with the intended target language. In this regard it is a language in a line that
began with the PHLIQAI system and continued with the TENDUM, PLUS and .~elta
projects (see [Bun84], [Bun95], [Bun98]). A common feature in all these systems is
that the different levels of interpretation are connected by explicit translation steps
which all do some form of interpretation: each step takes the representation closer to
the target language and possibly removes some ambiguities.
ULF uses the following techniques for the representation of ambiguity:
. in-situ terms for quantifier scope
. meta-variables for attachment ambiguity
. ambiguous terms for lexical ambiguity
. complex predicates for semantic vagueness
. meta-variables for referential ambiguity
ULF does not support any inference and has no direct interpretation.
In the next section we give the formal definition of the ULF language. After that
we will give some examples of how it is used to represent different kinds of sentences
with different forms of ambiguity.
4.4.1 Definition of ULF
Let D be a finite set of quasi-determiners:
{the, a, no, many, every, all, each, this, that, some, ...}
Let R be a finite set of restrictions corresponding to `content words' in the domain:
{microscope, light, bundle, zenith, adjust, increase, large, on, condenser,
virtual, ... }
Let 7~ be an infinite set of parameterss.
Let S be a set of strings.
Well-formed ULFs are defined as the set generated by the following BNF syntax:














































ulf (Det,P, F-list, R-list)
e ~ name I theposs ~ pro ~ conj ~ nodet ~ whdet ~
thatc ~ whetherc ~ ifc ~ D
[ Featurel F-list ) ~ []
C Restriction I R-list ] ~[]
[ P-val ] ~[ P-vall P-list J
7~ ~ {P-lit, . . . , P-lit}
7~ ~ ?T~
tense : tenseval ~ perf : Boolean ~ prog: Boolean ~
voice: voiceval ~ inv: Boodean ~ vform: vformval ~
neg : Boolean ~ prom : promval ~ num: numval ~
pers: persval ~ gend: gendval ~ wh: whvad ~
tail : tailval ~ clospunct : clospunctval
minus ~ plus
pres ~ past ~ modal
can ~ may ~ will ~ shall ~ could ~
might I would I should ~ must
active ~ passive
fin ~ inf ~ imp ~ perfpart ~ passpart ~ prespart
none I leftdisl ~ topical ~ do-supp
sing ~ plur ~ num
f irst ~ second ~ third
masc ~ fem ~ neut ~ animate
none ~ who ~ what ~ which ~ how ~ where ~ when ~ why
none ~ please ~ tag
period ~ questmrk ~ exclmrk ~ none
restr(Rname, P-list, A-list) ~ Special
[ R] ~ C R I Rname ] ~[ Rname ] ~
[ Rname I Rname ]
[ Argument I A-list ] ~ []
Argname: ULF ~ Argname:7~
agent ~ theme ~ goal ~ preparg ~
thatarg ~ coparg ~ cnj 1 ~ cnj2 ~ ante ~ cons
Name ~ Poss ~ That ~ ConjRest
restr ( [name] , P-list, [namearg : S] )
restr ( [poss] , P-list, [possarg : Argument] )
restr ( [that] , P-list, [thatarg: ULF] )
restr ( [Conj Name (R-list, R-list) ] ) ~
restr ( [SentCon~7 , P-list, ArgList)
if-then ~ ConjName
and ~ but ~ or ~ while ...
The ULF features are explained in figure 4.8.
Name Description
tense Represents the tense of a verb: past, present, or
a modal (future is handled as a case of the modal
will).
perf Indicates whether a verb is in perfect or imperfect
tense.
prog Indicated whether a verb is in progressive form or
not.
voice The voice of the verb: active or passive.
inv If this feature has value true, there is subject-verb
inversion.
vform Tells us what form a verb is in: imperative, participle
etc.
neg When its value is plus, the quasi-determiner must
be interpreted as being negated.
prom Indicates whether there is any syntactic prominence
indicat,or in the sentence, such as topicalization.
num Syntactic number of an object or verb.
pers Syntactic person of an object or verb.
gend Syntactic gender of an object.
wh Indicates whether an object is introduced by a WH-
element, and if so, by what type of WH-element.
tail Gives information about the form of a question:
whether it is followed by please or is a tag question.
clospunct Represents the punctuation at the end of the
sentence.
Figure 4.8: Features in ULF
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4.4.2 Representing sentences in ULF
Complete ULFs represent objects, be they singular entities, plural entities, or events
of some sort. They have the form
(149) ulf(Det,P,F-list,R-list)
These objects are usually quantified; the exact nature of the quantification is de-
termined by the quasi-determiner Det. Events are recognizable by the presence of a
quasi-determiner e. The parameter T of a ULF functions as a referent for the (plural)
object or the event itself. F-list is a list of feat~res in a ULF which contain informa-
tion about the parameter that cannot be fitted into the `propositional content' of a
sentence; for instance some bits of syntactic information to be used for anaphora res-
olution or information about voice and mood of verbs that can be used to determine
the discourse function of an expression.
The final ingredient of a ULF is R-list: a list of restrictions on parameters. The
restrictions in a. ULF need not be about the parameter introduced by this ULF, this
is why parameters re-occur in restrictions7. Restrictions may have arguments. These
are either ULFs themselves, or just parameters.














[restr ( [lens] , [Z] , [] ) ] )
])])
The main ULF describes an event with parameter X, that has a single restriction
reach. This restriction has two arguments, or role-fillers, an agent, described by an
embedded ULF with parameter Y, which is restricted to being a bundle, and which is
quasi-quantified by every, and a theme, again described by an embedded ULF, with
parameter Z and also a quasi-determiner some. The quantifiers in the arguments are
represented in-situ; their respective scopings have not been established.
7Although in almost all cases, the restrictions in a[,'LF are about the same parameter that is
introduced in that ULF.
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The features of both arguments are the canonical ones for a singular object. The
features of the event parameter are the canonical ones for an event in a simple declar-
ative sentence.
So ULFs represent the meanings of noun phrases and of (possibly incomplete)
sentences. Other syntactic constituents generally correspond to some substructure of
ULFs. Indeed it is the case that there is a canonical place where the semantic contri-
butions of certain syntactic categories can be found. This is not a formal requirement
on the representations however, but it is merely something that follows from the way
ULFs are built up.
For common nouns, the canonical contribution to ULFs is in the form of a restric-
tion on a parameter in an object ULF. Correspondingly, the contribution of a verb is
often a restriction on some event parameter.
This correspondence between object ULFs and event ULFs can be extended by
the observation that adjectives add additional restrictions on object parameters, while
adverbs normally impose some extra restriction on an event parameter.
Relative clauses are treated similar to adjectives, as an extra restriction on the
parameter. Numerals are treated as adjectives. This means we cannot represent
complex determiner structures such as more than two bvt less than five in ULF. For
the present DEtvK domain, electron microscopes, this is not a serious obstacle. For
other domains it may be required to change the definition of ULF in this respect.
Finally, the canonical position for the contribution of a determiner is of course as
a quasi-determiner at the ULF level.
As said, adjectives, like adverbs, add extra restrictions on a parameter. This is why
there is a list of restrictions on parameters in each ULF substructure. However,
some adjectives should not simply add an extra restriction, but rather modify the
restriction introduced by the head noun. Examples of such adjectives are words
like former, naake-believe, false, apparent etc., which share the property that they
make the restriction introduced by the noun to be possibly untrue of the object (a
`make-believe electron microscope' is not an electron microscope). Such adjectives
are usually called fv.nctional adjectives. Functional adjectives do not add an extra
restriction on the restriction list in ULF but add an item on the Rname list, creating
a complex restriction name. As an example, take the sentence the virtual bundle










restr ( [on] , [X] , [




[restr ( [screen] , [Z] , [] ) ,
restr( [blue] , [Z] , [] )] )] )] ) .
Other cases that cause an Rlist to contain more than one item, are noun-noun
compounds such as gun voltage, thereby underspecifying semantic vagueness, and
intensifier-adjective clusters such as e~trernely high.
Auxiliary verbs are represented in a rather non-standard way. They all contribute to
the value of the tense, prog and perf features. This even holds for modal auxiliaries.
The copula be on the other hand is represented by an event-ULF. As an example, here















Note that the second argument is actually as if the sentence had read extre~n,ely high
gun voltages ~reay be (a) dangerous (thing). This is the case for all constructions
involving copula: the second argument to the event restriction is always understood
to denote an object, but in some cases very little is specified about the object. This
way we can use the same construction for both combinations of copula with a noun
phrase (which requires a full ULF as argument) and combinations with adjectives or
prepositional phrasesg.
Pronouns are represented by a ULF with quasi-determiner pro and an empty restric-
tion list. The anaphor one receíves no special treatment in ULF. It introduces a
restriction [aone] 9. Example: It reaches the secondary one.
sHowever, this collapsing of the two forms of to 6e turned out to be undesirable in the second
interpretation stage. In section 6.5.1 we show how this was remedied.















restr ( [aone] , [Z] , [] )] )
])])
Conjunctions
Certain forms of conjunction are representable in ULF. We use two distinct construc-
tions to represent conjunctions. These allow us to build representations for a large
number of sentences involving conjunction.
We start with simple sentential conjunction and noun phrase conjunction. Since
both sentences and noun phrases introduce full ULFs, the same form of conjunction
can be used. It is represented by a ULF with quasi-determiner conj and restric-
tion [and] lo. The conjuncts' ULFs appear as argtrments to this restriction with the
dummy roles cnji and cnj2. As an example, here is the ULF for the sentence the
b~c~,dle reaches the lens and it is dispersed.
(154) ulf(conj,Z,[tail:none,clospunct:period],


















Here, the conjunction is made up of two coordinated sentences, but we also use this
construction for subordination. For instance the sentence if the bu~,dle reaches the
screen, then it lights up has this ULF:
(155~ ulf(conj,X,[tail:none,clospunct:period],








































In case of subordination, we use the `roles' ante and cons. This has the added
advantage that we can also represent partial sentences which may occur as answers









[restr ( Cscreen] , CY] , C] ) ] ) ] ) ,





















Note the dummy preposition whprep in (156). This mirrors the interpretation (at)
which (time) does the screen light np?.
Going back to forms of conjunction, verb phrase conjunction can also be represented
with the conj quasi-determiner. As an example, let us look at ULF for the bv,ndle
passes the condenser system and enters the oa apert~re.
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(1~g) ulf(conj,X,[tail:none,clospunct:period],























The subject of the sentence, understood as being the subject of both events, is rep-
resented at the same level as the con,juncts.
Noun phrase conjunction is also represented with the use of the conj quasi-determiner,
as noun phrases are also represented as full ULFs. For instance, the sentence the























Notably different is the treatment of conjunctions involving `N-bar' expressions. These
expressions `share' a single determiner and their canonical contribut,ions are single
restrictions instead of full ULFs. This means conjunctions of these are conjunctions
at the level of restriction lists. As an example, take the sentence the bzendle reaches
the aperture and scree~a. The conjunction is between the two nouns aperture and













Crestr ( Cscreen] , [Q] , C] ) ] ) ] , [Z] , C] ) J )
Parameter lists
The next aspect of ULF we want to highlight is the use of the parameter list in
restrictions. Sofar we have seen lists containing just one element (a parameter) in
restrictions. Multiple parameters, or sets of parameters, can be used to underspecify
structural syntactic ambiguity. As an exarnple, let us look at the representation of




[restr ( [focus] , [X] , [
agent:
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ulf(this,Y,[pers:third,num:sing,gend:neut,
~ wh:none,prom:none],









[restr ( [tube] , [P] , [] ) ] ) ] ) ] )
The restriction derived from the PP in the tnbe can be either a restriction on the
event itself (the focusing), or on the object of the sentence (the bundle). So what we
see is that the restriction beginning with restr ([in] .., has two parameters in its
parameter list, indicating that there is an ambiguity. The two parameters are to be
taken as a disjunction: only one of them can be the intended one.
For this reason restrictions may occur outside of the ULF that `binds' a parameter
(see below). The parameter Z is introduced by the quasi-determiner the in the therne
ULF, but the restriction in the tv,be occurs at a higher level. To make sure that
restrictions on parameters can be easily traced, we add the following requirement on
ULFs:
Requirement
Restrictions on parameters tnust occur in the restriction list of the ULF that binds
the parameter, or in the restriction list of one of its ancestors.
A few terms need some more explanation here:
Definition 23
. A ULF binds the parameter that occurs as its second argument.
. A ULF A is the parent of another ULF B if B is an argument of a
restriction in A's restriction list. A ULF A is an ancestor of a ULF
C if A is the parent of C, or there is a ULF B such that A is the
parent of B and B is an ancestor of C(transitive closure).
With this requirement, we can guarantee that we have found all restrictions on a
parameter by checking just the restriction list of the ULF that binds the parameter
and its ancestors, i.e. all relevant restrictions lie on a path from the introducing ULF
to the top ULF.
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As we saw in section 4.2.2, another construction that may lead to attachment am-
biguity is conjunction. This is the case if we have a noun-noun conjunction with an
adjective before the first noun (or a post-modifier after the second noun). For ex-
ample, in the sentence the bundle reaches the secondary lens and apertv,re, the word














restr( [and( [restr( [lens] , [P] , [] )] ,
[restr ( [aperture] , [Q] , [] ) ] ) ] ,
CZ] , C] ) ] )
])])
What we see here is a parameter specification for the restriction secondary incolving
a parameter set, which means the restriction is a restriction on all parameters men-
tioned. We also see the ?-operator here, which is understood as meaning that the
restriction is possibly about the parameter. So restr( [secondary] ,[{P,?Q}] ,[] )
means that secondary is a restriction on P and possibly on Q. This is equivalent to
restr ([secondary] ,[P, {P, Q}] ,[] ), but in some cases we want to use the ?-operator
to allow the parsing stage to build up ULFs compositionallyll
5pecial restrictions
A few idiosyncratic constructions need explaining. First, there is a special construc-
tion for possessives, which are represented by a quasi-determiner theposs and a spe-
cial restriction poss. As an example, here is the ULF for the bundle's intensity
decreases:
11.Although it has been shown ([Kie97]) that a parser could in principle take advantage of a modified
grammar to analyse sentences in such a way that the output ULFs contain such parameter lists and
parameter sets, tt~e current DeNK parser does not support it.













[restr ( [bundle] , [Z] , [] ) ]
)])])])])
Another special construction is the one for relative clauses. It uses the restriction
[that] , and in the event described by the relative clause, one of the arguments is
understood to be the object that the clause itself modifies. This means one of the
arguments to the restriction is formed by ,just a parameter, as can be seen in the t1LF


























[restr ( [gun , current] , [Q] , [] ) ]
)])])])])])])
The third construction we want to show has to do with propositions. In a sentence like
1 want to know whether this lens is on, we need a representation for the embedded
proposition whether this lens is on, to function as an argument. We could simply
use a ULF with deterrniner e for this, but then we would not be able to distinguish
between I want to check whether the lens is on and I want to c.laeck that the lens is



















inv : minus , vform : f in ,
neg:minus,prom:none],










[restr ( [ona] , [R] , [] ) ]
)])])])])])])
This completes our overview of the ULF language that we use to represent the input
of our disambiguation algorithms. In the next section we will present some extensions
to the output language, the annotated segments that we introduced in section 3.5, to
allow underspecification in that formalism as well.
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4.5 Underspecification in annotated segments
Although ULF does underspecify a lot of the possible arnbiguity and vagueness in
natural language, we still might end up with more than one ULF for a single utterance.
This means we use sets of ULFs to represent the underspecified meaning of utterances.
Starting from such a small set of ULFs as underspecified representation of a user's
input, disambiguation should ideally yield a single extension to an agent's current
CTT context. In the next chapter we present an algorithm for constructing such
extensions that only creates more specific representations and doesn't need to back-
track. This can be done by allowing underspecification of some ambiguities at every
step of the disambiguation process. This means that, besides the underspecification
language ULF, we will also have to extend the format of annotated segments with
constructions that allow underspecification. However, since each disambiguation step
is supposed to remove some ambiguities from the meaning representation, annotated
segments do not have to represent all the forms of ambiguity that we can represent
in ULFs.
4.5.1 Minimal readings in CTT
Certain kinds of scopal ambiguity can be represented in CTT directly. If we have a
sentence involving a universal and an existential quantifier, such as
(166) Every student read a book.
we can represent its `minimal reading' by the CTT segment:
(167) ~ : (IIs : student .Eb : (book .read.s.h))]
VVhat this representation says is that p is a function that assigns to every object of
type student an object of a sigma type. As we know, such objects are pairs. In this
example, the function p assigns to every object of type student a pair, the first of
which is a an object of type book, and the second is a proof that this student read
tliis particular~ book. Now, based on this function p we can construct another function
by means of the projection operator rrl, which returns the first element of a pair:
(168) .~~ : student .~rl(p.~) : (H~ : student .book)
Since the variable ~ does not appear in the resultant type book, this can also be
written as
(169) ~x : student . rrl(p.~) : (student ~ book)
So what we have constructed is a function from students to a book which this student
has read: a path in the sense of Van der poes and Verkuyl ( see section 4.2.1). We
use a definition to get a convenient format for using this function:
(170) studentbook - (~~ : student .~rr(p.x)) : (student -~ book)
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We can use properties of this function to get to different interpretations, so we propose
to use (167) as the representation of the ambiguous sentence. Should more information
become available that forces us to reconsider the interpretation we assigned to t.he
sentence, we can use our path ftmction studentbook to strengthen it. For instance,
suppose after hearing (166), the next utterance we encounter is
(171) They thouylz it was qv,ite good.
Now, if we try to resolve the anaphor it, we run into problems because we do not
have a unique referent to bind it to. However, under the object wide scope reading of
(166), there is a unique book. So, if we strengthen the interpretation that we assigned
to that, (167), we can resolve the anaphor.
To strengthen the interpretation, we add a statement that turns the path function
studentbook into a constant function:
(172) a : (Et : student .(IIs : student . eq-book.(studentbook.t)-(studentbooks)))
Note that we actually need a student here: (167) does not presuppose the existence
of any student, but to be able to refer to the book, we need an argument to the
studentbook function.
The referent of it in (171) can now be constructed as
(173) studentbook.~rr(a) : book
50, we do not, need to disambiguate scopal ambiguity when converting natural lan-
guage into CTT. This means we allow such ambiguity to be unresolved for several
utterances or not to be resolved at all.
tlsing annotations, we can also underspecify some forms of ambiguity, but ïf these
are not resolved, the CTT segment will be ill-formed and thus carmot be completely
processed by the system. However, it is still convenient to have such underspecified
annotated segments for instance to represent ambiguities that only occur briefly dur-
ing processing, and to represent the meanings of utterances that contain forms of
ambiguity that cannot be completely interpreted but for which the system can ask
more information from the user. We will define some annotatíons that do this in the
ne.xt section.
4.5.2 Underspecification annotations
When a ULF is converted into an annotated segment we use several algorithms in
a certain order. However, sometimes we need to make a choice at a point in the
processing at which the relevant information is not (yet) available. To be able to
continue processing, we use several forms of underspecification and disjunctions to he
able to delay making that choice.
One example is the use of type information in a polymorphic predicate. If we use,
for instance, the eq predicate to represent the meaning of a sentence like
(174) This lens is the c2 lens.
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we need the type information lens as an argument to the eq predicate, as in the
following annotated segment (showing only relevant annotations):
(175) [l : lens, p : eq.lens-1.c2]
{rb - [ [l]] , mt - [l : attr-demon] }
We can do this, because in the conversion of the subject this lens, we can deduce that
the type of the object is lens. However, there are also cases where we do not know
the type, for instance when a pronoun is used, as in:
(176) It is the c2 lens.
Such a pronoun is initially converted into two statements with annotations:
(177) [t : ~S,x : t]
{rb - [ [t, x] ] , mt - [~ : pronoun] }
Now, before we know what the referent is for it, we cannot be sure that there is no
type conflict between that referent and the requirement coming from the eq predicate.
The first argument for the eq predicate has to be lens, or a type that is a supertype
of lens. To be a well-formed segment, the type that the referent of it has, has to be
a subtype of the type in the first arguinent of the eq predicate. Since at the moment
the segment is formed out of the ULF we do not have the relevant type information
yet, we record all these type requirements by means of annotations on the segment we
construct. The resulting segment for (176) is:
(178) [t : ~S, ~ : t, s : ~s, p : eq.s~x-c2]
{rb - [ [t, x] , [s] ] , mt - [x : pronoun , s : vartype]
tr- [tCs,s)t,,s)lens]}
Note that the first argument to the eq predicate is itself introduced by a negative
statement s:~5. It has been assigned marker type vartype. The required relation-
ships between the types are recorded in the tr annotation, whose value is a list of
inheritarice relations. This annotation can be used during anaphora resolution, for
instance to make it more likely to find a referent for it that actually meets the re-
quirement listed for its type t: any object whose type inherits from t is a more likely
candidate than an object that does not inherit from t.
A more complicated example of the use of the tr annotation are the so-called depen-
dent disjunctions. Suppose we have a word that has several possible meanings such
that there are several possible CTT types as its translation. In ULF, such a word will
simply be assigned a restriction name that still contains this ambiguity, but since it
does not correspond to any single CTT type this ULF restriction will be converted
to a disjunction of several CTT types. However, in some cases the disjunction is not
strictly local, in the sense that a certain choice made by a disambiguation step to
remove a disjunction, has to have a similar effect on another disjunction that may be
present in another part of the annotated segment. To be able to do this, we introduce
the dependent disjunctions:
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Definition 24
Given a set of indices I, a dependent disjunction of n objects of a certain
sort T, is a set of pairs {(cr , tl ), ...,(c,~, tn) } where each c; E I and each
tz is of sort T.
The options function pos is a function from I to {0,1}.
The following simplification rules hold for such disjunctions:
. A dependent disjunction D can be simplified to
{(c~,t~) E D ~ pos(c~) - 1}
. If D contains only one element, it can be simplified to t~ (in which
case it is no longer a disjunction).
The idea is that the options function pos records for each index whether objects
associated with that index are still considered possible values of the disjunction. By
updating this function (and having more indices mapped to 0), the number of choices
is reduced. Since indentical indices can occur in different disjuntions, choices are not
local: if an index is mapped to 0, all disjunctions that contain that index lose one of
the disjuncts as options.
An example of such a dependent disjunction is the translation of the transitive
verb to increase. We distinguish between two uses of this verb:
(179) Can you increase the voltage?
(180) Turning this dial increases the voltage.
Note that in (179) the subject is one of the dialogue partners (represented by a exta
annotation), while in (180) it is an event. Also, in (180) some sort of causal relation is
assumed between the subject event and the increasing event. The annotated segments
arerz:
(181) [v : voltage, e : event, p: incr-voltage.qv-v.e]
{exta - [e : s] , . . . }
(182) [d : dial, f : event, r : turn.d. f, v : voltage, e: event,
p: incr-voltage.qv.v.e, c: cause. f.e]
{...}
Now, in some cases we cannot decide which of the two version of the increase predicate
we need. For instance if the subject is a pronoun in the utterance. In such cases we
can use a dependent disjunction that connects:
. the external agent (none or the subject),
. the type of the subject (event or dialogue partner (denoted by ext(part)),
. the presence of the causal relation (absent or present).
12Again, showing only the relevant annotations for these examples.
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So, we have dependent disjunctions for all three of those. In the segment and anno-
tations, the three objects whose identity is unknown are represented by parameters.
The tr annotation contains for each of these three the possible instantiations:
(183) [t :~S, x: t, v : voltage, e: event, p: h]
{exta- [e:b],
tr- [b:{(A,nil),(B,x)}, }




So, t is the type of the agent. From the tr annotation it follows that it must be
either event or ext(part). Both these choices have an index (A and B respectively).
Similarly h is unknown. It represents the new information conveyed by the utterance,
which is either that the voltage is increased, and that that is caused by some event
(hence the E-type), or it is just the information that the voltage increases. Again
these options are linked to indices A and B. Finally the external agent value b of the
exta annotation is either nil or ~.
If some information forces a decision about one of the three dependent disjunctions,
either index .9 or index B is set to 1 and the other to 0. This means the other
disjunctions are also immediately resolved.
4.6 Summary
Underspecification plays an important role in our view on context-driven interpre-
tation. In the multi-level approach to interpretation, syntactic analysis leads to an
underspecified representation of the meaning of an utterance. Contextual informa-
tion is then used to further refine the interpretation of the utterance. During t.his
process it is convenient to still be able to use underspecification, since that a.llows the
disambiguation to be done in steps.
In the DEtvK system, two representations are available that support underspec-
ification. The syntactic analysis of an utterance leads to a representation called
Underspecified Logical Form (ULF), while the disambiguation algorithms also uses





In chapter 3 we introduced a representation of context, from the perspective of an
agent, based on Constructive Type Theory. In this chapter we show how we can use
this model to convert underspecified representations of the meaning of an utterance
into fully specified representations.l
We build on existing approaches to disambiguation and see how these can be
incorporated in a CTT framework. A lot of existing disambiguation strategies can
be viewed as consequences of the way we model communication: communication is
performed through possible extensions of an agent's common context, CTT segments
representing such extensions can only be interpreted when they are well-formed with
respect to that context.
The techniques and ideas that we will review and restate in terms of CTT, are:
. interpretation is a form of abduction ([HSME88], [HSAM93])
. scopally ambiguous utterances can sometimes be represented with a single `mini-
mal' reading ([KC81], [VV96], [Hob83]), and there are constraints to the possible
scopings of certain configurations of quantifiers ([H587])
. selectional restrictions guide sense disambiguation ([A1195], [Hir88])
. coercion provides a way to satisfy selectional restrictions ([Pus91], [Pus93])
1Reca11 that `fully specified' is a relative notion that depends on the degree of specificity in
the target language (section 4.2). Given that we use CTT as our underlying language, and that
this allows us to apply the `minimal reading' approach to certain scopal ambiguities, as shown in
section 4.5.1, `fully specified' in our case at least does not include full scoping.
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. anaphora are variables that must be linked to accessible and fitting referents
([Kam81], [Hei82])
. presuppositions are anaphora ([vd592]).
Together, these ideas provide us with the necessary tools to state and implement rules
for converting ULF representations into annotated CTT segmentsz.
In the following sections we present an algorithm that takes advantage of all of
these techniques.
5.2 The scoping algorithm
In section 2.2.3 we saw that it is possible for some forms of ambiguity to view dis-
ambiguation as the result of assuming that the proposition is trne: to interpret a
sentence is to prove its logical form, allowing for coercions and making assumptions
where necessary.
The interpretation strategy that we follow is based on a similar but weaker as-
surnption: to interpret a sentence is to prove that its logical form is well-forrrzed,
relative to the current context, allowing for coercions and making assumptions where
necessary.
Krause ([Kra95]) has applied the same technique to recast Van der Sandt's the-
ory of presupposition resolution ([vd592]) into a type-theoretical setting. We will
generalize this to include anaphora resolution, bridging and coercion.
The algorithm that we will describe takes a set of ULFs as input and returns a set of
annotated segments as output. These annotated segments are maximally resolved in
the sense that:
. If a parameter is tagged as still requiring linking to the context, it is also flagged
as being unresolvable, i.e. all anaphoric material is either linked to something in
the context or it has been established that there is no unique suitable antecedent.
. All annotated segments are equally `fitting'. In terms of a weighing mechanism
that takes into account how well the interpretation fits with the context, the
returned annotated segments have the same, optirnal, weight.
Ideally, the algorithm returns a set containing just one annotated segment. In that
case, that annotated segment is taken to be the intended meaning of the utterance.
Otherwise, the sentence is considered to be ambiguous, resulting in a situation where
a clarification question needs to be asked.
We distinguish four steps in the process of getting from a set of ULFs to a set of
annotated segments:
ZThese annotated segments should represent the literal meaning of the sentence. We are not
concerned with recovering any indirectness in the sentence; that task is reserved for another module
in the DErrK system which we do not discuss here: the response generator.
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1. Scoping
The relative scopes of determiners and other quantificational elements in ULF
is underspecified. This first step fixes the scopes, by scoping the elements in
such a way that `minimal readings' are the result. If some configuration does
not have a minimal reading, more than one structure is created. The output of
this step is formed by a set of Underspecified Scoped Forrres (USFs). Section 5.3
describes this step in more detail.
2. Conversion to annotated segments, including coercion
This step, described in section 5.4, compositionally converts the USFs into an-
notated segments. At this step type checking is done, which effectively means
imposing sortal restrictions on both predicates and arguments. Coercion may
be used to ensure well-typing.
3. Linking negative statements to context.
Some objects in the annotated segments end up being tagged as requiring linking
to context material, that is, they have negative polarity. For each of those, a
search is done through the different contexts that form our total context model.
This is described in section 5.5.
4. Preference ordering
Given that the above steps create several structures in cases when an ambiguity
cannot be represented locally, we need some way of ordering these different
interpretations so we can determine which one is the most likely. This is done
by considering factors like remaining type clashes and unresolved anaphoric
material. Section 5.6 describes this in more detail.
Now, it might not seem obvious that we can separate these steps and still get a sound
algorithm, since it might be the case that certain information that is only accessible
in some step is already needed in an earlier step to make the right disambiguation
choice. However, there are two ways of ensuring we still end up with the correct
results:
. Use backtracking.
In case a choice is made at some point that turns out to be incompatible with
other information, the algorithm could backtrack and see if another choice is
possible.
. Use multiple representations.
The result for each choice is added to the set of structures under consideration.
Later information will lead to some structures being discarded.
The second option has the advantage that it tells us whether there are other options at
some point. The algorithm can use this information for deciding whether a structure
can be discarded, since it might be the case that by discarding a structure we end up
with no options left. It is preferable to have a least an ill-formed structure that can be
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used for producing a response to inform the speaker what problems were encountered
during interpretation.
We will use such multiple representations at each level to allow wrong choices in
some disambiguation step to be corrected at a later point. The next four sections will
describe these steps in more detail.
5.3 Scoping
The first step in our disambiguation algorithm is the scoping of quantifiers. We have
chosen to adapt an existing algorithm by Hobbs and Shieber ([H587]) to take ULFs
as input and return ULFs that are scoped.
5.3.1 The USF language
The language for scoped ULFs (USFs for short), is similar to that of ULF. However,
where the basic structure of ULFs is
(184) ulf(Quasi~eterminer,Parameter,Features,Restrictions)
USFs have an extra argument, Scope, that specifies the scope of the quasi-determiner.
So USFs have the form:
(185) usf(Quasi~eterminer,Parameter,Features,Restrictions,Scope)
USF has almost the same syntax as ULF, so we will present only the changes with








usf ( Det, P , F-list, R-list, Body)
restr(Rname, P-list, A-list) ~ USF ~ Special
Restriction ~ 1~
For instance, every lens is on has the ULF (ignoring features):





and the USF is:
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(187)
usf (every,X, [. . .] ,






which should be read as `for every lens X, there is a`be on' event~state Y'. Note that
the embedded USF (usf (e ...)) also has a scope to preserve the general format of
the USF representation. We use its own parameter for this3.
5.3.2 Hobbs and Shieber's scoping algorithm
To scope ULFs, we use an algorithm based on the one given by Hobbs and Shieber
in [HS87). Their algorithm converts a(scopally) underspecified representation of
some logical form into scoped representations. They note that a naive algorithm,
where every permutation of quantifiers is a possible scoping, may lead to impossible
interpretationsfor certain sentences. Take the sentence
(188) Every representative of a company saw most samples.
Assuming this sentence has three quantifiers, the naive algorithm would produce 3!-6
possible scopings. This sentence however, does not have six interpretations, but only
five. The `missing' interpretation is the one in which most samples is outscoped by
every representative, but outscopes a company. That interpretation would allow for
a different company not only for each representative, but also for each sample.
The point is that in this sentence there is a noun phrase every representative of a
company that contains an embedded quantifier a company. No quantifier from else-
where in the sentence can outscope the embedded quantifier unless it also outscopes
the quantifier of the whole noun phrase.
The basic step in the algorithm
As said, the algorithm takes a scopally underspecified representation as input, and
returns a scoped form. The unscoped representations will contain what Hobbs and
Shieber call comple~ terms, that is, terms essentially consisting of three parts:
. a quantifier
. a bound variable
. a restriction
3The reason we use a parameter is that this is consistent with the basic step in the scoping
algorithm which we use.
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These complex terms are located in situ, somewhere inside the representation. The
scoped forms on the other hand will contain terms consisting of four parts:
. a quantifier
. a bound variable
. a restriction
. a body
So, for instance, every man works has the underspecified representation
(189) work(Gevery, m, man(m)~)
The scoped version of which is
(190) every(m, man(m), work(m))
To get from the unscoped version to the scoped version, the algorithm first searches
for complex terms inside the representation. The restriction of t,he complex term itself
may then be scoped ( or it can be left as it is), leading to further possible scopings.
The algorithm replaces the complex term with just the variable, leaving just work(m).
This is then used as the body of a new four-part structure, the other three parts of
which are formed by the parts of the complex term that was selected. This yields
the scoped form. Of course if more than one complex term is present in the initial
representation, this basic step needs to be performed several times to get to a fully
scoped form. The order in which complex terms are scoped determines the final
ordering of the quantifiers.
A more complex example
Let us look at the way this works for (188). The scopally underspecified representation
for that is:
(191) see(Gevery, r, rep(r) 8c of(r, Csome, c, com(c)])~,
Cmost, s, sample(s)~)
The algorithm looks for applicable terms: complex terms at the highest level, so only
Cevery, r, rep(r) 8~ of(r, Gsome, c, com(c)~)~andGmost, s, sample(s)~
are considered. Selecting the second one, we get:
(192) most(s, sample(s),
see(Gevery, r, rep(r) 8c of(r, Csome, c, com(c)~),s))
Applying the algorithm to (192), we again have two possibilities because the restric-
tion of Gevery. ..~ can itself be scoped, leading to one fully scoped representation
(marked with Roman numeral I):
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(193) I:every(r, some(c, com(c), rep(r) 8c of(r, c)),
most(s, sample(s),see(r, s)))
and one representation that can still be scoped:
(194) every(r, rep(r) 8c of(r, Gsome, c, com(c)1,
most(s, sample(s), see(r, s))))
which produces the fully scoped interpretation:
(195) II: some(c, com(c) ,every(r, rep(r) 8c of(r, c),
most(s, sample(s), see(r, s))))
Selecting the first applicable term of (191), we get two possible scopings, because
the algorithm can also be recursively applied while scoping every. Its restriction is
rep(r) 8c of(r, Gsome, c, com(c))) which contains an applicable term. If we
scope this restriction we get some(c, com(c) , rep(r) 8~ of(r,c)). This means the
scoping of every has two possible outcomes (the first one results from the scoped
restriction):
(196) every(r, rep(r) 8c of(r, Gsome, c, com(c)))),
see(r,Cmost, s, sample(s))))
(197) every(r, some(c, com(c), rep(r) 8c of(r,c)),
see(r,Gmost, s, sample(s)1))
The latter has only one complex term left, so there is no choice there, and the fully
scoped representation becomes:
(198) III: most( s, sample(s),
every(r, some(c, com(c), rep(r) 8c of(r,c)), see(r, s)))
Representation (196) again has two top-level complex terms, so there are two ways
to apply the basic step:
(199) some(c, com(c), every(r, rep(r) 8c of(r, c),
see(r,Gmost, s, sample(s)))))
(200) most(s, sample(s),
every(r, rep(r) 8c of(r, Gsome, c, com(c)~), see(r, s)))
and (199) finally yields:
(201) IV:most(s, sample(s), some(c, com(c),
every(r, rep(r) 8~ of(r, c)),see(r, s))))
while (200) leads to:
(202) V:some(c, com(c), most(s, sample(s),
every(r, rep(r) 8c of(r, c),see(r, s))))
Figure 5.1 summarizes the derivation paths for each of the scopings.
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I - scoping step recursively
applied to restriction
(195 ) 11
Figure 5.1: Derivation paths for the scoping example
(202) V
Extensions to the algorithm
Hobbs and Shieber argue that, although the algorithm already returns fewer scopings
than one might naively expect, it still isn't strict enough. For some sentences, it
may produce output that does not correspond to any scoping of the sentence. This
occurs for instance whenever an embedded noun phrase re-introduces the variable
corresponding to the outer noun phrase. An example of this is a noun phrase such
as:
(203) Every man with a Pictv,re of himself arrived.
The representation of this sentence is:
(204) arrive(Gevery, x, man(x) 8c
with(x, Gsome, y, picture(y) 8c of(y, x)1)~)
Now, this sentence has only one interpretation, which can be constructed by scoping
the restriction of the subject quantifier while scoping the subject:
(205) every(x, some(y, picture(y) 8c of(y, x),
man(x) 8c with(x, y)),arrive(x))
But if we scope the subject quantifier without scoping the restriction, we end up with:
(206) every(x, man(x) 8c
with(x, Gsome, y, picture(y) 8~ of(y, x)~),
arrive(x))
which by another application, yields
~.3. SCOPIvG 129
(207) some(y, picture(y) 8c of(y, x),
every(x, man(x) 8~ with(x, y), arrive(x)))
And this contains an unbound occurrence of the variable x.
To remed,y this, Hobbs and Shieber restrict the notion of applicable terms to those
complex terms at the highest level that do not contain any unbound variables whose
binder has been applied already. So, in the above case, after we first scoped every,
the binder of x, the other complex term cannot be applied anymore since it contains
x as a free variable. In that case the algorithm will discard the intermediate form
(206) because it contains a complex term but no applicable term.
5.3.3 Scoping ULFs
Hobbs and Shieber's algorithm, described in the previous section, has been adapted
to meet the specific rieeds in our architecture. One of the things that must be kept
in mind is that scope carr to some extent be underspecified in CTT. As we saw
in section 4.5.1, the `minimal reading' approach to the underspecification of scope
can also be incorporated in a type-theoretical sernantics. This means that we can
postpone fixing the precise scope of certain pairs of quantifiers. Given this option, we
will look at ways to limit tlre scopings that are generated by the algorithm to those
that correspond to minimal readings in CTT.
Another consequence of working with CTT is that, because not all quantifiers in
natural language can be represented in it unless one assumes some theory of plurality,
we will restrict our algorithm to those quasi-determiners in ULF that are directly
supported iri our version of CTT: every, a~some, no, the, this~that4.
To limit the number of scopings produced by the algorithm, we use the following
heuristics:
. ~~'here possible, use the `weakest reading' approach, so scope universals over
existcntials.
. Give referring expressions smallest possible scope. While anaphoric expressions
may depend on indefinites or universals or other definites, universal and indefi-
nites can never depend on anaphoric terms. So it is safe to scope universals and
indefinites over anaphors.
. Give event quantifiers narrowest possible scope. This restriction is based on
the fact that event quantifiers are interpreted as indefinites. Combined with an
indefinite subject, we get two indefinites, so both scopings would be equivalent.
When combined with a universal, the weakest reading approach dictates giving
the indefinite narrow scope as well. In combination with anaphorical terms
9Plurals can be represented in CTT by adopting a theory of plurality such as the one in Ap-
pendix A. This will not complicate the scoping algorithm, since the quantifiers introduced there
behave like definites or indefinites. The problem of additional ambiguity caused by distributive
versus collective readings for plurals is also discussed in the Appendix.
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(definites~pronouns), it is important to observe that anaphorical terms cannot
refer back to events introduced by the verb that they are an argument to.
. Definites in restrictions must outscope the quantifier of the complete expression
(every tyre of the car).
. Indefinites in restrictions must outscope the quantifier of the complete expres-
sion if the latter is definite ( the engine of an airplane).
Using these heuristics, most ULFs are scoped into a single USF. The only frequently
occuring construction in which several USFs will be constructed by the algorithm
is for noun phrases of the form the X of every Y, where both relative scopings are
generated by the algorithm, because neither of them is entailed by the other, and
both may lead to possible scopings.
So, for instance, the sentence the wavelength of every bundle increases has the
ULF:
(208) ulf (e,Z, [. . .] ,






[restr ( [bundle] , [X] , [] ) ] )
])~
restr ( [wavelength] , [Y] , [] ) ] )
])])
The only applicable term is the agent ULF, which contains another ULF in one of its
restrictions. We can choose either to scope that before scoping the agent ULF itself,
which leads to the USF:
(209) usf (every,X, [. . .] ,
[restr ( [bundle] , [X] , [] )] ,
usf(the,Y, [. . .] ,
[restr ( [wavelength] , [Y] , [] ) ,
restr( [of] , [Y] , [
preparg:X
])],





or afterwards, resulting in:
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(210) usf(the,Y, [. . .] ,
[restr ( [wavelength] , [Y] , C] ) ,
usf(every,X,[...],
[restr ( [bundle] , [X] , [] ) ] ,
restr( [of] , [Y] , [
preparg:X
]))],






Conjunctions form an exception to the standard scoping mechanism. Recall that
we represent conjunctions using a quasi-determiner conj in ULF. However, for this
quasi-determiner, the notions of restriction and body are irrelevant.
We assume the conjuncts restrict the scope of embedded quantifiers, effectively
keeping objects from both substructures separated. This is done by using a sec-
ond event quasi-determiner ext-closure which cannot be outscoped. This quasi-
determiner is explicitly inserted into the ULF before scoping takes place. So, to scope
coordinations, the following steps are executed:
1. Replace the e quasi-determiner of the subevents with ext-closure.
2. Scope the resulting structure.
The resulting representation is a well-formed USF. However, its interpretation differs
from that of regular USFs. In the conversion to annotated segments such USFs again
will receive a special treatment.
As an example here is the ULF for the if... then sentence if the gv,n ern,its a b~cndle
it reaches the speci~nen:
(211) ulf (conj ,X, [. . . ] ,
[restr( [if-then] , [X] , [
ante:
ulf (e,Y, [. . .] ,
[restr( [emit2] , [Y] , [
agent:
ulf(the,Z,[...],
[restr ( [gun] , [Z] , [] ) ] ) ,
theme:
ulf ( indef , P , [ . . . ] ,
[restr ( [bundle] , [P] , [] ) ] )
])]).
cons:
ulf(e,Q, [. . .] ,
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[restr ( [reach2] , [Q] , [
agent:




[restr ( [specimen] , [S] , [] ) ] )
])])
At the outer level of (211) we see the conj quasi-determiner. It has one restriction,
if-then. Both `conjunct' are arguments to this restriction. This is interpreted as an
implication between the two clauses. If the restriction were another kind of subordi-
nat.ing relation, like until, it would be interpreted as a temporal relation between the
two clauses.
First both e quasi-determiners are replaced by ext-closure. Next the ULF is
scoped. This results in:




usf (indef , P, [ . . . ] ,
[restr([bundle],[P],[])],
usf (the,Z, [. . . ] ,







usf (the , S , [ . . . ] ,
[restr ( [specimen] , [S] , [] ) ] ,
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Note that both clauses are scoped separately. This means that universals in one of
the clauses cannot have scope over quantifiers in the other clause, just as one would
expect.
This concludes our discussion of the scoping step. After scoping, the representation
of an utterance consists of a set of USFs. The next step is to convert these USFs into
annotated segments. This is thc: topic of the next section.
5.4 Conversion to annotated sements
After scoping, each USF is converted into a single annotated segment, using a transla-
tion function between the USF format and the annotated segment format. This is the
level at which type requirements are applied. Note that failure to conform to typing
restrictions does not lead to readings being discarded immediately. Type mismatches
are simply noted, and are used in the weighing process described in section 5.6, which
determines the most likely interpretation(s) of the utterance.
The conversion procedure follows the structure of USFs, starting with the outer-
most quantifier. First its restriction is converted to an annotated segment. Next its
body is recursively converted. Then the quasi-determiner plays a role in combining
the two annotated segments into one. Finally the USF features are converted, and
their translation added to annotations.
So in fact there are only three basic steps:
. converting a restriction(-líst) into an annotated segment
. using a quasi-determiner to combine two annotated segments
. converting USF features to annotations
These three steps are the topic of the next section.
5.4.1 Content and structure
The structure of USFs reflects the relative scopes of the determiners. However, some
determiners will be converted to CTT objects that do not have any scope, rather,
they encode the fact that the statements they introduce have negative polarity. This
means their contribution will be represented in the annotations part of the resulting
annotated segiYient. Examples are the definite determiner, pronouns, and demonstra-
tives.
The restrictions in USF will usually be translated as CTT terms. There are some
restrictions that get translated to annotations. These are all restrictions that are
domain independent. For instance, the adverb always is represented by a restriction
in ULF and USF, but in our annotated segment formalism where tense information is
represented through the annotations, it will introduce a feature on an event parameter.
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Restrictions
The translation algorithm has access to a translation function for restrictions. This
maps every restriction to a partial annotated segment, and introduces several require-
ments on parameters.
To define the translation in a compositional way, we use partial annotated segments
with parameters:
Definition 26
Let V be a set of variables.
Let I'b be an initia] context that defines the language part of the domain
(c.f. section 3.6).
The set PS of parametrized statements is the smallest set such that:
. IfPE VandI'b~T:~s,thenP:TEPS.
. If P, A1 ... An E V and I'~ ~ T: IIXl : Bl, ..., X,t : B~ .~p, then
P : T.A1.....A~ E PS.
(the AZ do not necessarily have to have type Bi: after all, they can
be parameters which are not part of the CTT language proper)
. If P, Ai . . . A~ E V and I'b F- Tl : ~S, . . . , Tn : ~S, S : ~S, F : IIXl :
Tl ... IIXn : Tn . S then P- F~A1-...-An : S E PS.
. IfI'bf-P:T:~S,thenP:TEPS.
A parametrized segment is a sequence of parametrized statements.
These parametrized segments form the basis for constructing abstracted CTT expres-
sions that serve as translations of ULF restrictions. The four clauses correspond to
four different types of translation for restrictions in ULF:
. Most nouns in the English language fragment will directly correspond to ob-
ject types in the CTT formalization. Such nouns typically denote classes of
objects. For instance, the noun aperture, with ULF representation [aperture],
corresponds to aperture : ~S.
Now, when the word apertv,re is used, this will represent some inhabitant P
of this type, so we translate it as [P : aperture~, where P is a parameters.
Depending on the determiner used with the noun, this parameter will
- be instantiated as a term in the context, for instance if the statement has
negative polarity;
- be interpreted as a CTT variable bound by a II operator, for instance if
the quantifier is a universal one;
SWe will be using capital letters for the parameters since they are actually the same objects that
appear as variables in ULFs.
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- be treated as a fresh CTT variable, for instance if the quantifier is an
existential one.
. The second type of translation is found e.g. for some adjectives, such as vis-
ilile, and for verbs. In the CTT formalization, there is a function visible :
pattern ~~p. In ULF this is represented by a restriction [visible] on
a parameter that represents the object that is visible. In CTT that object
can be found as the argument to which the function has been applied. So
the parametrized segment that forms the translation of the restriction is [Q :
visible.P], where P is the parameter representing the object; and Q is a proof
term.
. The third type of translation is the one we need for nouns that typically behave
as functiorrs, in the sense that they tend to be associated with a PP starting
with of, or with genitives.
In our domain, the word wavelength has such a translation. There is no type
wavelength, but there is a type size of quantitative values. The function
wave-len maps each object of type bundle to such a quantitative value. So, if
we want to translate wavelength to something in CTT, we either have to refer
to this function, or to the type of quantitative values size. In fact, we will do
both.
The restriction [wavelength] in ULF is translated as the parametrized segment
[P - wave-Ien.A : size], where A is another parameter that needs to be bound
to an object of type bundle. This argument may be supplied by an `of'-phrase
in the utterance, but it may also be unspecified.
. The last type of translation is needed for defànite noun phrases that refer to
a fixed entity in the domain. Such noun phrases act as names. For instance,
in the electron microscope domain the different modes that the microscope
can be in are objects of type mode. Inhabitants of this are objects such
as hm~rrode:mode. These serve as translations for the corresponding noun
phrases, so the ULF restriction [hm,mode] will be translated by a statement
that does not contain any parameters.
For some cases, translation involves functions applied to parameters. To result in
well-typed segments these parameters must be of the right type. We extend the
parametrized segments with information about the parameters to keep track of type
requirements on the parameters.
Definition 27
. Let ArgnaTne be the set of ULF argument roles except preparg (see
the definition of ULF on page 101), extended with {ofarg, locarg,
goalarg}
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. A parameter type value is a term T such that I'6 ~ T: ~s or T-
eventive.
. A parameter type specification is a statement of the form P:T where
P E V and T a parameter type value, or T-{(cl , Tl ,...(c~, T~) }
where each T2 is a parameter type value, and each ci is a disjunction
index. In the latter case, the parameter type specification consists of
a (dependent) disjunction.
. A parameter type requirement is an expression of the form R(P : T)
where R E Argname or R-subject, and P: T a parameter type
specification.
. A tagged parametrized segment is an expression of the form SR, where
S is a parametrized segment, T is a set. of parameter type specifica-
tions, and R is a set of parameter type requirements.
. An abstracted segment is an expression of the form AP . T where
P E V and T is a tagged parametrized segment.
The special reserved term eventive is reserved for arguments that are propositions
derived from verbs.
The reserved term subject is reserved for controlling the flow of type infortnation
between different restrictions in the same restriction list, as we will see below.
The parameter type specification set contains the type information. The parameter
type requirement set lists the types that parameters must have for the expressions
to be well-formed as well as information about which ULF objects have to provide
instantiations for these parameters, through `typical role' information in the Aryname.
This links the arguments of CTT functions, corresponding to verbs or adjectives, to
their natural language counterparts and encodes what are usually called .selectional
restrictions: restrictions that predicates impose on their arguments and which can be
used in word sense disambiguation (cf. [A1195]).
To come back to our earlier examples, ULF restrictions that correspond to CTT
types will provide a parameter type specification, whereas ULF restrictions that cor-
respond to functions will also provide parameter type requirements for the argument
parameters. A part of a translation table is given in figure 5.2.
[aperture] AP . [P : aperture] aper ure
[visible] AP . [Q : visible.P] Q event~vesub'ect P: attern
[wavelength] AP .[P- wave-len. A : size] P s,zeofar A:bundle
[hm,mode] AP .[P- hm~node : mode] P mo e
Figure 5.2: Restrictions corresponding to abstracted segments
This table provides us with the translations of individual restrictions. In line with
earlier projects such as PLUS that used different laciguages to get from natural laii-
guage to a target language, we call this table the conceptv,al le~icon. It provides the
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connection between terms that are close to the surface representation of the utter-
ance, and terms (concepts) from the domain formalization. To access the conceptual
lexicon, we assume the presence of a function cl such that cl(R) - A iff restriction R
is translated as abstracted segment A. We will now see how this is used to provide
translations for complete USFs.
The translation function f from USF to annotated segment is built up using some
auxiliary functions:
Definition 28
.fn([R1:Pr,...,Rn:Pryz]) - { Rr:Pr,...,R,a:Pn~
f~~(R) ~~ cl(R) if R E Dom(cl)
-L otherwise
f,.s(restr(R, [P] ,A)) - f,.~(R)(P) O fa(A)
The first case is for a list of arguments, given as role-parameter pairs. These are
mapped onto a set of those same pairs. The second case is for the restriction names,
which of course are mapped through the use of the conceptual lexicon. If no conceptual
lexicon entry is given, an error message is generated. The tlrird clause combines the
result of mapping the restriction with the set of its arguments by means of a partial
application O. This application compares the parameter type requirement set in
its first argument, comíng from the conceptual lexicon translation of the restriction,
with the role-parameter pairs in the second argument. If matching roles are found,
the parameters are unified. Otherwise, if a role in the parameter type requirement set
is not found, we have a situation where an argument is not explicitly stated. We will
discuss this in section 5.4.3. On the other hand, if a role frorn the second argument
is not present in the type requirement set, we have a rather peculiar situation where
we have too many arguments. This will lead to conversion failure.
As an example, the restriction restr( [visible] ,[Y] ,[] ) is converted as:
frs(restr( [visible] , [Y] , [] )) -
frn( Cvisible] )(Y) O fa( [] ) -
cl([visible])(Y) O Ql -
~Q : vlsible.Y~{Q:eventive}{ sub j e ct ( Y: pattern )}
So, this restriction yields a segment with a single statement, consisting of the proposi-
tion that some Y, which should be a pattern, is visible. The proof for this proposition
is given by a parameter Q.
As we saw in the above example, at restriction level in a USF, arguments to CTT
predicates are found as translations of parameters. How can we know whether these
parameters are of the right type? Where can this information come from?
Let us take another look at the USF in (186), repeated here for convenience.
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(213)
usf(every,X,[...],
[restr( [lens] , [X] , [] )] ,




Tlre [be , on-pred] restriction has an agent argument, with parameter X. This pa-
rameter is bound by the quasi-determíner, and introduced with its own restriction
[lens] . So in fact the information that X has type lens is present, but at a higher
level in the USF.
This means that the translation is set up in such a way that information about
parameters is collected and `passed down' to provide translations for substructures.
The translations of these substructures are themselves combined to provide the trans-
lation of the whole structure. This will be explained in more detail below when we
discuss the quasi-determiners.
Now we might have multiple restrictions on a single parameter, as in every visible lens
is on:
(214) usf (every,X, [. . .] ,
[restr ( [lens] , [X] , [] ) ,
restr([visible],[X],[])],




In such a case we should make sure we give any restriction that may provide type
information precedence over other restrictions. Converting the [lens] restriction will
fix the type of X to lens, whereas the [visible] restriction merely checks whether
the type is pattern. In this case, we obviously have a problem. In section 5.4.2 we
will discuss what to do in such cases.
The translation of a list of restrictions can be found by first translating the restric-
tion that provides the type of the object parameter, and then converting the other
restrictions. Any requirements that these other restrictions may impose on the object
parameter are represented by means of type requirements with the special subject
role. So for instance the restriction [visible] will lead to the requirement that its
subject (which is the object. itself) has type pattern. The resulting segments are
appended following the translation order. The union of all type requirement sets pro-
vides the type requirements set of the translation of the restriction list. The subject
type requirements that are met are dropped from the requirements set.
For the type specification set we also take the union of all type specification sets.
In the case of visible pattern this means we end up with:
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(215) [.X : pattern, (~ : vlsible.X]{.X:pattern,Q:e~enti~e}
Now, these type requirements can be used to disambiguate for instance between dif-
ferent meanings of a homonym. Any lexical ambiguity will lead to a disjunction in
the parameter type specification of the parameter representing the object. Using the
parameter type requirements for that same parameter may lead to the selection of one
of the disjuncts and thus fix the interpretation of the ambiguous word. This is in fact
a simple application of selectional restrictions to resolve lexical ambiguity ([A1195]),
as for instance implemented by Hirst ([Hir88]).
Similarly, PP-attachment anrbiguity can in some cases be resolved by this match-
ing of type specifications and type requirernents. Alt,hough ambiguous attachment
leads to multiple annotated segments, in case one of the attachments leads to a type
mismatch, that annotated segment will receive a lower `well-formedness' score than
other options (see section 5.6).
Quasi-determiners
Besides a tracrslation of restriction lists we also need a translation for the quasi-
determiners. Where the translation of the restriction lists provides us with the content
of segments, the quasi-determiners provide either str~cture or annotations.
The easiest determiner in our case is the indefinite determiner. In a declarative
utterance such as some bundle enters a lens, all quantification is indefinite: the event
quantification, the subject quantification, and the object quantification. As a result,
the translations of the three objects, the bundle, the lens, and the entering event,
which all three translate to segments, are appended, because the intended interpre-
tation is that of a conjunction. Definite determiners also lead to segments being
appended, but they also add rb and mt features (see section 3.5) to the annotation
part, to indicate whiclr statements have negative polarity and are to be linked to
pre-existing objects in the context. Universal quantifiers on the other hand, lead to
radically different segment structures. As an example, we will look at every ~nicro-
sco7~e is on. Its USF is:
(216) usf (every,X, [. . .] ,
[restr ( [microscope] , [X] , [] ) ] ,





Translation start~ with the outermost quasi-determiner. First its restriction is con-
verted. This leads to the tagged segment:
(217) [X : microscope]{x:microscope}
The parameter type specifications this yields, are used in the conversion of the body.
For the body we find:
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(218) [Y : activated.A]{Y:eventive}{ agent(A: microscope) }
The type requirement in the event translation is fulfilled by the type specification
given in the subject translation, so X and A can be identified.
Now, note that Y here is an inhabitant of the proposition that some microscope X is
on. But this is not what the utterance claimed. If Y is indeed a representation of the
proof of the proposition that underlies the utterance, then Y should be the inhabitant
of a II-type.
This is exactly what is done in the translation of the quasi-determiner every.
A II-type is created, using the translation of the restriction of the USF, and with
the translation of the body of the USF as range type. Tlie inhabitant of the body
translation is made the inhabitant of the II-type.
(219) [Q : (IIX : microscope . activated.X)~{x:microscope,Q:eventive}
Of course, the body may contain more than one statement, in which case the segment
needs first to be converted to a E-type, after which we have a single statement and
we can again apply this strategy.
If, on the other hand, the restriction contains more than one statement, we simply
iterate the II-abstraction for each statement.
Figure 5.3 gives a short overview of how different USF quasi-determiners con-
trol the construction of complex annotated segments from the restriction and body
translations.
a~some append Restriction and Body
e append Restriction and Body
the append Restriction and Body,
add rb annotations for all iiihabitants in Restriction segment
add mt annotation for first inhabitant in Restriction segment
this~that append Restriction and Body,
add rb annotations for all inhabitants in Restriction segment
add mt annotation for first inhabitant in Restriction segment
wh append Restriction and Body,
add mt annotation for first inhabitant in Restriction segment
every create II-type
conj depends on the conjunct: annotation and~or structure change
Figure 5.3: Procedures connected to different quasi-determiners
There are several ways in which the conversion of ULF quasi-determiners may give
rise to problems. For instance, to create a II-type for sentences containing a noun
phrase with every, the parameter must be, or contain, a variable. So, for instance, we
can create a II-type out of the subsegments for every lens is on:
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(220)
restriction: [X : lens]
body: [Q : activated-X]
since the parameter X can be used as a CTT variable. But, as we have seen, not
all noun restrictions are translated to CTT types. Some are translated as functions.
In those cases, something interesting happens. Suppose we have the sentence every
wauelength increases. The restriction [wavelength] is translated as a function, the
argument of which is required to be a bundle. Since the argument is not found in
tlre translation of the sentence, it is presupposed and added to the restriction. This
means that the segments that are to be connected through the II-type, ares:
(221)
restriction: [Y : bundle, X - wave-len.Y : size]
body: [E : event,Q : incr.size.qs.X-E]
We canrrot create a II-type using the X. But we can use the parameter Y", so we work
with that. Since a function cannot be converted to a II-introduction, it has to be
eliminated. This is done by replacing every occurrence of X by wave-len-Y (which
is valid, since the X is just an abbreviation), and removing the definition statements.
This leaves:
(222) restriction: [Y : bundle]body: [E : event,Q : incr.size-qs.(wave-len.Y).E]
When we construct a II-type from these segments, we end up with:
(223) [Q : (IIY : bundle . EE : event . incr.size-qs.(wave-len-Y).E)]
This is the representation of the wavelength of every bv,ndle increases, in the interpre-
tation where there is a difFerent wavelength for each bundle. This is precisely what
the original sentence meant.
Now, things go wrong if the argument to such a function is mentioned in a sentence
and is not introduced by an indefinite. For instance, the utterance increase every
radius of the c2 apertv.re leads to the following segments to be combined into a II-
type7:
(224)
restriction: [Y - c2 : aperture, X- rad.Y : size]
body: [E : event,Q : incr.size-qs.X.E]
There is simply no parameter that can be used in a II-type. So, it is impossible to
use every in these circumstances. The solution chosen in the algorithm is to simply
append the segments, as if a definite determiner were used, and add an error message
6Actually, the first two arguments to the incr predicate, the type size and the proof qs that this
type has the quant property, have not been determined at this point in the conversion process, but
for the sake of clarity we fill them in in this example.
~There is a small simplification: in the actual formalization, c2 aperture is not translated into a
constant.
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to the annotations that indicates that there has been a`user misconception'. In this
case, the user apparently was unaware of tlie fact that apertures have only one radius.
This error message can be used to construct a response from the system that inforrns
the user of this fact. Note that interpretation is still possible; user misconceptions are
not fatal errors, since the system can still infer the message that the user probably
intended to utter.
ULF features
~~e have seen how the segment part of an annotated segment is created as the result
of a recursive translation process. This process also yields some of the annotations.
However, we did not yet discuss what happens to the feature list that is present in
each USF.
Most ULF~USF features have direct counterparts in the annotation language, so
translation is simply a matter of copying the relevant information. The only thing that
is different in the annotation language is that each annotation is a single structure,
whereas in the USF language the features occur within some USF associated with
an event or object. To be able to record which information belongs to which object,
t,he parameters are added in the annotation values, so for instance if in a USF we
have some temporal feature present, for a certain event E, then in the annotation this
temporal feature is added with the parameter E as an argument.
However, there is one interesting USF feature that does not end up as a feature,
but in the CTT part of the annotated segment: the neg feature.
In ULF, negation is represented by a feature. During conversion to CTT, if a USF
is tagged as being negative, the resulting segment is negated by applying the CTT
function not to it (see section 3.6). So, for instance, the rnicroscope is rzot o~, has as
USF:
(225) usf (the,X, [. . .] ,





The e USF is initially converted into:
(226) [Y' : activated.X]
and then negated:
(227) [Y : not.(activated.X)]
which is then combined with the restriction of the the USF to give the full annotated
segment for this sentence:
(228) [X : microscope,Y : not.(activated-X)]
{rb- [[X]],mt- [X:def-art]}
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5.4.2 Resolving type conflicts with coercion
As we have seen, we might end up with translations for segments that state certain
requirements about parameters that are not met by the actual types of these parame-
ters. This may be due to a conceptual error of the user, like trying to use an argurnent
with a verb that just makes no sense in the domain:
(229) The dial emits a magnification.
But in some cases the mismatch is the result of the typing being as strict as it is,
rather than a conceptual error of the user. As an example, let us look at
(230) The bundle reaches tiae screen.
In the CTT representation of the electron miscroscope, we have the following entries:
(231) plane : ~S
axobj : ~S
bundle : ~ S
element G axobj : ~S
screen G element : ~S
p-of : (axobj ~ plane)
reaches : (bundle -~ plane ~ ~p)
This leads to the entries in the conceptual lexicon listed in figure 5.4.
[plane] AP . [P : plane]
P'p ane
[bundle] AP . [P : bundle] P:
un e




AP .[P : reach-A.B] a ent A:bundle ,theme B: lane
Figure 5.4:
During the conversion to CTT, the object tagged with the theme role, will have
type screen. But the conceptual lexicon entry of [reach] states that the theme role
must be filled by something of type plane. Since screen does not inherit from plane,
the parameter representing the screen cannot be unified with the expected parameter
for the theme role of the event.
Now, the intended meaning in terms of our domain definition can be paraphrased
as The bv,ndle reaches the plane of the screen. So if we were to apply the function
p-of to the screen parameter we would end up with the intended argument for the
reach predicate.
This is of course a form of the phenomenon of coercion that we have seen in
section 2.2.2. As we have seen there, Pustejovsky proposed to handle type mismatches
through the application of certain priviliged functions which were defined by the
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qualia structure of concepts. We will interpret the notion of qualia structure in our
type-theoretical setting as denoting a set of privileged accessor functions: that is,
functions from one object type to another. Not only does the conceptual lexicon
contain translations from ULF restrictions to bits of annotated segments, it also
records which functions in the domain may be used for coercion.
Coming back to our example (230), the function p-of is considered to be a function
that encodes the constitutive qualia role of axobj, and is tagged as such in the
conceptual lexicon. This means we are indeed allowed to insert this function between
the found object and the expected object and get a well-formed segment with the
intended interpretation. Section 6.4 shows how this can be implemented.
Given that there may be several functions of the right type for coercion, we need a
way to select the most appropriate one. Consider the following two pairs of sentences:
(232) (a) Try ~opening~` that door.
(b) Try the other one.
(233) (a) Try ~listening~` at that door.
(b) Try the other one.
Each of the (b) sentences has a preferred interpretation where the coercion follows
the explicitly uttered action from the (a) sentences. This means that coercive func-
tions are similar to other anaphoric material in that they can sometimes be linked
to material in the context, and that a measure of salience can be used to determine
the most likely candidate. Coercive functions thus behave as anaphors and can be
handled by a generic resolution algorithm.
5.4.3 Missing arguments and presuppositions
The predicates in CTT are often more complex and take more arguments than their
linguistic counterparts. Also, in language, there is usually a lot of variation in the
number of arguments a verb can take: some arguments are required, but some may
be optional. In CTT, the predicate needs all its arguments for the result to be a well-
formed proposition. This means that when an argument is not given in an utterance,
the algorithm has to somehow find one. Where such an argument must come from
is not immediately clear. It depends on the kind of argument, and on the kind of
utterance the predicate is used in. As an example take these sentences:
(a) Increase the g~en voltage.
(234) (b) Increase the wavelength.
(c) Tv,rn the rrcagnification dial.
The (a) sentence is interesting because of the way the verb increase is represented in
our domain:
(235) incr : (IIt : ~S . IIp : quant.t . IIx : t . IIe : event . ~p)
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The second argument, providing a proof for quant.t., is not provided by the utterance
itself, so it must be found in the context. Since we are dealing with a proposition
here, the identity of the proof is not really relevant.
A different phenomenon occurs in the (b) sentence. Besides the missing proof
argument in the translation of in,crease, we also have to provide an argument for the
function that is the translation of wavelength. If the argument is not provided in t.he
utterance by an `of'-phrase, it also has to be bound to something in the context. Here
it does make a difference which object we choose as antecedent.
In the (c) sentence we are faced with the problem that there is no indication in
the utterance of the direction of the turning, which in the CTT translation has to
be specified. The question now is whether we should look for an antecedent for such
arguments. After all, it could be argued that, in the case of a command as in the (c)
sentence the intended interpretation is tv,rn the rnagnification dial in sorne direction.
It seems then that we must include in our conceptual lexicon information about
which arguments must be bound, and which can be taken as indefinites when not
explicitly determined by the utterance. If they are to be bound they are flagged as
such, and their binding is taken care of by the generic anaphoric linking algorithm
which we introduce in the next sectiorr.
5.5 Anaphoric linking
The first two steps of the disambiguation algorithm produce a set of annotated seg-
nrents. These annotated segments may contain annotations that indicate that for
some parameters, referents have to be found in the context. In this section we will
describe the third step of disambiguation that does just thats.
We will presuppose that an anaphor always refers to an already available entity,
the antecedent, and that the referential process can be deictic (outsíde the linguistic
context) as well as anaphoric (inside the linguistic context).
The resolution process will be defined with respect to our context model. We will
make use of the distinction between private, common and observable knowledge that
is pr~esent in that model. Since we are working towards providing a resolution module
for a dialogue system, the dialogue with the user will be used in case of interpretation
problems, i.e. if no object, or more than one, is suggested as a possible antecedent.9
The resolution process to be presented will heavily rely on semantic and pragmatic
principles, and less on syntactic grounds. This implies that, in order to solve the
antecedent of a definite we will use information contextually available, such as the
common contexts of the dialogue participants, and the Gricean maxims of quality and
quantity.
BThis section is based on work jointly done with Robbert-Jan Beun, which has been published as
[BK95] and presented during the International Pragmatics Conference in Mexico City, 1996.
9In our case the resolution process does not try to always make a choice when our resolution prin-
ciples are not sufficient.We prefer using dialogue principles in unclear cases to get extra information
from the speaker that may help resolution. See also ([Piw98]) for the mechanisms involved.
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Besides the traditional linguistically realized anaphors (pronouns, definite noun
phrases etc.), we also define resolution for terms coming from other sources:
. Presuppositions: following Van der Sandt ([vdS92]), we treat presuppositions
as anaphors.
~ Unspecified arguments: some predicates require, in their CTT representation,
arguments which are not necessarily realized in the uttered input. We use a
search mechanism to find the most likely object to serve as argument.
.`one' anaphors: we assume that the word one, in noun phrases like the red one,
is an anaphor at object-type level. There are other words like that, such as
another.
All these are represented as negative statements that must be bound to corrtextual
material. Only the marker type is different.
5.5.1 Prominence and anaphoric markers
The general idea behind our resolution strategy is that objects that can serve as
antecedents for anaphoric expressions may be present in different parts of the total
context. Since our context is built up from different CTT contexts, the resolution
algorithm will look for antecedents in any of these contexts. We will assume that
during interpretation, the assistant is guided to one or more of these contexts by
means of the information available in the anaphoríc expression. In the annotated
segment this information is present throught the mt arrnotation.
Moreover, we assume that, within a particular context, objects have different
degrees of prominence. In line with Beun and Cremers ([BC95]), we distinguish three
ways in which an object can become prominent. First, an object may be inherently
prominent because it is the only one of its kind, or stands out in any other way.
Second, an object may be prominent because it has been mentioned recently in the
discourse.ro And thirdly, an object may become salient if it is functionally relevant,
i.e. if it is part of the task at hand. Since prominent objects are easier to identify, we
will assume that the notion of prominence is closely connected to what is often called
accessibility (e.g. [Ari90]).
The previous classification only concerns the object itself, but it should be stressed
here that objects may also receive prominence as a result of the prominence of other
objects. In that case we will talk about inaplicit prominence, while in the direct case
we will talk about explicit prominence. Implicit prominence may be the result of both
domain properties, for instance, objects that are spatially close to the most promirient
object (see [Cre96]), and mental properties, for instance, the roles that objects play in
a given domain. So, for instance, objects may be introduced by definite descriptions,
because they are connected to the most prominent object. We already encountered
this in section 2.2.5:
loThese mental objects may be anchored to objects in the domain of discourse, but need not be.
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(236) [rA carJ` entered the village. ~The driverJZ wore a blue sweater.
The importance of this phenomenon for the resolution process is that, if all attempts
fail to find a direct antecedent for the anaphor, t,he antecedent, may be found among,
or constructed from, these related objects.
Precisely how the notion of prominence influences the resolution process in differ-
ent communicative situations is an open question and correct formalization of promi-
nence is a difficult task, since it depends, for instance, on the properties of the user's
perception and the structure of the discourse. Some of what we present is influenced
by the work of Allen ([A1195]), Grosz Bc Sidner ([GS86]), Ariel ([Ari90]), Cremers
([Cre96]), Van der Sandt ([vdS92]), Krahmer 8c Piwek ([KP96]), and Huls, Claassen
8e Bos ([HCB95]).
In some cases the decision about the most prominent object is only a matter of the
last mentioned ob,ject in the dialogue, e.g.:
(237) A Turn on the microscope.
B OK.
A Which button is on?
B ~The blue oneJ`.
A Turn ~itJi off!
Here the last fitting entity ( i.e. the blue button) is taken from the dialogue, as an-
tecedent for the pronoun it. However, as we can see in the next example, the last
introduced discourse entity in time does not always agree with the most prominent
one:
(238) A Is ~the button ne~t to the on~off-buttonJz on?
B Yes.
A Turn ~itJi off!
Note that in this case the on~off-button is used as a relatum and helps to iderrtify
another button. This other button is the antecedent of the pronoun, even though it
was mentioned earlier.
So, simply constructing a stack of discourse entities that may serve as antecedents
is insufficient. Simply removing the relatum frorn the possible antecedents is also not
an option, because there are situations in which it can serve as an antecedent:
(239) A What is the name of the aperture below ~the condensor lensJ` ?
B The C2-aperture.
A Turn (itJ2 off!
One option is to assign different prominence levels to objects in different positions in
the sentence. This, combined with the temporal order of the sentences, may provide
a starting point for defining dialogue prominence.
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Note that prominence should not be defined in such a way that two objects always
have different degrees of prominence, since that would entail that ambiguities cannot
arise. But there are situations in which ambiguities arise precisely because several
antecedents are equally likely:
(240) A Does ~the wavelengthJ` change when ~the voltageJ~ changes?
B Yes.
A Increase (itJt~ !
In sucli cases, we want the algorithm to note the resolution problem and initiate a
question to the user, asking for clarification.
5.5.2 The anaphoric markers
Natural language contains a rich marking system for anaphors. Each rnarker selects
specific contexts as being more accessible than others. Take for instance the following
example:
(241) ~WatsonJ` poured drinks.
~HolmesJ~ watched JhimJZ~(laimselfJ~.
Here the pronoun him refers to Watson and not to Holmes, the last mentioned and
therefore probably the most prominent one, while the reflexive pronoun himself refers
back to Holmes. The reflexive pronoun takes the sentence as a search space for the
most prominent referent, while the non-reflexive pronoun takes the previous discourse
to find its antecedent. In other words, a speaker has specific linguistic means to guide
the hearer as to the retrieval process, and the hearer has to use these means during
interpretation.
Although there is no simple correlation between the markers and the context that
contains the antecedent, the form of a. specific marker is far from accidental (see e.g.,
Ariel ([Ari90]), Gundel, Hedberg 8L Zacharski ([GHZ93]), Piwek 8e Cremers ([PC95])).
For instance, Piwek and Cremers' empirical investigations have shown that in 29 cases
of first reference to objects in the domain with pointing the Dutch marker deze (this)
was used and in none of the cases die (that). Hence, markers may give hints for the
resolution process as for where to look first in the context.
In Englísh the following markers are used (from [Hud84]):
. definite articles (the cube)
. substantive demonstrative pronouns (this, that, these, those)
. attributive demonstrative pronouns (this cube, that man, etc.)
. nominative personal pronouns (I, yon, it, he, we, etc.)
. accusative personal pronouns (me, yov,, him, it, us, etc.)
. attributive possessive pronouns (my mistake, ov,r conversation, its radius, etc.)
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. absolute possessive pronouns (mine, his, yours, etc.)
. reflexive pronouns (myself, itself, etc.)
. proper nouns (Mickey, Leen, RJ, etc.)
. gaps (shake e before use)
However, our anaphora resolution algorithm does not have to deal with all classes of
markers. The resolution of anaphors with certain kinds of markers is less context-
dependent in nature. For instance, the referent of a reHexive can be deduced on the
basis of syntactic infomation alone (it has to be the subject of the clause), and the
referents of names are assumed to be given by the conceptual lexicon.
The next example seems to provide evidence that pronominal reference and the use
of the definite article directs the hearer's attention to the dialogue context, while the
substantive demonstratives direct the hearer's attention to the domain of discourse.
This is in line with the general findings in the literature, e.g. [CM81].
(242) A Is ~the c2 lens~` on?
B Yes.
A1 Turn ~it~2~t,hat~this off!
A2 Turn ~that oneJ2~this one off!
A3 Turn ~the lensJi~~that lens~2~this lens off!
Often though, a demonstrative does not refer to objects in the domain of discourse.
For instance, in cases where the object cannot be presented on the screen or the object
is introduced in the previous discourse. In the following example, both the objective
aperture and tlre LM-mode are taken from the previous discourse as an antecederrt.
Note also that the LM-mode is not observable in the dornain.
(243) A Which áperture enhances contrast in ~LM-mode~` ?
B The ~objective apertureJ~ .
A Does ~that aperture~~ select the visible area in ~that mode~z ?
Note also that in case of uniqueness of the object, t.he object is often part of the
common context (e.g. `the C2 lens', `the gun', etc.). So, since there is no sirnple cor-
relation between the markers and the context-type, we will say that specific markers
~refer specífic contexts to direct the hearer's attention.
As a consequence, in all cases of a demonstrative marker, the domain has to be
examined for a pointing action. If the pointed object agrees with the descriptiorr, the
object will be selected as an antecedent for the expression. If there is no pointing
action or if the description does not agree, an antecedent will be looked for in the
dialogue context.
From the previous discussion we concluded that the anaphoric markers indicate a
preference for a particular context-type. In some cases, claims can also be made
about the exclusion of a particular context as a search space for the antecedent. For
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instance, demonstratives seem to indicate that the antecedent is already available
in the domain or the dialogue context (or both). This would imply that implicit
prominence can never be indicated by a demonstrative, since the `inferred' object
always has to come from the common context. So, this predicts that sequences such
as the c2 aperture ... that radiv,s, where that radius is supposed to be the radius of
the c2 aperture, are unacceptable. As a consequence, if all direct attempts fail in
the resolution process, a counterquestion can be asked without first trying to find an
indirect antecedent in the comnron context. The same conclusion can be drawn with
respect to pronominal reference.
We will not go into a detailed description of the relation between the marker and
t,he accessible c.ontext, but list, the main results from the literature:
. non-reflexive personal and possessive pronouns refer only to the dialogue context
or the sentence itself, but never to the subject of the sentence in which they
appear; no implicit prominence
. reflexive pronouns always refer to the sentence in which they appear (we will
return to this below); no implicit prominence
. demonstratives may refer to both the physical domain, the dialogue and~or the
same sentence, there is a slight preference for the domain; no implicit prominence
. definite articles may refer to all contexts, even to the system's private belief
in case of bridging (see next section), but never to the same sentence; implicit
prominence should be taken into account
. gaps refer to the sentence itself or to the dialogue context,.
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Figure 5.5: Preferences related to types of anaphors
5.5.3 Definite descriptions, functions and bridging
There are several circumstances in which it is felicitous to use a definite description:
1. the description is only satisfied by one object in the world
~The vniverseJt is very old.
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2. there are several objects that satisfy the description, but one of them is more
prominent than the other
A:I have ~a dogJ`.
B:I )aave a cat and ~a dogJ~ .~The dogJ~ is named Tipsy.
3. the central component of the description is a functional noun
~The mayorJi of a city is appointed by the senate.
4. one object satisfying the description is associated strongly with another object
that is very prominent
I took ~my carJ` for a test drive. ~The engineJ~~ made a weird noise.
We will assume here is that all these cases can be seen as consequences of the fact
that the meaning of a definite description is a function that selects a single object
within íts context.
To find the selected referent, the following steps must be taken:
. Add hypothetical objects, accessible from the position of the definite description,
to the private context.
. In the resulting context, select the most prominent object satisfying the descrip-
tion.
Irr case 1, there is only one object that satisfies the description, so it is the most
prominent one by default. Case 2 shows that prominence is to be defined in terms of
recency of inention. In case 3, we have an accessible object standing for a hypothetical
city, which serves as an argument for the `mayor-of' function. This hypothetical city
is very prominent because it is mentioned in the utterance itself. Case 4 shows that
prorninence is not constrained to objects that have been mentioned themselves, but
that there can be one or more associated objects that receive prominence as well.
The last case is what is called bridging in the literature ([BBM95], [AL96]). Bos
et al. propose to handle bridging as coercive accomodation. They use the following
three sentences as examples of three ways that definite descriptions can be analyzed:
(244) (a) When I invite a celebrity, the celebrity never comes.
(b) When I go to a bar, the barkeeper always throws me ov.t.
(c) When I give a party, the king of France always attends it.
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For the (b) sentence, Bos et al. propose to use some sort of qualia structure to in-
troduce associated objects. Lexical entries, they argue, for words, also contain qualia
information. These Q-DRS's are normally not accessible and do not affect the truth
conditions of sentences. However, they can be used to accommodate definite descrip-












Linking fails, since there is no suitable accessible antecedent, but through bridging
the discourse mai~ker z becomes accessible:
(248)
x,z







Finally, for the (c) sentence we get the a-DRS:
(249) x
y






The pronoun represented by z can be linked to x, but there is no link, or bridge, to
provide an antecedent for y. This means we have to accomodate y by copying the
information to the main DRS:








This leads to the reading there is a king of France, and if I give a party he will attend
i t.
Now, there are underlying assumptions in this model that are absent in our dialogue
model. For instance, the last case, accomoda.tion, assumes that presuppositions are
always true. That is, by acconrodating information that cannot be found in the
DRS, presupposition failure is impossible. The problem seems to be caused by the
assumption that interpretation starts with an empty DRS, whereas we would like
to say that interpretation starts relative to the entire background knowledge of the
agent. This background knowledge may or may not contain a king of France. If the
agent knows a king of France, the definite description can be linked to it. If he doesn't
know a king of France, accomodation should not be automatic, but must be done by
a conscious process; either by realizing that the speaker has more knowledge tharr
him, or by asking the speaker for clarification.
For the bridging case the existence of qualia structures is assumed. We will use
a similar way of handling these. Recall that for coercion we assumed the availability
of certain privileged functions to get from one type of argument to another (sec-
tion 5.4.2). Bridging is related to this, but the range of possible functions is much
larger. Coercion in some sense identifies a given argument with an expected argu-
ment, whereas bridging connects conceptually different objects to each other. So, in
general, bridging functions as above cannot be used for coercion: a function from bars
to barkeepers cannot be used to get a reading `the barkeeper of this bar has three
children' for
(251) This bar has three children.
So, we must take into account such bridging cases in our resolution process, by as-
suming the availability of bridge functions in the basic context that are tagged as such
in the conceptual lexicon.
5.5.4 Eíficient anaphora resolution
As we have seen, the annotated segments contain parameters, which, depending on
the determiner that was used to introduce them:
. must be linked to a term from one of the contexts that form the total context
of the agent.
. are treated as a CTT variable in the case of universal quantification, for instance
in universally quantified noun phrases.
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. are treated as a fresh inhabitant, for instance in the case of existential quantifi-
cation.
We are interested in the first case here. If a pararneter is tagged with a rb annotation,
it must be linked to a term that can be found (or constructed) in either the privat,e
context, the common context, the domain, or the annotated segment itself. Based on
the anaphoric marker (available throught the mt annotation), a number of searches
are done. Possible candidates from some context are collected in a set. This set is
then used as input for a number of filtering operations, which form the heart of the
resolution process. Ideally, we are left with one single object, which is then taken
to be the intended object that was referred to by the expression. The parameters
are linked to the object, and the descriptive content of the referential expression is
removed from the segment. The precise details of this resolution strategy are given
in section 6.6. In the remainder of this section we will give an example of how the
annotations corne into play, and what criteria are used in selecting a referent.
Let us look, as an example of resolution of annotated segments, at the sentence
increase the ~n.agnification at the plane. The annotated segment resulting from this is
(252) [P : plane, M : magnification, A: at..~l -P, E: event,
Q: incr . magnification. qm. M. E]
{rb - [[P] , [A1,:9]],mt - [P:def-art,M:def-art],ra - [E,Q]}
The referential expressions are now to be resolved in the order indicated by the value
of the rb annotation: first the referent of the parameter P must be found. Assuming
this can be done, and the result is some plane, say sa-plane, then this value is
subst,ituted for P in the segment. A new du annotation is added to allow us to
update the dialogue context. Any object that is mentioned in the utterance is listed
in this annot,ation. At this point in the process, it contains just sa-plane:plane.
Note that since we may still be working with several possible annotated segments at
this point in the process, we cannot. perform updates on the actual dialogue context
itsclf.
Finally, the first element of the value of the rb feature and the corresponding
element in the va.lue of the mt anotation are removed, since this referential expression
has been re~solved. This results in





du - [sa-plane : plane] }
Now the next element on the value of the ref feature is processed. Suppose we find
tliat the object msa is both a magnification and is such that there is an inhabitant of
the proposition type at.msa.sa-plane, then this object is taken to be the intended
referent for lli. Again a substit.ution is performed and the features are adapted:
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(254) [E : event, Q : incr.magnification.qm.msa.E]
{rb - C] ,
mt - [] ,
ra - [E,Q],
du - [sa-plane : plane , msa : magnification] }
The resolution step has succesfully terminated for this annotated segment, since its
rb feature is empty, and there is no error feature.
To select the intended referent, we can apply several criteria to the list of objects
available from some context. We distinguish between hard and soft criteria. Hard
criteria must be met by possible referents, while soft criteria may be violated.
Any type information given in the description is considered to be a hard criterion.
For instance, the noun phrase tlae lens can only refer to objects of type lens.
On the other hand, type information that can be calculated on the basis of predi-
cates that the anaphor is used as an argument to, is considered to be a soft criterion.
The dialogue partner may be unaware of certain type constraints on specific pred-
icates, so we must allow for her violating such constraints. Take for instance the
following dialogue:
(255) A: Is ~the c2 lens~` on?
B : Ye.s.
A : Increase ~it~2.
Even though lenses cannot, be increased, this is the intended meaning of the sentence.
So rather than replying with what do yov, rn,ean by it, a cooperative system should
respond with lenses cannot be increased.
Such type criteria allow us to limit the set of possible referents to those that fit the
description and the surrounding predicates best. This is one dimension that influences
the resolution process. The other dimension is prominence, or salience. We use the
following values as indicators of prominence:
. Whether an object has been selected with the mouse or not
. The `last mention' of the object, which can be deduced from the discourse
context
. The spatial proximity of the object to other objects
Now, not all criteria and ways to order possible candidates are equally important for
the different anaphoric markers. VVe propose to make anaphora resolution an efficient
process in the following way:
. Use a specific resolution strategy for each anaphoric marker. Such a strategy
defines the preferred context, the criteria to apply, and the most useful ordering.
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. Apply criteria only when they are necessary. This means that the resolution
algorithm should check at every point whether the information that has been
applied sofar, has already led to the identification of a single referent.
5.5.5 Comparison with other resolution algorithms
We now briefly compare our approach to reference resolution with some of the many
proposals found in the literature, to highlight the differences.
In [GJW95], anaphora resolution is tied to the notions of forward and backward lookin~
ce~ters. Centers are objects in the world, that may be realized by noun phrases, i.e.
noun phrases may be used to refer to these objects.
Our approach does incorporate some of the results from this centering theory.
For instance, there is a criterion on candidates for pronouns through which those
candidates that were referred to using a pronoun the previous time are considered
to be more likely. However, contrary to centering theory, we do not assume that
every sentence has a single backward looking center. Utterances may be linked to
the preceding dialogue by any number of anaphoric expressiorrs. Moreover, since
links to the `preceding context' in a multi-modal system may exist in multiple modal
dimensions, it may be that an utterance has no link at all with the preceding utterance.
Also, we assume tha.t every object that is mentioned is a forward looking center,
except in some cases such as universally quantified objects or objects in if...ther,
constructions. Our notion of accessibility follows DRT in this respect.
As we have seen in chapter 2, Grosz and Sidner ([GS86]) use a far richer model of
context than we do, to account for possible topic-changes in discourse and resulting
problems for reference. Although we agree that discourse structure should play a role
in reference resolution in general, we feel that for present-day man-machine interfaces
there is no need to take it into account. People using such interfaces will refrain from
making interruptions and stay on-topic, since the interface will have a domain-specific,
limited vocabulary.
If the role of discourse structure is taken away from Grosz and Sidner's theory,
what remains is a theory of reference based on focus spaces. These focus spaces can
be identified with the dialogue context and the pending context in our system. As
a result, similar predictions will be made by Grosz and Sidner's model and by our
model, as far as references to objects introduced in previous dialogue are concerned.
The way reference resolution is done in our algorithm is in some way similar to what
Alshawi did in the CnPTVRE system ([A1s87]). In that system noun phrase reference
resolution is also done by first selecting a set of entities that satisfy the coristraints
found in the linguistic expression, and subsequently filtering this set until a unique
referent is found (in the case of singular noun phrases). Another shared feature with
Alshawi's system is that some constraints are dropped if they are so strong as to
discard all candidates.
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A difference with Alshawi's system is the use of constraints coming from predi-
cates (selectional restrictions). In Alshawi's system, a predicate imposes selectional
constraints on its arguments, and these constraints can be used as a criterion to filter
the candidate set. However, as we noted earlier, we do not expect the user to be an
expert in the domain of discourse. If the system were to use these constraints anyway,
it might select the wrong referent. Since we do allow the reference resolution to fail,
and have equipped the response geneïator with ways to handle such situations, we
prefer resolution failure above possibly selecting the wrong referent.
The above is also true in case the constraints are not strong enough to identify
a unique referent. In Alshawi's system, the algorithm would then make an arbitrary
choice. We however prefer to be cautious and have the response generator report
interpretation failure.
In the MMI~ system (Multi Modal Interaction with Man Machine Interfaces for know-
ledge based systems ([BDDV92]), a clifferent approach to multi-modal reference is
taken. There is no context representation for dialogue history. Every interaction,
be it lingual, visual or otherwise, is added to the global history without extracting
specialized context updates. The extraction of relevant information is done only when
it is needed by some module, such as the one for reference resolution.
While this has the advantage of saving time, a lot of the work that is needed for
extracting context-relevant information from an utterance has to be done anyway in
order to be able to determine the meaning of the utterance.
Another advantage of the way the MMIZ system keeps track of the interaction
liistory, is the flexibility it offers for extending a system with other context-sensitive
modules without ever having to change the format of the stored representations.
However, this does assume that the meaning format used to store the interactions is
itself complete. Since if one were to add another modal dimension, it could be that
the representation is not rich enough to cover all possible intricacies of that modality.
Another important difference between our algorithm and the one in the MMIZ
system, is that the latter ignores the differences between the modalities for the purpose
of reference resolution. This is of course one of the key features of our algorithm.
5.6 Selecting a single meaning
Once we have scoped and converted the ULFs coming from the parser, we have come
to the point where we must check whether we can decide which annotated segment
represents the intended meaning of the user.
Since any problem in converting ULFs to annotated segment is recorded in the
error feature, we use that feature as a basis for deciding the relative likelihood of the
annotated segment representing the intended reading. The underlying idea is that
a speaker will try to make her utterance as understandable as possible, and hence
will avoid violating type constraints or using ambiguous referential expressions. So
we select the intended reading by simply weighing all the errors and seeing which
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annotated segment comes out best. The relative weight of the different forms of
errors is something that will have to be determined by trial and empirical evaluation.
Should more than one annotated segment receive the same probability rating, the
response generator will have to inform the user that some ambiguity was present in




1) User misconception detected
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Figure 5.6: Representations during different steps of the disambiguation process
As an example, let us look at the way a single utterance is converted from ULF to
annotated segments (figure 5.6). Suppose the syntactic analysis has yielded three
ULFs. For two of these, there are two different ways of scoping. This results in
five USFs. During the conversion to annotated segments, one of them is found to
contain an error of type `user misconception', and thus an error feature is added.
Moreover, two of the other USFs give rise to type conflicts that cannot be resolved
through coercion, so these two contain ill-formed segments. The third step, finding
referents for anaphoric material, leaves one of the annotated segments with unresolved
objects, and this also leads to ill-formed segments. During the preference ordering
step, the relative well-formedness of the annotated segments is compared, and since
we have one that apparently is well-formed, all other segments are discarded. The




In this chapter we restated several existing proposals regarding disambiguation in
terms of operations on our model of context. This has led to an algorithm which
takes a set of USFs into a set of annotated segments in four steps. The basic force
behind our disambiguation strategy is that segment,s rnust be well-forrned with respect
to an agent's common context. This restricted form of abduction irnmediately leads
to the inclusion of selectional restrictions and coercion in the syst,em. Furthermore,
anaphora resolution is extende.d to cover all types of statements of negative polarity.
An algorithm is given that takes advantage of the internal structure of our context
model by specifying for each type of anaphor a specific way of searching for referents.
Finally, a simple weighing system determines which annotated segment represent,s
the most likely interpretation(s) on formal grounds and discards the other annotated
segments.




In the previous chapter we have described an algorithm for disambiguating natural
language utterances by converting underspecified logical forms to annotated segments.
This algorithm has been implernented as part of the prototype user interface developed
by the participants in the DENK project.
In this chapter, we discuss some aspects of the irnplementation of this algorithm in
the DENK prototype system. We begin by giving a general overview of the prototype
system a.nd its architecture.
In accordance with the triangle view discussed in section 1.2, the DeNK system
consists of two independent cornponents: the cooperative assistant and the application
dornain model.
The software components implementing the cooperative assistant are shown in
figure 6.1. We will describe their function briefly:
. Natural language parser
A parser with an implemented fragment of English grammar for typed input.
The fragment has certain syntactic, semantic and pragmatic limitations (see
[Ver96]) reHecting the properties of the kind of tasks the system is supposed to
provide assistance with. Tlre publicly available Attribv,te Logic Engine (ALE)
([CP94]) was chosen for HPSG-based analysis of English. The standard HPSG
analysis has been modified so that the parser returns ULFs as output.
The fragment of English used in DENK differs from standard HPSG analyses
syntactically in its treatment of bare plurals (see [Ver97]), that of relative clauses
and in some minor other respects (see [Verfc]), semantically in its use of ULF
as sernantic representation formalisrn, and pragmatically in handling a variety
of `pragmatic features': i.e. morphosyntactic features, punctuation and typo-
graphical phenomena that may contribute to determining the communicative
functions of the input.
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of the cooperative assistant
r
The implemented ULF language forms the interfa.ce between the parser and the
context-driven interpretation module.
The HPSG grammar itself is described in detail in [Verfc].
. Context-driven interpretation module
This module will be described in detail in this chapter from section 6.2. It per-
forms the context-dependent stage of interpreting the user's utterance. The out-
put of this module is a set of annotated segments, where the segments represent
the semantic content and the annotations represent communicative functions
and other information that may be relevant for another module: the response
generator.
s annotated v iY - - - - -„ Interpretation module ~ ~a segments segments ~ i
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o annotated ~ i
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The cooperative assistant's communicative behavior is controlled by the re-
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sponse generator, a dialogue manager which aims at producing cooperative be-
havior using three types of contextual information:
1. the knowledge states represented in the private and common context;
2. the information about recent interactions, stored in the pending context;
3. the current state of the application domain represented by the GDP.
If an input utterance is succesfully analysed, the common context is updated
with any new shared information in a way determined by the cornmunicative
functions represented by the annotations of the utterance. If an uttenrace has a
communicative function of a command, a domain action is generated; in the case
of a question, the necessary actions for answering the question are generated.
Since the cooperative assistant is considered to be an expert about the domain,
new information about the domain is not accepted from the user: declarative
statements about the domain are only verified. This mearrs they are essentially
treated as yes~no questions.
The pending context plays an important role in governing the behavior of the
response generator. Annotated segments are stored here until they have been
fully processed and their precise effect on the assistant's knowledge state has
been determined. For instance, utterances that for some reason could not be
succesfully interpreted by (the context-driven interpretation module of) the as-
sistant can be stored here while the response generator formulates a clarification
question, the answer to which may provide sufiicient information to succesfully
re-interpret the utterance. The rules and principles that govern the behavior of
the dialogue manager are the subject of Piwek's thesis ([Piw98]).
. Observation, type checking and reasoning module
For using and updating context information represented irr CTT and handling
information extracted from utterances and expressed in annotated segments, the
interpretation module and the response generator have access to a proof checker
and a theorem prover for type theory. The proof checker determines whether
a CTT context or expression is well-formed. The theorem prover, based on
the work of Helmink and Ahn ([HA91]), incorporates strategies for combining
type-theoretical deduction steps with domain observations.
. Natural language generator
In order to produce output to the user, the DEtvK system includes a component
for converting communicative responses (in the form of annotated segments)
generated by the response generator into English. The generatiori component
in the present system is not very sophisticated. It performs a rather simple
translation of annotated segments into English, although it does use some in-
teresting heuristics for generating referring expressions. It is described in more
detail in Appendix B.
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. Context representation
The system contains a representation of the cooperative assistant's information
state in the form of two CTT contexts: the common context and the private
context (see section 3.8). A model of an electron microscope world has been
formalized in CTT ( [Ahn95]) and implemented in the system: the concepts
related to such a microscope are assumed to be part of the common context,
while the particular axioms describing the functioning of the microscope are
initially private knowledge.
. Domain evaluator
This is an evaluator for converting a CTT expression into an expression which
can be sent to the application domain model simulated in the GDP (see below).
The simulation will evaluate the expression, leading to either a change in the
domain, or the observation of some information.
The Generalized Display Processor (GDP) is both conceptually and in the implemen-
tation a separate component of the system. It is capable of simulating any domain
given a formal description in an object-oriented language called Looxs (see [Pee95]),
and it provides the user with a graphical and dynamic representation of this domain
through animation.
To enable interaction between the cooperative assistant and the GDP, a close
relation exists between the Looxs description of the domain and the type-theoretical
representation used by the assistant. By virtue of this relation, CTT expressions are
semantically grounded in LooKS and the translation fronr CTT to Looxs is a simple
evaluation process.
The context-sensitive interpretation algorithm that we described in chapter 5 has been
implemented in SICStus PROLOG (version 3). This implementation forms the context-
driven interpretation module in the DKNK prototype that performs the context;
dependent stage of interpreting the user's utterance. The module itself consists of
several submodules, corresponding to the disambiguation steps in the algorithm:
. a scoping modwle that converts a set of ULFs into a set of USFs,
. a conversion modv,le called CLUES that converts a set of USFs into a set of
annotated segments,
. a resolv,tion modu.le called RESOLVE that finds referents in the context for
anaphoric terms, and
. a selection mod~,le that orders annotated segments with respect to well-formedness,
and selects the most likely one(s).
However, before we discuss these, we will first briefly present three other modules
which are applied even before scoping. These form the interface with the natural
language parser.
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6.2 Parser interface modules
The parser in the DE!vK system is based on ALE, the Attribute Logic Engine ([CP94]).
The data structures that this parser uses are attribute value matrices represented in
PROLOG. These AVIVIs are much more complex than the flat ULF structure that the
disambiguation algorithms use. Moreover, several ULF features are handled outside
the parser itself. For instance, the information about punctuation in an input ut-
terance is separated from the words by a pre-processor and this information is again
added to the ULFs returned be the parser. We call features such as this e~terrcal ULF
features. Another external feature is used to handle numerical expressions. Ratlier
than having the parser recognize numbers, we substitute the numbers with a limitecl
set of dummy words. After parsing, the actual numbers are inserted again into the
ULF.
For efficiency reasons, the parser is run as a separate process and connects to the main
assistant process through a TCP~IP connection, using the SiCstus PRO[.oc sockets



















Figure 6.2: Connections between the main process and the parser process
The preprocessor converts a PrtoLOG string of characters into a list of atoms rep-
resenting individual words and a list of features. The list of atoms is sent to the
parser. The features are added to the ULFs returned by the parser. Moreover, the
preprocessor does the following:
. it converts all letters to lowercase,
. it ignores all non-alphanumericals, or -in the case of in-line punctuation markers-
replaces them by atoms x-comma, x-colon or x-semicolon, which are treated
as words by the parser,
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. it strips off the end-of-line punctuation markers and stores their description in
the external feature clospunct,
. it splits up words consisting of a number followed by some word (like 35mm),
and
. it replaces all numbers by an index x~umberl through x~umber9, which are
words in the HPSG parser's lexicon. If more than nine numbers occur in the
string, the remaining ones get index x~umber0 and the atom number-overf low
is added to the external features. For every number index a term is added to
external features of the form value ( Index , Value) , storing the original number.
The postprocessor adds the external features to the top-level features in the output
ULFs of the parser. Also, the x~umber indices are replaced by their original values.
The module signs2ulfs, on the parser side, has two main tasks. First it checks for
unknown words in the input by consulting the parser lexicon. If a word is unknown,
tlie input is not sent to the parser, but an x~nissing-words ULF is returned to
the assistant containing information about which words were unknown. Secondly it
converts the ALE feature representation of a parsed utterance into a flat ULF. If there
is no parse, an x~o-parse ULF is returned.
So there are four possibilities for ULFs returned by the postprocessor. If one or
mode words are unknown, the output will be a ULF containing x~nissing-words. If
no parse is returned by the parser, the output will be an x~o-parse ULF. The
third possibility is that there were too many numbers in the input, causing an
x~umber-overflow error in the annotations. If none of the previous possibilities
is the case then at least from a syntactic perspective the input is accepted.
6.3 Module ulfscope
In section 5.3 we have seen that our scoping algorithm is based on Hobbs and Shieber's
algorithm with some specific changes to reHect peculiarities of the ULF format, and
several heuristics to ensure that we get minimal reading representations for our ut-
terances. We repeat these heuristics briefly for convenience:
. Universals must outscope existentials.
. Referring expressions must be assigned narrowest possible scope.
. Event quantifiers must be assigned narrowest possible scope.
. Definites in restrictions must outscope the quantifier of the complete expression.
. Indefinites in restrictions must outscope the quantifier of the complete expres-
sion if the latter is definite.
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Furthermore we saw that for conjunctions we also have a special requirement: no
embedded quantifier is allowed to take scope outside the conjuncts. This means the
embedded variant of the e quantifier for events, ext-closure, must outscope any
embedded quantifier.
To implement these heuristics, each quasi-determiner in ULF is assigned a rel-
ative strength. Quasi-determiners from the same level (that is, occurring as sister
arguments of the same restriction in a ULF) are scoped relative to each other accord-
ing to this strength. Stronger quasi-determiners outscope weaker ones. For quasi-
determiners with the same strength, the surface structure is decisive.
The last two heuristics in our list are implemented using a predicate which for each
possible pair of determiners A and B indicates whether determiner A must outscope
determiner B if A is in the restriction of B. Naturally, this leaves cases where both
relative scopings are allowed, so here we do get multiple scopings. As an example,
take
(256) The wavelength of every bz~~cdle increases.
Because the relative scope of the and every is not constrained, two structures are
generated: one where for every bundle we increase the wavelength of that bundle,
and one where we increase an object that is both a wavelength and is related to every
bundle (see example 209).
In the current implementation the scoping module is named ulfscope. In this module,
strengths are assigned to the quasi-determiners using the predicate force~2. These
















The predicate outscoper~l lists the determiners that cannot be outscoped by em-
bedded ones:
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(258) outscoper(conj).
outscoper(ext-closure).
The predicate restrict~cope~2 succeeds if the second argument (a quasi-determiner)











So, for instance, the second clause says that a definite in the restriction of any term,
must outscope the quantifier of that term, as in every t,yre of the car.









The behavior of the scoping algorithm is completely determined by the four predicates
force~2, outscoper~l, intensional~l, definite~l and indefinité~l. It suffices
to modify one of them to change the behavior of the whole scoping module.
6.4 Module ulf2ctt
The conversion from USFs to annotated segments is implemented in the modtzle
ulf2ctt. This module consults the conceptual lexicon and tries to resolve type mis-
matches through coercion. Also, quasi-determiners are converted to either CTT struc-
tures or annotations. ULF features are converted to their annotation counterparts.
See section 5.4 for the theoretical background of this module.
The format of CTT used in the implementation is slightly different from the one we
6.4. itiIODULE ULF2CTT 169
used sofar, since the CTT terms have to be represent.ed by PRO[,oG terms. Functional
application is denoted by a dash, -, while II-types of the form IIA : B . C are repre-
sented by complex terms of the form pi (A : B, C) . Similarly, E-types are represented
by complex terms of the form s igma (A : B, C), and .~-terms by lambda ( A: B, C). The
projection functions ~rr and rr2 are represented by p0 (...) and pl (...). Parameters
and CTT variables that are bound by II, E or ,~ are represented by PROLOG vari-
ables (uppercase), while other CTT variables such as the ones in introductions are
represented by Prtor.oc atoms (lowercase).
6.4.1 The conceptual lexicon conlex
In the conceptual lexicon, we have for every ULF restriction name an entry imple-
mented as an instance of the predicate conlex~7, a predicate with seven arguments.
Examples are given in (261). The seven arguments each fulfill a specific role:
. The first argument is a specification of the requested entry. It is of the form
UlfRestrictionName~Number~ArgumentNumberList
The ULF restriction name is a list (see the definition of ULF on page 101). The
Number and ArgumentNumberList are there for future extension with plurals.
It allows us to make the translation dependent on the syntactic number of tlre
object (in the case of NPs and adjectives), or on the syntactic number of objects
that serve as arguments (in the case of verbs).
. The second argument of the conlex predicate is a CTT segment providing the
semantic contribution of the ULF restriction to the CTT representation.
. Tlre third argument is identified with the object referent. It will be unified with
the ULF parameter if possible. This is the implementation of the A-abstraction
we saw in the definition of parametrized segments (page 135).
. The fourth argument is a list of the new inhabitants introduced in the segment.
This list is needed for the conversion of quasi-determiners.
. The fifth argument specifies type restrictions on any arguments that the CTT
terms in the segment might require. This implements the parameter type re-
quirements we introduced in parametrized segments.
. The sixth argument indicates how this lexical entry narrows down the type
of the resulting object. In the case of NPs the type is uniquely determined
by the entry so then it will be a straightforward CTT type. But in the case
of adjectives, where the type is expected to be determined by the noun that
heads the noun phrase, this argument is of the form ?TYPE where TYPE is the
type required for the segment to be well-formed. So, in terms of parametrized
segments, this argument is either a parameter type requirement or a parameter
type specification.
170 CH~PTER 6. I11~IPLE.IIE~'T.4TION
. Tlie seventh argument is used to add any additional annotations. We need these
in cases the words translate not to something in the domain, but to meta-level
entities. For instance communication verbs like tell and ask are converted to vc
annotations, and references to the dialogue partners to exta annotations. See
section 3.5.
The next table shows part of the implementation of the conceptual lexicon. Compare
the first four entries to figurc: 5.2:
(261) conlex([aperture]~-~[], [A:aperture],
A , [A] , [] , aperture , [] ) .
conlex([visible]~-~[], [B:visíble-A],
A, [B] , [] , ?pattern, [] ) .
conlex([wavelength]~-~[], [wavc-len-A:size],
wave-len-A, [], [ofarg-(A:bundle)], size, []).
conlex([hm,mode]~-~[], [hm-mode:mode],
hm-mode, [hm-mode], [], mode, []).
conlex([bundle]~-~[], [A:bundle],
A, [A], [], bundle, []).
conlex([plane]~-~[], [A:plane],
A, [A] , [] , plane, [] ) .
conlex([lens]~-~[], [A:lens],
A , [A] , [] , lens , [] ) .
conlex([button]~-~[], [A:button],





A , [A] , [] , B , [rb- [ [B] ] , mt- [B : one] ] ) .
The last entry is the one for the noun one, as in does it reach the ~e~t one? This
is translated as a segment which introduced both a fresh type (pa.rameter B) and
an inhabitant of that type (parameter A). The type is flagged with a rb annotation,
indicating the anaphoric resolution module has to find a referent for it. The marker
type for this anaphor is one.
The final entry in the conceptual lexicon is:
(262) conlex(B~C~D, [],
A, [A] , [] , ?toptype,
[error-[A:unknown-restriction(B~C~D)]]).
Any restriction lists for which no entry is found is unified with this clause, leading t.o
an annotated segment containing an error feature which the response generator can
use to inform the user that the specific concept she used is not known by the system.
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6.4.2 The conversion algorithm
We will first present the conversion algorithm and then give three examples of con-
versions.
The algorithm works top-down through the USF structure, translating the restrictions
first and the body last.
The list of restrictions is converted recursively. For each restriction, a fresh param-
eter is created. This parameter is unified with the third argument of the restriction's
conlex entry. The second argument of the entry contains one or more statements
which form the translation of the restriction in CTT. If the restriction has any ar-
guments, the types of the parameters that form these arguments are compared to
the types that the restriction expects (see the examples in the next section). All
restrictions are converted this way.
In order to decide how to combine the statements originating from the different
restrictions, the corresponding type inforrnation is checked. If that information is a
specification then the statement is prepended to the result of the recursive conversion.
If it is a requirement, and thus starts with a?, it is appended. This ensures that
statements that introduce a parameter appear to the left of statements that have it
as an argument to a predicate.
From the collected type information the definitive type of the described object is
determined by searching for type information not flagged with a?. The other type
information is checked with respect to this type: it must be compatible, meaning that
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Figure 6.3: Using function ff, an object of type B can be used where type A is
expected
We saw in section 5.4.2 that in some cases type conflicts can be resolved by inserting a
coercive function. Given a required type A and a given type B, we look for functions
from some type C to some type D that are flagged as coercive functions, where D is a
subtype of A and C is a supertype of B in the inheritance hierarchy. If such a function
is found, the fresh parameter is unified with the result of applying the function to the
object parameter. If no such function is found, a type mismatch error is included in
the annotations (see figure 6.3).
After restrictions have been converted, the algorithm is applied to the body of the
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USF (using the type information on parameters introduced in the restrictions). As
can be seen from the definition of USF, the body is either a USF again, a restriction,
or a parameter.
Next, USF features are converted to annotations, using a rather sirnple function.
The results from converting the restrictions and the body are combined, depending





As we have seen in figure 5.3, the resulting segment CombinedSegment produced b,y
this function can be radically different from the input segments, for instance if the
quasi-determiner is every. Other quasi-determiners will simply append the restriction
segment and the body segment, but add features in the annotations that indicate
that some parameters need to be bound (this is what the [IntroducedParameters]
argument is for).
Using these steps, any USF can be converted to an annotated segment. We will
now go through some examples to show some possibilities.
Some examples
Consider the following three input sentences:
(a) Every bundle reaches a plane.
(264) (b) Every bundle reaches a lens.
(c) Every bnndle reaches a button.
The USFs for these sentences are identical, except for the restriction that represents
the direct object. The (a) sentence's USF is:
(265) usf (every,X, [. . . ] ,
[restr ( [bundle] , [X] , [] ) ] ,
usf (indef , Y, [. . . ] ,
[restr ( [plane] , [Y] , [] ) ] ,
usf(e,Z, [. . .] ,




First of all, the restrictions of the outermost USF are converted ([bundle] ), this
results in a segment [X : bundle] , and the type informa.tion X: bundle.
Next, the body of the first USF is converted. This is another USF, so we first
convert the restriction plane, yielding [Y:plane] and Y:plane. Since all type infor-
mation is collected into one list, we now have X: bundle , Y: plane.
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Again the body of that USF is another U5F, this time with an e quasi-determiner.
Its restriction is [reach2] , a restriction that has two arguments. In the conlex entry
in figure 261 we see that t,here are also two arguments expected for this restriction.
Looking up the conceptual lexicon entry, we find [Z : reaches-A-B] , where the role
of A is agent and the role of B is theme. The type information is now X: bundle ,
Y: plane , Z: event ive, witli event ive the pseudo-type we use for any proposition.
The function apply-to-args checks the arguments listed in tlie USF and finds
that the agent is given as X and the theme as Y. Since we have type information on
these parameters, we can check whether we may assume that A is indeed X and that
B is Y. The types are compatible in this case, so the segment can be simplified to
[Z:reaches-X-Y].
Again, the body of the e USF is converted. In this case the body is formed by the
Z parameter itself (defined as meaning `true'). Its translation is an empty segment.
The identity of the parameter is stored in the annotation mpm, since it might serve as
the value we need for ra or ri (see section 3.5).
Next, the features of the e USF are converted. This results in some annotations
regarding tense and punctuation.
We then come to the first application of a determiner (we are still working on the
innermost USF). The restriction segment is [Z:reaches-X-Y] and the body segment
[] . The clause for the application of the e determiner states that we should simply
append the restriction segment and the body segment, and not change any annotation.
This results in the segment [Z : reaches-X-Y] .
Next, the features of the indef USF are converted, and its quasi-determiner ap-
plied. So now the restriction segment is [Y:plane] and the body [Z:reaches-X-Y].
Since we have an indefinite here, again the only thing this does is append the two
segments. This results in [Y : plane , Z: reaches-X-Y] .
Finally, the features of the outermost U5F are converted, and the quasi-determiner
applieci. The restriction segment is [X : bundle] and the body segment is the result of
our previous operation: [Y : plane , Z: reaches-X-Y] . Since the quasi-determiner is
every, a complex statement has to be built from these two segments. First a function
called sigmat ize is applied to [Y : plane , Z: reaches-X-Y] . This converts the seg-
ment into a single E-statement. The inhabitant of the last statement in the segment is
used as the inhabitant of the sigma type, resulting in Z: s igma (Y : plane , reaches-X-Y) .
Then for each statement in the restriction segment, a II-introduction is inserted.
Since we have only one statement we only get one II, so this operation yields:
Z: pi (X : bundle , s igma (Y : plane , reaches-X-Y) ). The resulting segment for the ap-
plication of the quasi-determiner is formed by this single statement, so we end up with
the final segment
(266) [Z:pi(X:bundle, sigma(Y:plane,reaches-X-Y))]
This can be paraphrased as: for every bundle there is a plane such that the bundle
reaches it. And of course this is exactly what we would like this utterance to mean.
Looking at (264)(b), the only difference between the USF for this sentence and the
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USF for the (a) sentence is that we have a[lens] restriction for the direct object.
The conversion to CTT is quite similar, except that [lens] translates to [Y:lens]
and of course parameter Y is assigned type lens.
When the algorithm gets to the point where it converts the [reach2] restriction,
something special happens. When the function apply-to-args compares the types
of the arguments with the required types, it finds that the parameter Y has type
lens where plane is required. Now, there is no inheritance relation between plane
and lens, so the only way to resolve the type conflict is to try coercion (cornpare
section 5.4.2). To tag the functions that can be used for coercion, the module that
implements the conceptual lexicon has a predicate forcing~unction~3 with t,hree
arguments:
(267) forcing-function(P:axobj ,p-of-P:plane, [] ) .
forcing-function(B:bundle,slice-B-P:pattern,
[locarg-(P:plane)]).
The first argument indicates what the domain of the function is. The second argument
gives the result of applying the function to its argument(s), with the resulting type.
If the function requires more than one argument, the other arguments are listed as
roles and type requirements in the third argument.
Now, in our example, we have a parameter Y:lens, while we need B:plane (recall
that [reach2] resulted in a segment [Z : reaches-A-B] with A and B fresh parame-
ters). Since type lens inherits from axobj in our domain, the forcing~unction
predicate tells us we can unify B with p-of-Y. Parameter A can be unified with
X since there is no type conflict there. This results in the segment translation
[Z : reaches-X- (p-of-Y) ] for the restrictiorr [reach2] .
The rest of the conversion is again similar to the (a) sentence, so the final segment
for the whole USF is
(268) [Z:pi(X:bundle,sigma(Y:lens,reaches-X-(p-of-Y)))]
In the third sentence we again find an incompatible type for the therne role in the
[reach2] restriction. The parameter Y has been assigned type button. However,
this time no coercion is possible. This means we cannot resolve the type conflict, so all
we can do is report it to the user and discard the segment, since it is not well-formed.
The resulting segment is
(269) [Z:pi(X:bundle, sigma(Y:button,reaches-X-B))]
and an annotation contains the relevant information about the error:
(270) error-[tm(Z,theme,(Y:button)~(B:plane))]
This indicates that the statement whose inhabitant is Z is not well-formed, since the
argument with role theme has been found to be Y of type button rather than B of type
plane. This information is used by the response generator to formulate an adequate
reply: Something cannot reach a bv,tton.
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6.5 Structural mismatches
There are several structural mismatches between ULF and annotat,ed segments which
slightly complicate the algorithms as sketched in the~ previous sections since they
preclude a recv,rsive conversion. At the moment, we have a special way of dealing
with one type of mismatch. This is the topic this of section.
6.5.1 Copular verbs and properties
When ULF was defined, and a representation for sentences with copular verb phrases
was needed, it was decided to represent them all in a rnanner reminiscent of sentences
with transitive verbs, namely as an event object ULF with the name of the verb as
sin,~le restriction and two arguments: the subject, and the copvlar argnment. For
scntc~uces like
(271) This is the gnn
the copular argument will be the ULF corresponding to the noun phrase the gnn.
Similarly for a sentence like:
(272) Tlais is a lens
Note the difference between the meanings of the two sentences: the first sentence
conveys an identity statement, the second one a classification statement.
A third type of statement might be dubbed property statements. These are the
result of combining a copular verb with an adjective, adverb or prepositional phrase:
(273) The microscope is in mu mode
Now, the copular argument will have to represent the meaning of the PP in ~nv,
mode. This is not a full ULF but only a single restriction. In order to obtain a uniform
representation for all forms of copular verb phrases it was decided to use `dummy'
object ULFs in such cases, so in fact the ULF for this sentence is:
(274)
ulf(e,X,[...],
[restr ( [be-prop] , [X] , [
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This also keeps the lexicon in the parser as small and simple as possible since we can
use the same meaning for a PP when used with a copular verb and when used as a
modifier.
The initial thought was that we could also directly translate this into CTT by
letting the dummy object behave as an indefinite, and interpreting to be always as
an identity. The CTT representation of the meaning of the sentence could then be
paraphrased as there is a thing in mu mode which is identical to the microscope. But
while it works in this case, it does not always work. Take for example a sentence like:
(275) The cube seems red
The corresponding ULF is:
(276) ulf(e,X, [. . .] ,
[restr ( [seem] , [X] , [
agent:
ulf(the,Y,[...],
[restr ( [cube] , [Y] , [] ) ] ) ,
prop-arg:
ulf(nodet,Z, [. . .] ,
[restr ( [red] , [Z] , [] ) ] )
If we would convert this into CTT we would get something that would mean there
is something tlaat is red, and the cv~be see~ns to be identical to that. Note that this
presupposes the existence of a red object. This presupposition is not present in the
actual sentence.
On the other hand, for this is the lens we do want to use identity, so we do take
that to mean this object is identic.al to the lens, where the referent of this object is
provided by the module Resolve. The same is true for combinations with indefinites,
likc: tlais is an apert,iire. We take t,his to mean there is an apertnre that this object is
identical to.
To cater for these differences in meaning of to be, we use two restrictions for the
clifferent forms. One is used when the copular argument is a noun phrase, the other
when it is an adverb, adjective or prespositional phrase.
In the ULF formalism nothing is changed but this added version of to be, be-prop,
for properties which assigns the role prop-arg to its second argument. However,
before the scoping algorithm is applied something is done to any ULF containing
such a`be of property': the copular argument is fused with the `be'-restriction.
Take for example the microscope is in mv, mode. We saw Lhe ULF above. Before
scoping, we call a function that removes the prop-arg from the argument list and
changes the main predicate from be-prop to be-in. The argument of the PP restric-
tion is also raised one level and becomes a sister to the agent ULF. The resulting
structure is the following ULF:
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[restr ( [mu , mode] , CY] , C] ) ] ) ,
agent:
ulf(the,Z, [. . .] ,
[restr ( [microscope] , [Z] , [] ) ] )
])])
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This ULF is scoped and converted into CTT using the algorithm described in sec-
tion 6.3.
Handling copulas this way does entail that we must have an extra entry for be-in
in the conceptual lexicon, and in fact we must have extra entries for all property-
denoting ULF restrictions as copular arguments with each of the different copula.
Fortunately it is possible to generate these on the fly from the regular entries in the
conceptual lexicon. For instance, the entry for [in] in the conceptual lexicon has one
argument, assumed to be of type mode:
(277) conlex([in]~-~-, [C:in-A-B],
A, [C], [preparg-(B:mode)], ?microscope, []).
The other argument for the in predicate is of course the microscope itself (whose
parameter would be bound through the use of the subject role). Now, the conceptual
lexicon entry for [be-in] should be an entry for a verb, where both arguments are
bound through real role arguments. So the microscope will be the agent. Moreover,





This is implemented by a PROLOG predicate that tries to derive restrictions of the
form be~Y from existing conceptual lexicon entries for X.
6.6 Module resolve
The resolution algorithm checks annotated segments for parameters tagged as being
negative, indicating that these parameters are to be bound to objects in the context.
For each of these parameters, a search is done among appropriate candidates. The
implementation of the resolution algorithm consists of two modules: resolve and
resolution~trategy. The first contains all the necessary predicates for locating
candidate antecedents, filtering them and ordering them. The second specifies for
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each marker type exactly where to look for candidates and how to filter and order
them. For this purpose a small declarative language has been developed. This allows
easy access to the strategy used and simplifies testing and comparing alternative
strategies.
The abstraction is based on the introduction of a datatype which we will call Res-
ohatiortStrntegy. Terms of this type rnust conform to the following syrntax (~ indicates
an open class, i.e. a type that may have more terms added to it, but then the code in
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Each strategy consists of a series of resolution steps. And in each resolution step a set
of candidates is created, filtered, ordered and evaluated. If the evaluation is positive,
resolution stops.
The predicate resolution~trategy~2 returns for each marker type the relevant
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ordering([]),








evaluation([ length-l means succeed,




This is a rather simple resolution strategy: first it is checkecí if anything has been
selected with the mouse. No filtering or ordering is done, but during evaluation it
is checked how many candidates there are. If there is precisely one, that is taken to
be the intended referent. If there is more than one then resolution fails, since that
means two or more objects have been selected with the mouse. If no object has been
selected, the otherwise clause makes the algorithm proceed with the next resolution
step. In that step, the whole-domain candidate rnethod is tried. This is connected
to a predicate in the conceptual lexicon module whole-domain~ 1, which returns an
object t.hat represents the entire domain. In our case it returns the CTT object that
stands for the electron microscope as a whole. If for some reason this predicate is not
defined or contains multiple objects, resolution fails. Using this last resolution step,
a question like what is this? without anything being select,ed, will generate an answer
by the system: the rrzir.rosco~e.
The candidate method focus-association allows the use of certain kinds of non-
identity anaphors. It returns objects of the desired type that, are related to highly
salient ob,jects by means of the bridge. furections that we discussed in section 5.5.3.
6.7 The selection module
Once a set of USFs has been converted to annotated segments and all anaphors
etc. are resolved, we can decide which of the annotated segments is more likely to
be the one representing the intended meaning of the sentence, since at this point
we know which annotated segments contain type mismatches, unresolvable negative
parameters, etc. This information can be used to assign to each annotated segment
a`well-formedness' index. By comparing these, a most fitting and thus most likely
annotated segment can be choseri.
In the implementation there is a module named resolve-plus, which provides the
predicate selectleast-errors~2 that takes a list of annotated segments as input
and returns a sublist. It first assigns to each annotated segment a number which
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specifies how many (fatal) errors it registers. The next step is to gather the segments
with the lowest error count. The final step normalizes the annotated segments list to
get rid of equivalent ones which may for instance result from two different syntactic,al
a.nalyses that happen to lead to the same interpretation.
The check for equivalent annotated segments is rather complicated, since it depends on
many factors. Obviously two annotated segments are equivalent iff the segments are
equivalent and the annotations are equivalent. For instance, two obviously equivalent
segments are the following:
(280) (b) [A:gun,B:bundle,C:emits-A-B][A:bundle,B:gun,C:emits-B-A]




Fortunately, the heuristics we used for scopings prevent most of these alternatives
from occurring.
To determine whether t,wo sets of annotations are equivalent, the algorithm has to
know a number of things:
. which annotations contribute to the actual meaning, rather than functioning to
store certain intermediate results;
. which feature values are lists, which are multisets, and which are sets;
. under which conditions annotated segments that share the same fatal errors can
be considered equivalent.
After the equivalence test, the resulting list of possible distinct interpretations is
returned. If the original sentence is unambiguous, this list should contain precisely
one annotated segment.
The annotated segment list of possible distinct interpretations is pushed onto the
pending context. Next the response generator will react. It inspects the pending
context. If more than one element is in the list, it will tell the user that the sentence she
used contained an unresolvable ambiguity. Otherwise it tries to determine what kind
of communicative acts the user intends to perform, and reacts accordingly. However,
that is beyond the scope of this chapter; see [Piw98].
Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
7.1 Conclusions
Our goal in this dissertation was to develop a formal notion of context for the inter-
pretation of nat,ural language utterances by a computer program that engages in a
dialogue with a user about a specific task domain. One of the problems we faced was
that it is not a priori clear what information should be included in a context repre-
sentation. In fact, it seems that contexts should be `rich': not finitely describable.
This would mean that any formal representation would fall short.
Fortunately, there is a way out. Since our aim is the interpretation of natural
language, we can view the machine as a conversational agent. Since an agent can
only use that irrformation that she has access to, we can restrict the notion of context
accordingly. A context is thus viewed from the perspective of an agent, and only her
internalized view of the context has to be taken into account.
To formalize the view an agent has of the context, we use Construc.tive Type The-
ory. This forrnalism can be used both to represent the meaning of utterances and the
beliefs an agent has. In order to use CTT as a model of context, we assume a distinc-
tion between private and common information, and we allow for direct observations
of the domain and the domain situation (such as who the participants are, whether
the other participant is paying attention etc.).
To model the process of context-driven interpretation, CTT segments represent-
ing the meaning of utterances are extended with annotations which contain pragmatic
information indicating how to relate elements in the segments to information in the
context. Moreover, CTT has a built-in notion of well-formedness, and several disam-
biguation techniques fall out as consequences from the way we view communication
as building up well-formed extensions of the common knowledge. This corresponds
to a restricted form of abduction: to interpret an utterance is to make sure it is well-
formed. The well-formedness demand also drives sense disambiguation and coercion.
The distinction between the three sources of contextual information: private, com-
mon and observable, allow the specification of an efficient algorithm for referent res-
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olution guided by accessibility markers. By first checking the preferred location of
referents for each marker type, the search can be optimized and the effort minimalized.
The results of this research are a formal notion of context and a context-driven
disambiguation strategy which have been implemented in a working prototype of the
multimodal DEtvK dialogue system.
This disambiguation strategy does have its limitations. It relies heavily on some
assumptions that we initially made and which limited its coverage. For instance, the
exclusion of higher-order quantifiers leads to a small number of scopal options for each
utterance. This reduces the amount of reasoning necessary for scopal disambiguation.
Adding more quantifiers will lead to computationally expensive calculations which are
probably not sufficient to determine a unique interpretat.ion anyway.
A second limitation comes from the fact that we designed the system to work
with a limited domain. Although in principle any domain can be chosen, the system
supports only one domain at a time. We would like to be able to combine several
domains in a modular fashion in such a way that an agent can decide for each utterance
in which domain it should be interpreted, and guide interpretation accordinglyl.
A third limitation is the degree in which we allow agents to talk about the con-
versation itself. 1~~7eta-level communication is handled by specific meta-level rules,
instead of for instance interpretation in a special `conversation' domain represented
in CTT ( although we do allow the use of `utterance referents', but this has not been
~~.~~rk~,d out in full). The possibilities for such rneta: level communication are currently
Inii' ~ c(.
7.2 Future work
This research can be extended in several ways. In this section we indicate some
directions for new research as ernerging from the limitations we reported above.
7.2.1 The natural language fragment
First, we have excluded from consideration several phenomena in the fragment of nat-
ural language that we assume as input. One extension would be with plurals. New
quasi-determiners would need to be added to the ULF and USF representation lan-
guages and the scoping algorithm would need to have information about the relative
strengths of these quasi-determiners. However, tlre so-called non-standard determin-
ers would lead to a lot of situations where no minimal reading in CTT can be given,
depending on the details of a theory of plurals in CTT. We have to add such a theory
of plurals in the basic context of the agent. See Appendix A for a possible way to
define plurality.
Given the availability of plurals, the scoping algorithm would need more heuris-
tics to limit the number of possible scopings., and the referent resolution algorithm
would need clauses for other types of non-identity anaphoric linking (see e.g. [vD91],
1The leve] of this selection might even have to be smaller than full utterances.
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[vdB96]). This may be achieved by adding bridge functions to the conceptual lexicon
that select smaller parts of plural referents as referents for singular anaphors.
Another area of the language fragment that we would like to see extended is that of
meta-communication: utterances that directly deal with the communicative interac-
tion (see [Bun94], [Bun96]). One example is a treatment of the verb to mean in terms
of relations between utterances in the pending context. For instance, suppose we have
an exchange such as:
User: Does the microscope emit a óundle?
(282) System: A microscope cannot emit anything.
User: I mean its gnn.
The first utterance by the user leads to interpretation problems because of the selec-
tional restrictions of the verb to emit in the domain. Only electron guns can emit




Now, the system did not trse coercion to resolve this problem because no function from
microscopes to guns was listed as a coercive function. However, we could interpret
the user's second line as an explicit request to allow such a coercive function. The
possessive pronoun its is resolved as referring to the microscope ml, so the segment
representation of the meaning of I mean its gvn is
(284) [gl-(tb-ml):gun]
The mean verb can be taken to trigger a search for some previous error that is remedied
by the information in the present segment. Looking at the pending context, the system
finds the error tm(Z,agent, (ml:microscope)~(A:gun)). Unifying gl-(tb-m1) with
A gives us a re-interpretation of the first sentence:
(285) [B:bundle,Z:emit-(gl-(tb-m1))-B]
error-[]
And what's more, we can look at the connection between the objects in the resolved
tm error: (ml:microscope)~(gl-(tb-ml):gun and conclude that we should add a
new coercive function to the conceptual lexicon:
(286) forcing~unction(A:microscope,gl-(tb-A) :gun, [] ) .
This way the system will learn from the interaction with the user. Because even
though the system is an expert on the application domain, it is the users who ulti-
rnately decides what is the most natural way to talk about it.
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7.2.2 Support for multiple domains
An interesting research question is whether the kinds of contexts that McCarthy et al.
work with (section 2.2.3) can be seen as CTT context with names. Recall that they
investigate how different theories can be related to each other. They have proposed
a forrnalism in which such contexts are primitive objects ([MB94],[McC93], [Buv96]).
Special lifting rules allow information from one context to be used in another context.
The basic scheme in their proposal states that a proposition is true in some context:
(287) c : IST(c',p)
which means that p is true in context c'. This statement itself is an assertion in
another outer context c.
One of the application they mention is to create a system that has knowledge
about multiple domains. In such a system, it is possible to give domain-specific
interpretations to terms that are ambiguous when taken in isolation. For instance,
if a system has knowledge about both geology and finance, the word bank can have
different meanings depending on the context we use the word in:
(288) 0 : ts`r(geology,`d~(bank(x) 4~ riverside(x)))
0 : IsT(finance,dx(bank(~) t~ bankfinance(x)))
It is tempting to try and integrate this notion of context with the type-theoretical one:
a sequence of statements representing information. If we add labels to such contexts,
it might be possible to refer to them from other contexts and add lifting rules to the
meta-theory.
One way to go about this is by viewing the lifting rules as modal rules. In modal
logics, the modal operators allow one to shift the reference point for interpretation to
other possible worlds. The CTT contexts are in some sense similar to possible worlds.
Now, modal operators have also been proposed for CTT by Borghuis ([Bor94]). These
modal operators are part of the meta-theory. We will not present all the details here
but merely show the basic ideas.
To get `possible worlds', Borghuis divides CTT contexts into a hierarchy of different
parts called subordinate contexts. Each subordinate context is separated from its
superordinate context by means of a separator O. Depending on the particular kind
of modal logic chosen, a modal operator O determines how terms can be copied from
one subordinate context to another, and what effect that has on the terms. To do
this, the deduction rules are extended with import and export rules that are valid for
specific modalities. For instance:
G~A:o„LB:~p
(289)
G~,,, []~ k,,, A: B KZ (for all indices m)
In this rule we see that for every modality m, a proposition with a modal operator 0„i
can be imported into an empty m-subordinate context (indicated by []), by dropping
the modal operator from the proposition and adding an operator k,,, to the proof
term.
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What is important to note is that in Borghuis's system, the indices ~n are part of
the meta-theory. Also, operators can be `stacked', providing access to subcontexts of
subcontexts.
If we were to restate McCarthy's logic of contexts in terms of a modal version of CTT,
we could start with a system like that of Borghuis, but with the following differences:
. the indices must be part of the object language, for instance by adding an extra
sort ~~ which has one inhabitant: context;
. modal operators are indexed with inhabitants of context. This means a modal
operator can only be introduced on terms if the index has been introduced
previously;
. similarly, whole contexts are indexed with inhabitants of context.
This makes indices behave as na~nes of contexts. This way we can state (288) as
(290) p ' (~geology~~ ~ bank .is~iverside.x)
q ' (~finance~~ :
bank .is~in-inst.x)
Note that this would mean that object types should be available throughout all sub-
contexts. If we include this in some outer context, we can `move' to more specific
contexts geology or finance in which only one of the two propositions in (290) is
available.
As far as meta-theory is concerned it is unclear whether such a move is feasible and
whether it does indeed have the desired effect on provability.
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Appendix A
A theory of plurals in CTT
Any agent that is to engage in communication needs to have access to a shared
language. The way we model this is by providing a basic conte~t and a domain-
specific vocabulary.
The basic context contains semantic primitives like equality and other useful pred-
icates. It can furthermore contain some linguistic theories, that is: theories about the
way agents speak about objects. One of such theories is a theory of plurality. We do
not need any extension to CTT to handle this. We will combine ideas from General-
ized Quantifier theory and algebraic theories on plurality ([Lan89a], [Lan89b], [Lin83])
and formulate them in CTT.
A.1 Distributive and collective
Plural is a syntactic notion. There is no unique corresponding semantic notion. To
see this, look at these two sentences, which are to be interpreted in the context of a
card game like bridge:
(291)
(a) East and West form a team.
(b) East and West played very well.
In the (a) sentence, the syntactic plural corresponds to a collective in the meaning:
the predicate `form a team' is not true of either East or West taken separately, but
only of `East and West'. This means `East and West' must refer to some collective
objectl.
In the (b) sentence on the other hand, the predicate `played very well' is true
of both East and West. No underlying collective object corresponding to `East and
West' needs to be assumed here. In this case, the predicate is said to be distribv,tive.
Not all predica,tes are purely distributive or collective. Some can be either, de-
pending on the situation. This may lead to ambiguities, for instance in
I We will be calling such collective objects grouys, sets or simply collections. All these terms must
be taken in their non-technical, pre-theoretical sense.
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(292) East and West have only one king.
In this sentence, it may be the case that there is one king which one of East and West
holds, or it may be the case that there are two kings, one that East holds, and one
that West holds.
However, we should still treat distributive and collective predicates as if they were
two opposite options. Although a collective predicate can indeed exhibit distributive
properties, as this example shows:
(293) The players gathered in grozlps of two.
The argument of gather is a group of players, but for subgroups of that group, which
have to contain at least two players, the predicate also holds. But note that the
following is not possible:
(294) ~` The players gathered in gro~ps of one.
Our approach will be that predicates that are applied to a plural object in principle
always distribute down over some subgroups. The size of the subgroups may differ and
range from the whole group (taken to be a subgroup of itself) down to individuals in
the group. What are usually called distributive predicates have the special property
that they ~nust distribute down to the level of individuals, while the predicates that
are usually called collective have the property that they cannot distribute down to
individuals.
Note that the distribution over subgroups has to respect some additional constraints.
The sentence
(295) Three players hold three spades.
can mean either of only two things: each of the three players holds three spades, or
the three players hold three spades total (which does not mean they all should hold
one, it may be that one of them holds one, another two, and the third one none).
There is no reading of this sentence that describes the situation in which one player
holds three spades and two others hold three spades together. The set of subgroups
that is distributed down to must in some sense consist of elements of the same2 size3.
zMost sentences allow the predicate to hold only of either the whole argument group, or of all
subindividuals, but nothing in between. So, for example, the sentence
(296) Three girls carried a óox upstairs.
cannot describe a situation where girl 1 and girl 2 carry a box, girl 2 and girl 3 carry a box, and girl
3 and girl 1 carry a box, even though there is a distribution over subgroups, in this case of size 2,
where each subgroup carries a box.
3There seem to exist counterexamples to this:
(297) 50q of the Dutch own a house.
This sentence has to mean that 7.5 millíon Dutch people own a house, but clearly this includes
people who jointly own houses, for instance spouses. So here the distribution includes individuals,
couples and larger groups. But note that this example is somewhat marginal and that in most cases
such interpretations simply are out.
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Several authors have proposed to treat this distributive~collective distinction as vague-
ness. Thereby implying that language users do not necessarily have to fill in all the
details about this distribution when interpretaing such sentences. Bunt ( [Bun81])
advocates this approach and calls it unspecific q~aantifïcation.
According to Van der poes and ~-érkuyl, ([VV96]), the proper way to treat these
ambiguous sentences is to regard them as being underspecified with respect to the
path from subject t,o predicate. They restrict, themselves to transitive predicates.
Transitive predicates denote a relation between two sets, one provided by the subject
noun phrase, the other by the direct object. Given such a relation we can form a
function from elements in the denotation of the subject noun phrase to subsets of the
denotation of the object noun phrase, such that for each element in the denotation
of the subject noun phrase the value of this function is the set of elements in the
denotation of the object noun phrase that the element in the domain of the function
is related to (see section 4.2.1).
By specifying additional informatiorr about this path function we can get differ-
ent readings of sentences. A constant function will result in a collective reading, a
strongly injective reading, where the elements in the range are disjoint sets, results
in a distributive reading.
We will exploit a similar way of looking at this kind of ambiguity in section A.7.
A.2 Quantificational and referential aspects
Some sentences involving plurals seem primarily to be stating information about quan-
tities:
(298) North hodds most of the spades.
In a generalized quantifier approach, this sentence is taken to mean that the number
of spades that North holds is more than half of the toal number of spades. That is,
the cardinality of the intersection set of spades and cards that North holds (identified
with the characteristic function of that set), exceeds half the cardinality of the set of
all spades:
(299) ~spadesfl,~~hold(N,x)~ 1 ~spades~J2
However, besides quantification, there is also a referential aspect to the noun phrase
ntost of the spades:
(300)
(a) North holds Imost of the spadesJ`.
(b) Bnt none of ~themJZ are face cards.
The pronoun them refers back to most of the spades. This means the quantificational
noun phrases does introduce an object that can be picked up by anaphoric terms.
Any theory of plurality must therefore provide both the quantificational and ref-
erential aspects of noun phrases.
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A.3 Intensional objects
Collective meanings can also be realized by syntactically singular expressions:
(301) The team gathered on Monday.
This sentence is syntactically singular, but the predicate `gather' is a collective pred-
icate. The argument must therefore be a plural semantically. L~nning ([Lr~nng]) calls
such nouns gronp-denoting nouns. However, this is not correct: if a noun like this is
used with a. distributive predicate, it does not entail that the predicate holds for all
individuals that make up the group corresponding to the noun. Even though there is
a group associated with the noun, it cannot be its denotation. Take for instance the
following example:
(a) Team A consists of John, Mary and Mike.
(302)
(b) Team A plays against Team B.
(c) John is ill.
(d) John plays against Team B.
From (a) through (c), (d) clearly does not follow.
Many authors have therefore treated such nouns as being intensional. This blocks the
inference of properties of individual members from properties of the denotation of the
noun. It also explains how we can say
(303) Fred replaces John in Team A.
In section A.11 we will touch on the representation of such nouns in a type-theoretical
setting.
A.4 An example domain
The examples in this section will all be taken from a domain of card games. The
formalization of this domain, except for the part where plurals come into play, is
given by the following context:



























































card ~ (suit -3 ~p)











The types we assume are card which stands for individual cards (with four subtypes
for the cards of a particular suits), suit for each suit as an abstract object, value,
for each value as an abstract object, player and round.
The types have the inhabitacits one would expect: the subtypes of card contaín
the individual playing cards, like `seven of hearts', suit contains the four suits, while
value contains the values two through ace. The four players are inhabitants of
player.
The functions suitis and valueis associate cards with their suits and values. Each
round has a dealer, so the function dealer is an accessor mapping each round to one
of the players.
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A.5 Plural types, collections and cardinality
Plural types are to be based on existing types. To achieve this, we add an operator
to our context which given a type constructs a new type4.
(305) group : (~5 -~ ~S)
So, for example, the following is a derivable statement:
(306) group.card : ~S
The inheritance relation (section 3.3.4) between object types is assumed to be ex-
tended in such a way that if a type A inherits from a type B, then the type group-A
inherits from group.B.
One predicate in our domain that should have a plural type as one of its arguments,
is the representation of the verb deal. This is taken to denote a relation between a
player (who is the dealer), a player, and a collection of cards:
(307) deal : player -j (player ~ ((group.card) -~ ~p))
To model that each player is dealt only one collection of cards per rounds, there
should also be a function from players to players to groups of cards:
(308) dealt : player ~ (player - ~ (group.card))
Other predicates that use these types can be constructed out of this. For instance,
the collection of cards that each player holds in a round after dealing can be accessed
by means of the function
(309) holds - (.~~ : round . ,~y : player . player.(dealer.x).y) :
round ~ (player -~ (group.card))
Plural types can also be used with inheritance statements. For instance, the concept
of a`game' can be introduced as a subtype of collections of rounds:
(310) game G (group.round) : ~S
This idea will be taken up again in section A.11.
Note that sofar we only have used types of plural objects, not the objects themselves.
These plural objects can be thought of as collections: groups or sets (the exact status
of these collections can be filled in by adding more axioms). A desirable property of
such collections for the purpose of natural language semantics, would be that they
have a cardinality. We can satisfy this requirement by adding a type of cardinali-
ties (of which the natural numbers are a subtype), a function from plural types to
cardinalities, and a relation between plural types and cardinalities:
4To get an intuition of what this function does: if we interpret types as sets, then the group
operator forms the powerset of that type.
SModulo subgroups.




cardinalityof . IIt : ~S . (group.t) -~ cardinalityvalue
cardinalityis . IIt : ~S . (group.t) ~ (cardinalityvalue -~ ~r)
Some examples will make clear how these can be used to represent simple noun phrases
involving numerals. Take the sentence
(312) In every rov,nd, the dealer deals every player three cards.
which can be paraphrased as `for every round, for every player, there is a collection
of cards such that its cardinality is 3, and the dealer of that round deals it to that
player'. This paraphrase is of course precisely how this can be represented in type
theorys:
(313) pl : IIr : round . IIp : player . Ec : (group-card) . Ep3 : (cardinalityis.
card.c.3) .deal-(dealer-r)-p.c
The use of the cardinalityof function is needed in the representation of constructions
such as as ~zany ... as, since it provides access to the cardinality in a direct way. For
instance,the sentence
(314) West has as ~rcany cards as North.
can be represented by using the cardinality of the collection of cards that North holds
as an argument for the cardinalityis relation, while the cards of West provide the
other argument. Note that we also need an argument for the round (in this case rl):
(315) p2 : cardinalityis.card.(holds.rl.west).
(cardinalityof. card. (holds .rl . north) )
Quantifiers can consist of complex expressions involving cardinalities:
(316)
(a) In any gaTne there are at least fov,r ro~ands.
(b) Every player hodds between three and si~ cards.
Such complex cardinalities can be added by the introduction of some funetions on
cardinality values7:
atleast . nat --~ cardinalityvalue
atmost . nat ~ cardinalityvalue
cardinalityand . cardinalityvalue -~
(317) (cardinalityvalue ~ cardinalityvalue)
between - ~x : nat . ,~y : nat .
cardinalityand . (atleast . x) . (atmost -y)
. nat ~ ( nat ~ cardinalityvalue)
6We assume al] the natural numbers have type nat.
7In section A.10, an alternative way of representing these sentences is presented.
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The meaning of the sentences in (316) can now be represented as
(a) p3 : (IIx : game . cardinalityis.round.~-(atleast.4))
(318) (b) p4 : ( IIr : round . IIx : player .
cardinalityis.card. (holds.r.x) . (between.3.6))
A first way of cocistructing groups is by means of a singleton operator. Given an
inhabitant of a type, the singleton formed by inhabitant type is a group of objects of
that type:
(319) singleton : IIt :~S . II~ : t . group. t
singnum : (IIt : ~S . Pix : t . cardinalityis.t.(singleton.t.x).1)
The kind of explicit group formation that we see in noun phrases such as East and
West can be represented by means of a union operator between groups:
(320) andg : ( IIt : ~S . (group-t) ~ ((group.t) ~ (group.t)))
So, East and West is represented as the union of the singleton group containing East
and the group containing West:
(321) eaw - andg - player ~ (singleton - player - east) . (singleton . player . west) :
group. player
A.6 Distributive predicates
In Link's work([Linng],[Lin83]), there is an operator that maps predicates that take
individuals as arguments to predicates that take groups as arguments. This operator
is needed to account for the fact that distributive and collective predicates can be
conjoined to a complex predicate. To do this in type theory, we define a function
that takes predicates on individuals as input and returns (distributive) predicates on
groups:
(322) plurdist : IIt : ~~ . (t -~ ~y) --~ ((group.t) -i ~r)
The sentence East and West pass now can be represented as using this plurdist
function. We apply it to the predicate pass which is a predicate over objects of type
player, and the result is a predicate over objects of type group-player, which can
be applied to eaw:
(323) p5 : plurdist-player.pass.eaw
To be able to derive the entailed propositions `East passes' and `West passes', we
need some extra axioms. In particular axioms about relations between groups and
individuals. We start with the introduction of a polymorphic element relation between
individuals and groups:
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(324) element : (IIt : ~S . (t ~ ((group.t) --~ ~p)))
Of course, we need axioms to ensure that this is indeed the intended relation. Some
will be intorduced later.
In (322) plurdist was introduced as a new operator, but it can also be introduced
as a definition:
plurdist - ~t : ~S . ~p : ( t -~ ~~,) . ~y : (group.t) .
(325) IIx : t . ((element.t-x~y) -i (p.r))
. IIt : ~S . (t ~ ~r~) ~ ((group.t,) -3 ~j,)
This says that plurdist is an abbreviation for a function t,hat takes singular predicates
of some type t as input, and returns plural predicates over groups of objects over type
t in such a way that if we have a proof that the plural predicate holds for some group
g, we can derive proofs for the singular predicate holding for every element of g.
If this definition is used, then p5 in ( 323) has the following type if we write out
the definitions and apply beta reduction:
(326) p5 : (IIx : player . (element.player.x.eaw ~ pass.x))
This in turn means that it suffices to have a proof of the fact that west is an element
of eaw to derive a proof that west passes. Assume we have such a proof westineaw,
then we can derive:
(327) p5.west.westineaw : (pass.west)
For the derivation of proofs that individuals are elements of certain groups, we need to
add a number of axioms, e.g. about subgroups. The inclusion relation can be defined
in the usual set-theoretic way:
(328)
,~t : ~3 . ag : group~t . .~h : group-t .
IIx : t . (element.t.x.g -~ (element.t.x.h))
IIt : ~S . (group.t) ~ ((group.t) -~ ~r)
subseteq
This immediately gives us reflexivity and transitivity of the subseteq relationg.
Another axiom we need is one that says that individuals are elements of the singleton
that contains them:
(331) singelm : IIt : ~s . II~ : t . element.t-x.(singleton.t~r)
BThe proofs are:
(329) at : a. aa : group t. ax : t. ap : element t x.a :
IIt :~s . n 9 : group t. subseteq.t.g.g
(330) at : .5 . aa : group.t . 16 : group.t . ac : group.t .
asab : subseteq.t.a.b . asbc : subseteq-t.b.c . ax : t. ap : element.t-x-a . sbc-t.x.(sab.t-x.p) :
IIt : ~S . Iia : group.t . IIb : group-t . IIc : group.t . (subseteq-t.a-b) - ~ ((subseteq.t.b.c) -i
(subseteq.t-a.c))
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And, of course we need to ensure that our union operator andg respects the subseteq
relation:
(332) subandg : IIt : ~S . IIg : group.t . lIh : group.t .
Ep : subseteq.t.g.(andg.t.g.h) . subseteq.t.h.(andg.t.g.h)
The term westineaw that we used earlier, representing a proof that west is an
element of eaw can now be defined as:
westineaw - ~r2(subandg.player.(singleton.player.east}
(333) (singleton. player.west)) . west . (singelm-player. west)
. element-player.west.eaw
There is a second reason besides conjoinability with a collective predicate, why we
cannot immediately on encountering a distributive predicate with a plural argument
represent this as a number of statements about individuals: consider the following
piece of discourse:
(334)
(a) Two players passed.
(b) North v~as one of them.
The identity of the two players in (a) is not known. It is therefore undesirable to
represent this with two statements about individuals (not to mention what would
happen if we wanted to represent 1,000,000 people attended the predident's fnneral in
this manner). Moreover, the (b) sentence contains an anaphor them. We would like to
be able to link this to some term in a previous sentence. The proposed representation
satisfies both desiderata:
(a) [pp : group.player,pp2 : cardinalityis.player.pp.2,
(335) s : plurdist-player.pass.pp]
(b) [n : element.player-north.pp]
Naturally, the expected consequence follows immediately:
(336) s.north-n : pass.north
A.7 Collective predicates and cumulative predica-
tion
Collective predicates are predicates that can be true of groups without being true
of individuals. So, not orrly do predicates like `form a team' fall into this category,
also predicates like `hold all the aces', for although they may be true of just one
individual, it is also possible that they are true of a group without being true of any
smaller object.
The collective predicates are typed in such a way that their arguments must be groups.
So the predicate `form a team' (taken to be atomic) has the following CTT represen-
tation:
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(337) teamup : (group.player) -~ ~p
The notion of curnulative quantification is needed to understand what is going on in
sentences such as
(338) Three pdayers hold 4 cluós.
Take this as meaning `the three players hold 4 clubs together'. We have here a holding
relation between a group of players and a group of cards. Clearly, it is desirable
to relate this holding relation to a more basic one between individual players and
individual cards.
First we construct a predicate `hold 4 clubs' that takes plural subjects without
necessarily implying distribution over the elements of the subject. A`hold' relation
between individual cards and individual players can be defined on the basis of the
`holds' functíon in (309):
hold - ,~s : round . aq : player . ~d : card .
(339) subseteq.card. (singleton.card.d). (holds-s.q)
. round -y (player ~ (card -a ~p))
This predicate will now be lifted to a predicate that takes groups of players as subject.
The idea is that a group of players holds a particular card if one of the players holds
it. In a sense, this is the opposite of the distribution kind of lifting that we saw in
(322). The operator responsible for this lifting will be given the name plurcoll:
plurcoll - .~u : ~S . .~q : (v, ~ ~p) . .~h : (group.u) .
(340) Ey : u . Ef : (element.v,.y.h) . q.y
. IIt : ~3 . (t ---r ~v) ~ ((group't) ~ ~n)
Applied to the hold predicate in the proper way, this gives us:
chold - ,~s : round . .~g : (group.player) . ~d : card .
(341) plurcoll-player.(~p : player . hold.s.p.d).g
. round ~ ((group.player) ~ (card -~ ~p))
Distributive lifting on the subject parameter finally gives us:
dchold - .~.s : round . .1g : (group.player) . .~h : (group.card) .
(342) plurdist-card.(.~c : card . chold.s.g.c)-h
round -~ ((group.player) -3 ((group-card) -r ~p))
Only now can we get the collective reading of sentence (338) (taking rl to represent
the current round):
(343) ~: group-player, cp : cardinalityis.player.p-3, c: group.club,
cc : cardinaltyis-club-c.4, s : dchold.rl.p.c]
which says that there is a group of players p with cardinality 3, and a group of clubs
c, with cardinality 4. Every card in c is held by someone in p, and every player in p
holds at least one card in c.
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A.8 Underspecified representations
Sofar we have seen three `modes' of predication over groups:
. Collective predication: where there is no basic predicate over individuals.
. Distributive predication: where the basic predicate takes individuals as argu-
ments and that predicate is true of all individuals in the group. This uses the
plurdist definition.
. Cumulative predication: where the basic predicate takes individuals as argu-
ments and that predicate is true of at least one of the individuals in the group.
This uses the plurcoll definition.
Verbs that take more than one noun phrase as argument can use different modes to
combine with each of these arguments.
An option that we will discuss now is to underspecify the mode of predication in
case the utterance does not itself indicate which is to be used. The approach is based
on the observations in Bunt ([Bun81]) about unspecific quantification for sentences
that exhibit collective~distributive ambiguity. It is also related to Van der poes and
Verkuyl's notion of paths [VV96]. See section 4.2.1.
The idea is that a sentence like (338) can mean two things: either each of the three
players hold 4 clubs, or the three players hold 4 clubs together. What these two
possible readings of the sentence have in common is that in both cases it is true that
there is a distribution of the group of three players into subgroups of equal size, such
that each subgroup does have the property of holding 4 clubs.
There are two options for this distribution: either it is a trivial distribution of
three players into one single group of there players (in which case we get the `three
players hold 4 clubs together' reading), or it is a distribution into three singletons
which gives us the other reading.
The wnderspecified representation, where we do not specify for which subgroups
of `three players' the predicate `hold 4 clubs' holds, is realized in CTT as follows: we
add an operator which creates what ca.n be thought of as partial f~cnctiores: given a
group, certain subgroups of this group are valid arguments to this function. These
are precisely the subgroups for which the predicate holds. This partial function based
on an operator which we will call codi:
(344) codi : (IIt : ~S . ((group.t) ~ ~y) ~ ((group.t) -~ ~p))
All this operator is construct such `partial functions' out of regular (collective) pred-
icates.
The fact that an object is an argument to such a partial function is signalled by
means of another predicate, called codiarg.
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codiarg - ,~u : ~S . ~q : ((group.u) ~ ~p) . ~la : group.u .
(345)
~r : codi.u.q-h . ,~a : group-u . (q.a)
. IIt : ~S . IIp : ((group.t) -~ ~p) .IIg : group.t .
IIs : codi.t-p.g . ((group.t) ~ ~r)
The minimal requirement on readings of such sentences is that they guarantee involve-
mertt of all the individuals that are elements of the group that must be distributed
over. This means every element in the group must appear in some subgroup for which
the predicate holds. This is expressed by the coverage axiom:
(346)
coverage . IIt : ~9 . IIp : ((group.t) ~ ~p) . IIg : group t . IIs : codi.t-p.g .
IIx : t . IIe : element-t.x.g . Eh : group.t .
Ed : subseteq.t h g. Ef : element-t-x.h . codiarg-t.p-g.s.h
The two possibilities we saw for sentences like (338) now only depend on properties
that we can ascribe to codiarg afterwards if we have more information about the
intended reading. For most sentences codiarg holds either for singleton subgroups,
in which case we get the purely distributive reading, or it holds for the group as a
whole, in which case we get the collective reading. We can define two terms for these
two options:
distributive - au : ~,, . ~q : ((group.u) --r ~p) . ah : group.u . ar : codi.u.q.h .
(347) IIx : u . ((element.u.x.h) -i (codiarg.u.y-h.r-(singleton.u.x)))
. IIt : ~9 . IIp : ((group-t) -i ~y) . IIg : group-t . IIs : codi-t.p.g . ~p
(348)
collective - ~u : ~s . ~q : ((group.u) -i ~y) . ah : group.u . ar : codi.u.q.h .
codiarg-u.q.h.r.h
IIt : ~S . IIp : ((group.t) -~ ~p) . IIg : group-t . IIs : codi.t.p.g . ~p
Sentence (338) can now be given an underspecified representation using the following
definition h4c of the predicate `hold 4 clubs':
h4c - ~g : group.player . Ec : group.club .
(349) Ecc : cardinalityis.club.c.4 . dchold.rl-g-c
. (group.player) ~ ~p
(350) (p : group.player, cp : cardinalityis.player.p.3, s: codi.player.h4c.p]
Assume that we learn that the three players involved are east, west and south,
which means that we have three proof objects
el . element.player-east.p
(351) e2 . element-player-west-p
e3 . element.player-south.p
Then, if we furthermore come to know that the distributive reading of (338) was
intended, we also have a proof term for that:
(352) z : distributive.player.h4c.p.s
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Using the definition of distributive, this equals:
(353) z : (IIx : player . ((element.player-x.p) -~ (codiarg.player.h4aps.(singleton-
player.x))))
Applying function z to west and to e2, the proof that west is an element of p, we
get:
(354) z.west.e2 : codiarg.player.h4c.p.s.(singleton.player.west)
Using the definition of codiarg, this equals:
(355) z.west-e2 : h4c.(singleton.player-west)
Which in turn, can be unfolded, using the definition of h4c, to
(356) z.west.e2 : (Ec : group.club . Ecc : cardinalityis-club.c.4 .
dchold.rl . (singleton.player-west) -c)
Further reductions are possible, using the definition of dchold. This enables us to
infer9that in fact west holds 4 clubs. The same can of course be done for east and
south. So this really does give us the reading where there are 12 clubs involved.
A.9 Other group-forming operators
There are several words in English that introduce groups with an unknown cardinality,
for exampple many, few and all.
Since the interpretation of many and few is highly context-dependent we will
not attempt to treat them here. All on the other hand is very suitable for a type-
theoretical interpretation. A noun phrase such as all cards will be represented using
a group-forming operator all:
(357) all : (IIt : ~S . group.t)
Given a formalization, some nouns may not correspond to a type in CTT but to a
predicate. An example in our domain is the word ace. To represent all aces, we need
another operator:
(358) pgroup : (IIt : ~s . IIp : (t ~ ~p) . group.t)
The noun phrase all aces is now representable as:
(359) pgroup-card-(~c : card . valueis-c.ace) : group.card
9There is a slight problem here. The plurcoll operator is defined to mean `the predicate holds
for one of the elements in the group'. To infer that in the case of a singleton group this means the
predicate is applicable to the individual, we actually need some extra axioms which are not given
here for reasons of brevity.
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Groups formed with all and pgroup have of course the intended interpretation that,
they contain all elements of a given class. Two axioms express this property:
allaxiom . IIt :~S . IIx : t. element.t.x~(all.t)
(360) pgroupaxiom . IIt : ~s . IIp : (t -~ ~p) . IIx : t. .
IIq : (p.x) . element.t.x.(pgroup.t.p)
Together with the definitions of plurdist and distributive this allows us to draw
the desired conclusions about individuals from statements about a class of objects.
A.10 Generalized quantifiers
Generalized quantifier readings typically are expressed as propositions about cardi-
nalities. To mimic this in CTT we need predicates on cardinalities for comparison,
































(362) West holds ~nost aces
This gets the following representationlo:
(363) p6 : cgreater.(cardinalityof.card.(pgroup.card.(ac : card . Es : hold.rl.
west.c . valueis-c.ace))).2
Note that we can use the tools in ( 361) to give alternative representations for the
meaning of the sentences in (316):
(a) p3' : IIx : game . cgreater-(cardinalityof.round.x).3
(364) (b) p4' : IIx : player . Ep : cgreater.(cardinalityof.card.(holds.rl-x)).2 .
csmaller. (cardinalityof. card - (holds . rl . x) ) . 7
loUsing the fact that there are only 4 aces, so `most aces' means `more than two aces'.
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A.11 Group-denoting nouns and intensionality
We will now briefly look at the problem of the intensionality of certain kinds of what
are called `group-denoting' nouns. The problem is in our opinion caused by a too
simple representation of such nouns. The meaning of a phrase like the team should
not be a group of players, but something distinct from it. Of course, there is a close
connection between a team and the group of its members, but in particular we do not
want to be able to derive propositions about team members from propositions about
t.he t.eam itself. A straightforward way of representing such nouns is available in the
version of CTT we use. We let group-denoting nouns correspond to a type, which
inherits from the type of objects it is usually associated with, so for example, team
corresponds to the following CTT statement:
(365) team G (group.player) : ~S
By this statement, we make sure that any predicate applicable to groups of players is
immediately applicable to teams. This in particular holds for distributive predicat,es.
However, being a member of a team does not need to be the same thing as being an
element of the group corresponding to the team. This is what blocks the improper
derivations about individuals.
To get the group of players that correspond to a team, we can use an accessor function
(366) members : team ~ (group.player)
This allows us to get to the underlying group if we want without imposing any identity.
Appendix B
Generation in the DENK
system
Although not foreseen in the original planning of the DEtvK project, it became clear
as the prototype carne closer to being completed that it would be desirable to have
a module that is able to convert the system's output to something more informative
than annotated CTT segments. Such a module has been developed and has been
given the name UTTER.
Although it does function quite well, there is considerable room for improvement.
For one, the module is not generic. It is in some ways tailored to take advantage
of features of the current domain application - electron microscopes - as will become
clear in the next sections.
B.1 The generation fragment
There are several restrictions on the output of the dialogue manager CotvDUCT. First
of all, since the assistant is assumed to be an expert on whatever the domain is, the
assistant hardly ever needs to ask a question. The only case in which the assistant
asks a question is when the user's input cannot be interpreted for some reason. A
similar reaction occurs when the user's input leads to certain presuppositions that
cannot be verified. These will lead to declarative responses rather than questions.
Furthermore, since the assistant is an expert on the domain, a declarative utterance
from the user will also be taken to be an assertion that has to be verified, so essentially
it will be taken to be a yes~no question. This limits the possible function of the user's
utterances to commands, questions and answers to a clarification question. Questions
can then be further divided into three categories: yes~no questions, why~how~when
questions, and other wh-questions (which~what). The response generator will thus
react with appropriate responses to these these five types of input.
A final form of reaction is to input that contains too many errors. In such cases,
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the assistant should inform the user as precisely as possible what exactly was wrong
with the inputl.
In short, the following types of interaction are possible:
(367)
User inpnt Response
yes~no question yes, rco ~`~`
why~how~when proposition~event communication ~`~
wh-question object identification ~
command command execution
answer (response to previous utterance)
ambiguous input clarification question ~~`
untrue presupposition proposition communication ~`~`
ill-formed input error message ~~`
The reponses tagged with ~`~` can only be communicated through language. The
identification of an object can be done in either of the possible modalities: through
language or highlighting in the visual domain (or a combination of both).
B.2 The form of output annotated segments
As we saw in the previous section, the possible inputs to UTTER are those things
that the dialogue manager has to communicate to the user through language. This
input will take the form of an annotated segment. The different `modes' of output
will be flagged by differences in the annotations. To be precise, we check the following
features in output annotated segments (see section 3.5):
. cl~i indicates the system wants the user to identify an object. This leads to
a clarification wh-question from the assistant.
. meta contains information internal to the dialogue manager.
. error indicates the segment possibly does not constitute a legal extension to the
current common context. The value of the feature provides more information:
- tm(A,Role,(B:T1)~(C:T2)) type mismatch
The type of the statement with inhabitant A contains the term C which
should be of type T2 to form a well-formed proposition, while the actual
utterance had the term B of type T1 for the argument with role Role.
1The distinction between ambiguous input and ill-formed input is based on the level of sophis-
tication of the currently implemented system. Clearly, a perfect system would be able to ask a
clarification question for every ill-formed utterance, but currently the system has no way of doing
this for utterances that do not lead to informative annotated segments (annotated segments that
have non-empty segment parts). Unknown words in the input, or strings that cannot be parsed, will
result in an error message.
B.3. FROM ANNOT~TIONS TO RESPONSES 205
- parse-constr~ail inpvit did not lead to a parse
The input could not be syntactically analyzed, or was not of one of the
allowed syntactic categories for utterances2.
- parse-lex-fail(Words) lexical failure
The words in the list Words are not known by the system.
- uo (Segment , [] ) resolv,tion failure
The object, or presupposition, described by Segment could not be resolved,
and there are no remaining candidates to chose from.
- number-overflow too many nv,mbers
There were more than 9 distinct numerical expressions in the input (this
is a problem for the preprocessor).
- verb-cons-overflow too many attitv,de or commnnication verbs
The system of annotations is designed to take care of the representation
of verbs whose meaning is at meta-level. This includes verbs like `know',
`see', `want', `must'. However, the annotations only allow a limited number
of such verbs, and only in distinct scopal relations (see [BP97]).
- mc(Param,unique) qv,antified object is uniqne
A quantifier was used together with a word whose meaning is a constant
in the domain.
- unknownsestriction(Param,List) unknown co~rtpound
A combination of nouns was used that the system does not know (although
it does know the individual nouns).
- ulf2ctt : apply-det (Det) v,nsupported qa~asi-determiner
A determiner was used in the input that is known by the parser, but has
no representation in CTT.
- ulf2ctt:general~ailure bv,g detected
Something unexpected happened. This indicates a bug in the implemen-
tation that the system managed to recover from.
All other features are ignored by the generation module.
B.3 F~om annotations to responses
In this section we will describe the relation between features in the annotated segment
and the kind of response the module is supposed to generate.
First we will look at the simplest cases: ill-formed input. These are simple because
in such cases the segment is not required to be a legal extension of the common context,
so we should not attempt to convert it to English. This means that we only have to
look at the annotations and formulate a response based on what we find there.
If the value of the error feature contains any of the following:
2We use the requirement that input utterances must be of one of a limited number of syntactic
categories to reduce spurious ambiguity. For instance, we do not allow the input to have the syntactic
category of a relative clause to avoid an extra interpretation of sentences such as that is on.








then the segment is not a legal extension. The responses for the error values that are
atomic will be standard canned phrases such as sorry, the syntactic construction yon
nsed is beyond my capabilities or you used too many nnmbers. The non-atomic error
values will allow the module to specify what went wrong in more detail, as in I do nat
know the following word(s): followed by the list of words inside the parse~ex-fail
term.
A more complex situation occurs when a tm(A,Role, (B:T1)~(C:T2)) expression oc-
curs in the value of the error feature. Such an error occurs when the user says for
instance
(368) Toggle the screen.
Since the CTT predicate toggle is only defined for things that can be toggled (in the
current domain objects of type bit), this leads to an error value:
(369) tm(A,theme,(B:screen)~(C:bit))
An appropriate response to this is
(370) A screen cannot be tog.gled.
To form such a reply we use the information about the role of the argument of the
verb that produced the incompatible type. In the case of toggle, it is the theme role,
and that leads to the use of a passive sentence in the reply.
The presence of unknown restrictions in the input is indicated by a
unknownsestriction(Param,List) value in the error feature. The system will
reply with there is no ... followed by the words in List.
Yes~no questions come in two varieties: direct yes~no questions such as
(371) Is the pattern on the screen a transmission Pattern?
and indirect yes~no questions:
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(a) Can I ask whether the pattern on the screen
is a transmission pattern?
(372) (b) Do you know whether the pattern on the screen
is a transmission pattern?
(c) Do you know whether the gun emits a bundle?
The direct questions are answered by a simple yes or no. For the indirect question
(a), the answer is either
(373) Sv~re, the answer is yes.
or
(374) Sure, the answer is no.
From the (b) and (c) sentences we can see that we have to distinguish between ques-
tions containing auxiliary verbs and those that do not. An appropriate answer to (b)
is either Yes, it is, No, it isn't or No, I don't. For (c) it is Yes, it does, No, it doesn't
or No, I don't.
A clarification question is indicated by a cl~i annotation. The value of the annota-
tion is a segment (such as [X:lens]). This segment is converted into a string. The
result of that is prepended with which and do you mean? is appended. In our exam-
ple that leads to which lens do you mean?. The conversion of segments to strings is
discussed in the next section.
B.4 F~om segments to strings
The first step in converting a segment to a string is making it into a single E-statement
and adding the information that the current position is a positive one. This polarity
information keeps track of the number of negations a term is embedded in. We will
call this information the polarity flag.
Furthermore, a list is created to store information about objects the algorithm
encounters as it recursively traverses the statement. This list is called the object li.st.
The conversion algorithm has access to a generation lexicon. This lexicon provides
a number of predicates:
~ noquant(tT:Type,-O:Term)
Succeeds if T is a type that does not have to be uttered if quantified over. O
contains the object to be unified with the quantified variable. This is usually
an object that can be referred to using a definite.
Example: noquant(microscope,ml) .
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. gl(?O:Term,-S:String,-R:y~n)
g1~2 S describes object 0 uniquely in the domain. R indicates whether a second
use of the object can be realized by a referential expression. After this predicate
is used, the type of 0 is instantiated.
Examples: gl(cl--:lens,"the cl lens",y).
gl(lowtreshold:excit,
"the low magnification treshold",n).
. iv(tT:Prop,-S:String,-V:Term,tD:Direction)
The proposition type T is translated as the intransitive verb phrase in S.
D is pos or neg, depending on whether we want to use T itself or its negation.





Proposition T is translated as the transitive verb and adverbial phrase in StS2.
D is pos or neg, depending on whether we want to use T itself or its negation.
V is the subject of the verb,W the object. These need to be translated recursively.
The final string will be VtSfOtS2.
Example: tv(contain-S-O,"contains","",S,O,pos).
~ tl(tT:Type,-S:String)
S is the linguistic realization of the type T.
Example: tl(element,"optical element").
. fn(tT:Term,-S:String,-V:Term))
S is the linguistic realization of the function T applied to argument V.
Example: fn(ang-X, "the angle of" ,X) .
. fn2(fT:Term,-S1:String,-S2:String,-V1:Term,-V2:Term)
S1 and S2 are the discontinuous realization of the function T applied to argu-
ments V1 and V2.
The final string will be S1fV1tS2fV2.
Example:fn2(slice-B-P,"the intersection of","with",B,P).
The algorithm uses these predicates both to determine what kind of syntactic category
should be assigned to the translation of the term, and what the string is that realizes
it.
If the segment represents an object, there are three possibilities:
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. the inhabitant represents an undetermined object, such as X:lens.
. the inhabitant represents a specific object, such as ml :microscope.
. the inhabitant represents an object constructed out of a function function ap-
plied to some argument, such as
rad-(c2-aperture-(tb-m1)):size
In the implementation the difference between the first case and the other two can be
seen by the fact that the inhabitant is a PRO[.oc variable. In such a case the type is
converted by means of the tl predicate and an indefinite determiner is added. This
leads to t,he string a lens.
In the second case, the inhabitant can be unified with one of the clauses of the gl
predicate. This predicate takes advantage of the fact that all objects in the electron
microscope domain have a unique name which can be used to refer to them in all
situations. This is one of the features that rnakes this generation algorithm unsuited
for a really generic interface. The gl predicate returns a string with a full noun phrase
such as the microscope.
In the third case the inhabitant matches one of the clauses of either the fn or
fn2 predicate. The predicate returns the part of he inhabitant that represents the
argument(s) of t,he function and which have to be recursively converted. In our
example this leads to t.he radi-as of the c2 apertv,re.
Now the interesting cases are those in which such noun phrases appear as arguments
to a verb. For instance if we have a statement like pg:activated-ml. In such a
case the type of the statement matches one of the clauses of the iv predicate. This
predicate tells us that the realization is an intransitivc verb phrase is on, and that
the subject is realized by ml which, as we saw, is converted to the microscope, so the
whole statement leads to the microscope is on. The occurrence of ml is added to the
object list by means of an entry
(375) ml:microscope-""-1-pos
The use of this list is explained below.
In case the argument to a verb is an undetermined object, we have a radically different
situation. In such cases, the object will have been introduced by a E-operator or a II-
operator. For instance pr:sigma(X:pattern,visible-X). When encountering this
E-operator, the algorithm converts the first argument to an indefinite: a pattern arrd
stores the following information in the object list:
(376) X:pattern-"a pattern"-o-pos
This indicates that the variable X when occurring as an argument to a predicate,
should be realized as a pattern. The number 0 indiciates that sofar no occurrence of
X has been realized. The pos indicates that X was introduced in a positive position
(not under negation).
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The algorithm then continues with pr:visible-X, that is, the whole sigma intro-
duction is ignored. visible is realized as the verb phrase is visible. Its subject is
to be realized by converting the variable X. The algorithm then checks the object list
and finds that X has the string a pattern as realization. It also checks whether there
are any other entries in the object list that have type pattern and a counter value
higher than 0. If not, the entry for X is changed to
(377) X:pattern-"a pattern"-1-pos
and the final string becomes a pattern is visible.
For II-types, something similar happens. Only instead of storing an indefinite
noun phrase in the object list, a noun phrase with every is added.
For example, pr:pi(X:pattern,visible-X) leads to a list entry
(378) X:pattern-"every pattern"-0-pos
and so the final string for the whole statement will become every Pattern is vi.sible.
Of course these are just the basic cases. There are several situations in which some-
thing more must be done. One of those is when a negation is found. This is discussed
in the next section.
B.5 Negation
If a negation is present in the statement, this influences the realization of noun phrases.
One of the factors that determine how it affects the noun phrases is the exact position




If the (a) statement is converted, the algorithm first encounters the X: pattern intro-
duction. This leads to the object list entry:
(380) X:pattern-"every pattern"-0-pos
The algorithm then encounters not. This leads to a reversal of the polarity flag. Tlte
algorithm goes on with pr:visible-X. Even though the polarity flag is now negative,
it still uses the positive variant of the intransitive verb realization: is visible. Next,
the algorithm tries to find a string to realize the subject X that was introduced as
a universal. It finds X-"every pattern"-0-pos and negates that by changing every
into no. This leads to the final string no pattern is visible.
The (b) sentence in (379) leads to a slightly different situation. Since the not is found
first, the algorithm encounters X: pattern when the polarity flag is negative. This
means
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(381) X:pattern-"every pattern"-0-neg
is added to the object list. Again the positive version of the verb realization is chosen.
Next the algorithm looks for X in the object list and negates that. However, since
this time it is introduced in a negative position, the negation is done by prepending
not to the subject string. Thus we end up with not every pattern is visible.
Further rules for negation determine how to realize other configurations:
. when the subject is introduced by a E-operator in positive position, the realiza-
tion becomes A(n) ... is ~cot ...
. when the subject is introduced by a E-operator in negative position, the real-
ization becomes No . . . is . . .
. in case of a transitive verb, even more configurations are possible. Similar rules
determine how to cope with each of these.
B.6 Intra-sentential references
Intrasentential reference should be created when an ob,ject occurs in multiple positions
in a statement. To recognize this, we make use of a counting mechanism in the object
list. As we have seen, when a variable is encountered by the algorithm, it checks the
object list, uses the string, and increases the counter. However, this string is only
used as such if the counter is currently 0, that is, when the object is first used.
When an object is used for the second time, a special predicate determines how
to realize it by looking at other entries in the object list:
. if the object list contains just one entry with cotint value higher than 0, use it.
. if the object list contains several entries with count value higher than 0, but all
with different types, use that together with the string that is given by the tl
predicate for the type.
. if the object has the same type as precisely one other entry in the object list,
use for~rcer or latter.
Forinstance,thestatementpr:sigma(X:gun, sigma(pl:of-mi-X, sigma(Y:bundle,
emit-X-Y) ) is converted as follows:
. X: gun leads to X: gun-"a gun"-0-pos on the object list.
. The next statement introduced by a E has a propositional type. This tneans it is
converted separately. Inside it, X occurs, so that means X: gun-"a gun"-0-pos
is replaced by X:gun-"a gun"-1-pos and the realization of the has predicate
becomes the microscope has a gun. Note that when ml is converted, that also
leads to an entry on the object list: ml:microscope-""-1-pos.
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. the algorit.hm next encounters Y: bundle with a E. So that is added to the
object list as Y: bundle-"a bundle"-0-pos.
. emit ]eads to a transitive verb emits and requires recursive conversion of its
arguments X and Y. Now when the algorithm checks the object list, it finds that
X has a count higher than 0. So the special `reference' predicate is called which
finds that there are two objects that have count values over 0, namely X:gun
and mi:microscope. Since the types of those objects are different, the second
realization of X becomes that gun. The object position is filled by a bundle since
this is the first time Y is used. The complete string thus becomes that gun emits
a bnnrlle.
. Finally, the two clauses coming from the E-type where the type of the introduced
object is a proposition are combined using the word and. This leads to the
output string the microsco,ve has a gu.n and that gnn emits a bundle.
B.7 Complex sentences
VVhen the algorithm encounters several II-introductions in a row, a number of intc~r-
esting things can happen.
Suppose the first II introduces an object. As usual, this will lead to an every entry for
the object on the object list. However, when the algorithm next encounters a II-type
where the introduced object has a propositional type, it will create an if. .. then-
sentence. To do this, it has to change the entry for the already introduced objects:
instead of universal quantification, these should now get existential quantification.
The propositional type is then converted, and the result is used prepended with if.
Next, the rest of the statement is converted and prepended with then. The two parts
are then appended to a single if. .. then sentence, separated by a comma. Finally, a
special check is done for occurrence of ", then if". This is replaced by "and".





The first II introduces an object of type microscope. Since this type is listen in the
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The type in-ml-imag~node is a propositional type, so the algorithm has to construct
an if. .. then sentence. The type itself is realized as the microscope is in imaying mode,
and the algorithm continues with the rest of the statement.
It then encounters another II, this time introducing something of type event. This
too is listed in the noquant predicate, so we continue with
(384) magdn:pi(P:turndown-(magni-m1)-e,
decr-magnification-qmm-(curmag-ml)-e)
Another II-type is encountered, and again the introduced object has a propositional
type. Its realization is the mag~aification dial is turned down. The algorithm finally
encounters the last statement:
(385) magdn:decr-magnification-qmm-(curmag-mi)-e
And this is realized as the magnification decreases.
Now all that remains is to combine the strings that have been created. We have two
if. .. then constructions, and the combination thus becomes:
(386) if the microscope is in imaging mode, then if the magnification dial is tzirned
down, then the magnification decreases
The final check for occurrences of ", then if" leads to one substitution, and the
algorithm's output becomes:
(387) if the microscope is in imaging mode and the magnification dial is turned down,
then the magnifica.tion decreases
B.8 Concluding remarks
Of course, this algorithm cannot handle all possible annotated segments, since it is
possible to formulate propositions in CTT that simply cannot be said in Errglish, be-
cause for instance we have many objects that are used several times, and the anaphoric
system in natural language is not capable of specifying that many links in an unam-
biguous way. As a catch-all the module therefore uses a default clause which will
print the string let me pv.t it this way: followed by the segment itself.
The final operation performed by the module is the addition of punctuation, and
changing the very first character of the output to uppercase.
We conclude with a sample of the kind of sentences generated by the module:
~ muax:pi(M:microscope, pi(q:strong-(tb-M),
pi (R: on- (mini-M) , in-M-micr~ode) )
If the objective is strongly excited and the mini condenser is on, then the mi-
croscope is in m~a (microprobe illumination) mode.
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. w:pi(A:axobj,not-sigma(E:event,
incr-height-qh-(h-(p-of-A))-E))
The height of the Plane of everything along the vertical a.~is of the ~rcicroscope
doesn't increase.
. x:pi(A:lens,pi(B:activated-A,sigma(Y:bundle,enters-Y-A)))
A part of the bnndle enters every lens that is on.
. e:pi(P: ~ ,pi(Q:quant-P, pi(O:P, pi(E:event,
pi(R:incr-P-Q-O-E,not-(decr-P-Q-O-E))))))
Nothing that increases decreases.
Appendix C
An introduction to electron
microscopes
Although the DF.NK project aims at developing a generic interface, a specific appli-
cation domain has been chosen for the development and testing of the prototype, and
to show that the system is actually capable of supporting a real-world rather than
toy domain.
The domain chosen is a simulation of a Philips transmission electron microscope.
The cooperative assistant in the DENK system takes the role of an expert on the
domain and can help a user gain knowledge and understanding of these kinds of
microscopes.
Because some sections in this thesis deal with specific details of the implementa-
tion and some of these details can only be fully understood in the light of specific
features of this domain, we will give a brief introduction to these microscopes and
their representation within the DENK system.
An electron microscope consists of three main components:
1. an electron optical column
2. a vacuum system
3. the necessary electronics
The column comprises the same elements as one would find in a light microscope.
There are, however, two important differences:
. The light source in the electron microscope is an electron gun which is built into
the column. Since electrons are invisible they are projected onto a fluorescent
screen which makes it possible to observe the image through windows in the
projection chamber.
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. Electromagnetic lenses are variable. They consist of electromagnetic coils. By
varying the current through the lens coil, the focal length (which determines
the magnification) can be varied. In a light microscope a variation of the mag-
nification is obtained by using different lenses or lens combinations or using a
mechanically adjustable zoom lens.
For the DEtvK prototype, the microscope is modelled as much as possible as a tradi-
tional light microscope, using linear models for lenses, the spaces between the lenses,
etc.
Six basic types of components are distinguished:
1. the electron gun, or filament, that functions as the source of the electron beam,
2. the variable lenses, that control the electron beam,
3. the vacuum chambers, where electrons can travel without disturbance,
4. the apertures that cut off specific parts of the electron beam,
5. the specimen,
6. the fluorescent screen.
With respect to the optical aspects of image formation in the electron microscope we
can distinguish two basic subsystems, much like a slide projector: the illumination
system which illuminates a specific area on the specimen, and the projector systena
which projects some illuminated plane onto the fluorescent screen.
The electron microscope knows two basic states: imaging mode and difJ`raction mode.
In imaging mode, the projector system is directed at the specimen itself so that
an (enlarged) image of the specimen is projected onto the fluorescent screen. In
diffraction mode, a diffraction pattern of the specimen is projected onto the screen.
This pattern provides information about, for ínstance, the structure of the specimen.
Furthermore, the illumination system can also be in either of two modes: low
magnification mode (LM) and high magnification mode (HM). Which of these modes
the electron microscope is in mainly depends on the state of a lens called the objective
lens. This lens can be either weakly or strongly excited.
Two types of high magnification illumination modes can be distinguished. These
cíepend on the excitation of the so-called mini-condensor lens. If this lens is on, the
electron microscope is in microprobe mode (~,P), if it is off, the electron rnicroscope
is in nanoprobe (nP) illumination mode.
Depending on the excitation of the objective lens (weak or strong), the image or
diffraction pattern of the specimen is formed at different planes. The projector has
to be directed at one of these planes, also depending on what kind of basic state
(imaging or diffraction) the electron microscope is in.
The apertures in the EM are used to clip the pattern present at a certain plane.











Figure C.1: Schematic view of an electron microscope
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EM is in. It can either select an area to be displayed or affect the contrast of the
image displayed.
All of the above facts about electron microscopes are formalized in the DE1vK system,
and the simulation contains all these elements and behaves according to this model.
Furthermore the cooperative assistant is able to reason about the different modes,
components and images and thus can help users understand how an EM works and
how the different components can be used to generate the desired kind of image.
Summary
Context-driven natural language interpretation
Natural language utterances cannot be interpreted without taking into account the
context of the utterance. This means that if we want to design a computer system
for the interpretation of natural language, we have to make sure it has access to a
formalized representation of such a context. The specification and usage of such a
formal notion of context is the goal of this thesis.
Since it is far from clear what information needs to be in a context, we start by
looking at, and comparing, existing proposals for the representation and application
of context in Natural Language Processing. From these we derive an inventory of
contextual information types (chapter 2).
For the representation of the meaning of utterances we use Constructive Type
Theory (CTT). In this mathematical formalism, the well-formedness and provability
of a term depends on an ordered background set of other terms. This set is called
a CTT-context. Since terms can be interpreted as information, such a CTT-context
can be used to model the knowledge of an agent. Communication between agents
is then definable as the exchange of terms between their CTT-contexts. For this
to be possible, the exchanged terms must be well-formed in the CTT-contexts of
both agents. To ensure an agent sends only messages that the other will understand,
each agent also has a representation of those terms that are assumed to be shared
with the other agent. Moreover, if we assume that the agents communicate about
some domain which both can observe, we must also allow messages to pertain to
that domain. This means we have to model the knowledge of one agent to consist
of at least three components: a private CTT-context, a shared CTT-context, and an
observable domain.
A question that arises from this view on communication, is to what extent we
can use these CTT-contexts as the context of an utterance. Since we already have
an inventory of contextual information types, we can check that against the kind of
information present in the agent's knowledge. It is important to observe that this
can be done because we view interpretation relative to a particular agent, which
means that we only need to take into account that contextual information which the
agent has access to. This solves the problem that contexts in principle may not be
219
220 SU1l1ALARY
finitely describable. We conclude that we only need to add some minor components to
the CTT-contexts representation to get a usable context representation for utterance
interpretation. To specify in what way parts of inessages can depend on context, we
add annotations to the CTT representations of utterances, leading to the format of
annotated segments (chapter 3).
Of course, a representation of the context is only half the story. For automatic
interpretation we also need a representation of the utterance. Specifically, we want
to divide utterance processing into two steps: one where an utterance is syntactically
analyzed (parsing) without any reference to contextual information, and one in which
contextual information is applied to get to the intended meaning (interpretation). To
do this, we need an intermediate representation of the meaning of the utterance that
contains precisely that information which is available on the basis of the utterance
alone, but still allows several possible interpretations. There are several techniques
for creating such underspecified representations. We combine several of them in the
representation ]anguage we use, ULF. Moroever, to be able to incrementally make
CTT representations more specific, we also allow underspecification in the annotated
segment language (chapter 4).
Based on the context representation and the underspecified representation of ut-
terance meanings, we can also specify an algorithm for combining the context infor-
mation with the information from the utterance to get to a fully specified utterance
interpretation. It turns out that the well-formedness criteria for CTT segments al-
ready give us a handle on certain phenomena: they can be seen as variations on the
well-known selectional restrictions approach to disambiguation and can be used to
guide coercion. Moreover, the resolution of anaphoric material can be defined with
reference to the different CTT-contexts that make up the agent's information, leading
t,o efficient resolution strategies (chapter 5).
All these considerations finally lead to the specification of an algorithm for context-
driven natural language interpretation that has been implemented as part of the




Uitingen in natuurlijke taal kunnen niet worden geïnterpreteerd zonder naar de con-
text van de uiting te kijken. Dit betekent dat als we een computersysteem willen
ontwerpen voor de interpretatie van natuurlijke taal, we ervoor moeten zorgen dat
het systeem een formele representatie van zo'n context kan gebruiken. Het geven
van een formele beschrijving van context en het gebruik daarvan is het doel van dit
proefschrift.
Omdat het niet duidelijk is wat voor soort informatie een context moet bevat-
ten, beginnen we met het bekijken en vergelijken van bestaande voorstellen voor de
weergave en toepassing van context op het gebied van natuurlijke-taalverwerking. Op
grond hiervan kunnen we een inventarisatie maken van types van contextinformatie
(hoofdstuk 2).
Om de betekenis van uitingen weer te geven, gebruiken we Constructieve Type-
theorie (CTT). In dit mathematische formalisme hangt de welgevormdheid en be-
wijsbaarheid van termen af van een geordende achtergrondverzameling van andere
termen. Zo'n verzameling wordt een CTT-context genoemd. Omdat termen kunnen
worden geïnterpreteerd als informatie, kan zo'n CTT-context dienen als model van de
kennis van een agent. Communicatie tussen agenten kan dan worden gedefinieerd als
de uitwisseling van termen tussen hun CTT-contexten. Dit is alleen mogelijk als de
uitgewisselde termen welgevormd zijn ten opzichte varr de CTT-contexten van beide
agenten. Om er zeker van te zijn dat een agent alleen boodschappen zendt die de an-
der kan begrijpen, heeft elke agent tevens een represerrtatie van die terrnen waarvan
verondersteld wordt dat beide agenten ze kennen. Bovendien, als we ervan uitgaan
dat de agenten communiceren over een domein dat beiden kunnen observeren, moeten
we ook toestaan dat boodschappen betrekking hebben op dat domein. Dit betekent
dat de kennis van een agent uit tenminste drie componenten moet bestaan: een privé
CTT-context, een gedeelde CTT-context, en een observeerbaar domein.
Een vraag die voortkomt uit dit model van communicatie, is in hoeverre we deze
CTT-contexten kunnen gebruiken als de context van een uiting. Aangezien we al een
inventarisatie hebben van types van contextinformatie, kunnen we deze vergelijken
met de informatie die aanwezig is in de kennis van een agent. Omdat we interpretatie
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ten opzichte van een agent definiëren, hoeven we alleen maar die contextinformatie
in overweging te nemen waar een agent toegang toe heeft. Dit lost het probleem
van de zogenaamde `rijke' contexten op die niet uitputtend te beschrijven zijn. We
concluderen dat we slechts enkele kleine componenten hoeven toe te voegen aan de
CTT-contexten om een bruikbaar contextmodel te krijgen voor de interpretatie van
uitingen. Om aan te geven op welke manier onderdelen van uitingen van de context
afhankelijk zijn, voegen we annotaties toe aan onze CTT-modellering van uitingen.
Het resultaat noemen we geannoteerde segmenten (hoofdstuk 3).
Natuurlijk vormt een model van de context maar een kant van het probleem. Voor
de automatische interpretatie van een uiting hebben we ook een representatie van
de uiting zelf nodig. We verdelen de verwerking van uitingen in twee stappen: een
waar de uiting syntactisch wordt geanalyseerd (parsering) zonder enige verwijzing
naar contextinformatie, en een waar de contextinformatie wordt gebruikt om de be-
doelde betekenis te verkrijgen (interpretatie). Om dit te kunnen doen hebben we
een tussenliggende representatie nodig van de betekenis van een uiting die precies
die informatie bevat die bepaald kan worden op basis van alleen de uiting. Er zijn
meerdere technieken om zulke ondergespecificeerde representaties op te bouwen. Ver-
schillende daarvan combineren we in de representatietaal die wij gebruiken: ULF.
Bovendien staan we ook onderspecificatie in geannoteerde segmenten toe teneinde
CTT-representaties stap voor stap specifieker te kunnen maken (hoofdstuk 4).
Gegeven een contextrepresentatie en ondergespecificeerde representaties van de
betekenis van uitingen, kunnen we een algoritme beschrijven om de contextinfor-
matie met de informatie uit de uiting te combineren om een volledig gespecificeercle
uitingsinterpretatie te krijgen. Het blijkt dat de welgevormdheidseisen voor CTT-
segmenten kunnen worden gezien als variant van de bekende strategie van het gebruik
van selectierestricties voor het oplossen van ambiguïteiten, en ze kunnen worden ge-
bruikt om coërcie te sturen. Bovendien kan voor het vinden van referenten voor
anaforisch materiaal het onderscheid tussen de verschillende CTT-contexten gebruikt
worden. Dit leidt tot efficiënte oplossingsstrategieën (hoofdstuk 5).
A1 dit tlieoretische werk kan tenslotte gebruikt worclen voor het opstellen van een
algoritme voor contextgestuurde natuurlijke-taalinterpretatie, dat geïmplementeerd
is als onderdeel van een prototype van het DENKsysteem: een multi-modale gebruik-
ersinterface voor computersystemen (hoofdstuk 6).
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